



Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

## CZECHIA

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS  
3-4 OCTOBER 2025

ODIHR Election Assessment Mission  
Final Report



Warsaw  
1 July 2026

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**CZECHIA**  
**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS**  
**3-4 October 2025**

**ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report<sup>1</sup>**

**I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Following an invitation from the government of the Czech Republic and based on the recommendation of a Needs Assessment Mission, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Assessment Mission (EAM) for the 3 and 4 October parliamentary elections.

The parliamentary elections took place against the backdrop of domestic policy challenges, including an economic slowdown driven by inflation and rising energy prices. The parties of the ruling coalition of the SPOLU and the Mayors and Independents (STAN) entered the elections amid financial and corruption-related controversies. The political landscape was polarized, primarily around Czechia's membership in the EU and NATO, the implementation of EU policies, and continued aid and military support for Ukraine. Some political parties resorted to populist and extremist rhetoric, which influenced public discourse.

The electoral legal framework, which underwent substantial amendments in 2024 and 2025, is generally robust and conducive to the conduct of democratic elections. Several new provisions addressed previous ODIHR recommendations, including the establishment of a digital election information system, the removal of voting restrictions based on legal capacity, and the introduction of provisions for international election observation. However, the only new provisions applicable to the 2025 parliamentary elections were those regulating postal voting for citizens residing abroad and recognition of digital voter identification; the remainder is applicable only for the next elections. A number of longstanding ODIHR recommendations remain unaddressed, including those related to comprehensive campaign finance regulation, decriminalization of defamation, and the adoption of clear procedures for the accreditation of observers.

The 200 members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected under a proportional representation system in 14 multi-member electoral districts. The allocation of seats per district, based on the number of valid votes cast, does not ensure the equality of vote. There are no legislative measures aimed at promoting women's candidacy.

The elections were administered through a highly decentralized, four-tier system involving bodies at the national, regional, municipal, and precinct levels. The State Election Commission (SEC) is a permanent body composed of ten members representing different state institutions and chaired by the Ministry of Interior (MoI). While ODIHR EAM interlocutors expressed confidence in the capacity and professionalism of the election administration, its sessions are not public, contrary to the electoral good practice and detracting from transparency, and gender-disaggregated data of its composition is not publicly available.

Citizens aged 18 years or older on the second day of voting are eligible to vote. Citizens deprived of legal capacity, including persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities, are not allowed to vote, at odds with international standards. The 2025 parliamentary elections were held for the last time on the basis of decentralized passive voter registers maintained at the municipal level. A centralized

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<sup>1</sup> The English version of this report is the only official document. An unofficial translation is available in Czech.

digital election information system, including a unified register and online registration of candidates and members of Precinct Election Commissions (PECs), is to become operational in 2026.

Citizens with voting rights who reach the age of 21 no later than on the second election day, may be nominated as candidates by political parties, movements, or coalitions. Independent candidates are not permitted, contrary to OSCE commitments. A total of 26 contestants registered for elections, but only 18 submitted candidate lists in all 14 regions. The Pirate Party, the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), and Stačilo included candidates affiliated with other political parties on their lists, forming informal coalitions. This practice was unsuccessfully challenged in courts for circumvention of the applicable electoral threshold. Women constituted 31.3 per cent of registered candidates, but none of the key electoral contestants applied voluntary measures that would promote women's representation on their lists.

Candidates were able to campaign freely and presented a wide range of political platforms, focusing primarily on issues related to the economy, energy security and prices, and foreign policy. The campaign took place in a polarized environment and was characterized, at times, by divisive language and imagery, and this discourse contributed to instances of electoral violence, predominantly in the online sphere. The online campaign lacked an effective regulatory framework to ensure transparency and address disinformation and potential foreign interference. The Czech Telecommunication Office, appointed as the Digital Services Co-ordinator, lacks powers to act *ex officio*, secure evidence, appoint trusted flaggers, or mandate domestic experts to identify illegal content and notify platforms accordingly, and in the absence of implementing legislation, is unable to effectively follow up on those complaints. Disinformation narratives amplified the campaign messages of the Motorists for Themselves, SPD, and Stačilo.

Political parties are financed through a combination of public and private funding. Electoral contestants are required to open special election accounts. There is no requirement for interim campaign finance reporting, and the 90-day post-election deadline for the submission of financial reports limits effective public oversight. While the law permits third-party campaigning, it lacks clarity regarding which type of activities would require registration, resulting in a number of activist groups that actively campaigned for certain political platforms without registering as third parties. The campaign finance oversight body, the Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements, lacks sufficient human and financial resources to fully implement its mandate.

Media environment is diverse with a plurality of news sources. Public service media enjoy a high level of public trust, while the commercial media sector is characterized by the dominance of a few news media providers and ownership concentration. Recent legal amendments strengthened the financial independence of public broadcasters and partially addressed concerns regarding the politicization of their oversight bodies, although appointment procedures remain influenced by political parties. The Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting, responsible for enforcing requirements of objectivity and balance, did not publish the election campaign monitoring reports or take action on complaints prior to election day, limiting the transparency and timely effect of its oversight during the campaign. The election campaign coverage, dominated by a significant number of broadcast debates, provided voters with sufficient information to make a well-informed choice.

Election disputes related to candidate registration and voter registration may be brought to the regional administrative courts, while challenges to election results fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Administrative Court. Complaints alleging violations of constitutional rights or principles, including proportional representation, voting rights, legal certainty, and principles of fair electoral competition, may be brought before the Constitutional Court. The legislation does not establish a clear and timely mechanism for adjudicating campaign-related complaints prior to election days.

The 2024 amendments provide for international election observation, but do not include provisions for domestic observers, contrary to OSCE commitments. As these amendments were not applicable to the 2025 parliamentary elections, the ODIHR EAM operated in the absence of an explicit legal framework governing international observation and was required to obtain multiple *ad hoc* permissions from different state institutions to observe different stages of the electoral process. While no domestic groups sought accreditation as observers for these elections, many interlocutors considered party representation in election commissions a sufficient safeguard.

In line with ODIHR methodology, the Mission did not conduct a comprehensive observation of the election days proceedings, but visited a limited number of polling stations. The observed voting was generally orderly, and procedures were largely followed. For the first time, voters were able to use the mobile application *Doklady* for electronic identification at polling stations. However, technical failures of the application prevented some voters from being identified and from voting. Arrangements for voters with disabilities, including the use of mobile ballot boxes, did not ensure fully inclusive participation, and no provisions were made for unassisted voting by persons with visual impairments.

This report offers a number of recommendations to support efforts to bring elections in Czechia closer in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections it has committed to. Priority recommendations relate to reviewing aspects of the electoral system to strengthen equality of the vote, clarifying the legal framework governing electoral cooperation and coalition formation, addressing electoral violence and violence against women, strengthening campaign finance oversight, enhancing safeguards for media pluralism, and ensuring a legal framework for citizen and international election observation in line with OSCE commitments. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities in further improving the electoral process and to address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports.

## II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Following an invitation from the government of the Czech Republic to observe the 2025 parliamentary elections, and in accordance with its mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Assessment Mission (EAM) from 17 September to 8 October.<sup>2</sup> The ODIHR EAM was led by Corien Jonker and consisted of five experts drawn from five OSCE participating States, comprising four women and one man. The ODIHR EAM was based in Prague and made visits to Brno, Ústí nad Labem, and Hradec Králové.

The ODIHR EAM assessed compliance of the electoral process with OSCE commitments and other international obligations, and standards for democratic elections, and with national legislation. In line with ODIHR's methodology, the Mission did not observe the election days proceedings in a systematic or comprehensive manner, but visited a limited number of polling stations.

The ODIHR EAM wishes to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) for their co-operation and assistance. The ODIHR EAM also expresses its gratitude to representatives of other state and municipal institutions, the judiciary, election commissions, political parties, the media, civil society, academia, the resident diplomatic community, and other interlocutors for sharing their views.

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<sup>2</sup> See previous ODIHR election [reports](#) on Czechia.

### III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Czechia is a parliamentary republic with a bicameral parliament, composed of the Senate (upper chamber), with 81 senators directly elected for a six-year term, and the Chamber of Deputies (lower chamber) with 200 members (MPs) directly elected for a four-year term. The government, headed by the Prime Minister, is appointed by the President.<sup>3</sup>

Following the 2021 parliamentary elections, four political parties and alliances won seats in the Chamber of Deputies: ANO, SPOLU, the Pirates and Mayors (PirStan), and the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD).<sup>4</sup> The political alliance SPOLU, comprising the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Christian Democrats of KDU-ČSL, and the Tradition Responsibility Prosperity (TOP 09), formed a majority government in coalition with the PirStan alliance, comprising the Czech Pirate Party (Česká pirátská strana) and Mayors and Independents (STAN).<sup>5</sup> The ANO political party, which had led the previous minority government, became the opposition.

The 2025 parliamentary elections took place against the backdrop of domestic policy challenges, including an economic slowdown driven by inflation and rising energy prices. The parties of the ruling coalition entered the elections amid financial and corruption-related controversies widely discussed during the campaign and featured prominently in political debate.<sup>6</sup> The political landscape was polarized, primarily on foreign policy issues, with diverging political stances on Czechia's EU and NATO membership, implementation of EU policies, particularly in the areas of migration and climate policy, and continued aid and military support for Ukraine. Populist and extremist rhetoric, used by some political parties, heavily influenced the discourse.

Women remain underrepresented in public and political life. There were only 50 women MPs (25 per cent) in the outgoing parliament.<sup>7</sup> There are no legislative measures to support women's participation in politics, contrary to prior ODIHR recommendations.<sup>8</sup> Most political parties' representatives met by the ODIHR EAM were against legislative gender quotas, arguing that equality of opportunity should be the only guiding principle, and none applied voluntary measures aimed at promoting women's representation on candidate lists. A limited number of interlocutors expressed support for

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<sup>3</sup> The President, as head of state, is directly elected by popular vote for a five-year term.

<sup>4</sup> ANO won 72 seats, SPOLU - 71, Pirates and Mayors - 37, and SPD - 20 seats.

<sup>5</sup> The Pirate Party left the ruling coalition in October 2024.

<sup>6</sup> On 18 June 2025, the government narrowly survived a non-confidence vote as a result of the Ministry of Justice accepting a bitcoin donation of approximately EUR 38.5 million from a former convict, found guilty of embezzlement, drug trafficking and illegal possession of weapons. The donation came from assets that had been returned to the donor after his release from prison and was intended to finance projects within the justice sector. The transaction generated significant public and political scrutiny because the assets were suspected of being linked to proceeds from criminal activity.

<sup>7</sup> Women hold 17 out of 81 Senator positions (21 per cent). In the outgoing government, only 2 of 16 ministers were women. Among the judiciary, 4 of the 15 (27 per cent) judges of the Constitutional Court and 11 of the 42 judges (26 per cent) of the Supreme Administrative Court are women.

<sup>8</sup> The [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women \(CEDAW\) Committee General recommendation No. 25](#) states that the "adoption by States parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating *de facto* equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination". The last attempt to introduce gender quotas dates back to 2015, when the MoI, together with the Minister for Human Rights, proposed a draft law on minimum quotas for candidate lists in elections to the Chamber of Deputies and regional assemblies, but the legislative process was subsequently halted. In 2016, the [CEDAW Committee, in its sixth periodic review](#), recommended Czechia to "take effective measures, including temporary special measures" and "to amend its electoral law and implement the "zipper" system for election candidates". In its [seventh periodic review](#), CEDAW Committee again expressed concerns regarding the underrepresentation of women in political decision-making and discussed the possible introduction of legislative quotas; the Czech authorities informed the Committee that a proposal to introduce a 40 per cent quota for candidate lists had not been approved.

indirect measures to promote women's participation in public and political life, such as additional or dedicated public funding to political parties.<sup>9</sup>

*In line with international standards and OSCE commitments, authorities should consider introducing temporary special measures, such as legislative gender quotas and gender-targeted party funding, to enhance opportunities for the equal representation of women in elected bodies.*

Some women MPs did not seek re-election, citing the impossibility of combining the MP mandate with private life due to the exceptionally long parliamentary sessions.<sup>10</sup> According to some ODIHR EAM interlocutors, women MPs have been limiting their political activities for fear of becoming a target of hateful comments, harassing behaviour, or violence.<sup>11</sup> ODIHR EAM interlocutors were critical of the lack of political will for the implementation of the governmental Gender Equality Strategy for 2021-2030.<sup>12</sup> According to the Department of Gender Equality in the Office of the Government, its initiative of a gender audit of the parliament did not materialise due to the lack of political support for women's political participation. Of the main political parties, only the Green Party has provisions in its statute that promote gender equality among party leadership and congress delegates. No party has internal policies to promote women's membership.<sup>13</sup>

*Authorities should undertake a comprehensive assessment of the political environment to determine and consequently eliminate obstacles to women's participation in public and political life. Political parties could consider including in their statutes provisions that promote women's membership and participation, also in leadership positions.*

The number of women in the Chamber of Deputies increased to 67 (33 per cent) following the 2025 parliamentary elections, representing the highest number of women parliamentarians in the history of Czechia. However, only 2 out of 16 members of the coalition government formed by ANO with SPD and the Motorists for Themselves, which took office on 15 December 2025, are women: the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Regional Development.

#### IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The electoral legal framework is composed of the 1993 Constitution (amended in 2024), the 1993 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (amended in 2021), the 1995 Law on Parliamentary Elections (amended in 2024), the 2002 Administrative Procedure Code, and the 2009 Criminal Code. The Ministry of the Interior (MoI) can also issue ordinances that provide further detail to the electoral

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<sup>9</sup> According to the Gender Equality Strategy for 2021-2030, 69 per cent of the Czechs support legislative measures to achieve balanced gender representation in politics, while 24 per cent expressed opposition.

<sup>10</sup> A [‘Modern Parliament’](#) initiative, led by a number of women parliamentarians, suggested limiting the length of MPs' interventions and of parliamentary sessions

<sup>11</sup> See: Forum 50% April 2025 report [Czech Women MPs and Gender-based Violence](#).

<sup>12</sup> See [Gender Equality Strategy for 2021-2030](#).

<sup>13</sup> Article 7(c) of the [CEDAW](#) prescribes that states shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country. [2016 PACE Resolution “Assessing the impact of measures to improve women's political representation”](#) lists among the political factors determining women's participation in public life *inter alia*: the electoral system, political parties and their statutes, candidate selection criteria, positive measures such as quotas, whether legal or voluntary as well as measures to balance work and family life.

legal framework. Czechia is a party to major international instruments related to democratic elections.<sup>14</sup>

The legal framework, which underwent substantial reforms in 2024 and 2025, is robust and generally conducive to the conduct of democratic elections. The provisions applicable to the administration of all electoral processes were harmonized into a single Act on Election Administration; similarly, the provisions related to campaigning, campaign financing, and third-party campaigning were included in the new Act on Campaigns, Transparency, and Targeting of Political Advertisement, adopted in 2025.<sup>15</sup> Some of the amendments address previous ODIHR recommendations, such as the establishment of a digital election information system to manage a newly created unified voter register, and the removal of voting restrictions based on legal capacity. The introduction of provisions allowing for international observers at polling stations during voting and counting of votes partially implemented the longstanding ODIHR recommendation (See *Election Observation*). At the same time, a number of ODIHR recommendations remain unaddressed, including those calling for more comprehensive campaign finance regulations, the decriminalization of defamation, and the adoption of clear procedures for the accreditation of observers.

Despite the comprehensive electoral reform following a consultative process, the majority of provisions contained in the new legislative acts entered into force only after the 2025 parliamentary elections.<sup>16</sup> The only new provisions applicable for the 2025 parliamentary elections were related to postal voting for citizens residing abroad and recognition of digital voter identification. Several political parties regarded the introduction of postal voting as politically motivated, based on a perception that the diaspora favours the incumbent parties, and opponents of the amendment also raised concerns about the secrecy of postal voting.<sup>17</sup> (see *Voter Registration*). The MoI issued specific ordinances relating to the implementation of the amendments pertinent to the 2025 parliamentary elections in a timely manner.<sup>18</sup>

In May 2025, the Criminal Code was amended to criminalize the establishment, support, or promotion of Nazi, communist, or other movements that demonstrably aim to suppress human rights and freedoms or incite hatred based on race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or social class.<sup>19</sup> Some of the ODIHR EAM interlocutors raised concerns that this may lead to the criminalization of some political ideologies, including communism.

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<sup>14</sup> Including the [1950 European Convention on Human Rights \(ECHR\)](#), [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights \(ICCPR\)](#), [1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination \(CERD\)](#), [1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women \(CEDAW\)](#), [1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families](#), [1995 Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities](#), [2003 UN Convention against Corruption](#), and [2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities \(CRPD\)](#). Czechia signed the [2011 Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence](#) in 2016 but has not ratified it as of June 2025; in January 2024, the Czech Senate rejected ratification. Czechia is also a member of the [Council of Europe's Venice Commission](#) and the [Group of States against Corruption \(GRECO\)](#).

<sup>15</sup> Political party funding is regulated by the Act on the Association in Political Parties and Political Movements.

<sup>16</sup> Most of the provisions of the Act on Campaigns, Transparency and Political Advertisement Targeting entered into force on 1 January 2026, but the provisions related to transparency and targeting of political advertising, which transposed to the Czech legislation the EU Regulation [2024/900](#), entered into force on 10 October 2025.

<sup>17</sup> In 2021 parliamentary elections SPOLU received 34.26 per cent of votes cast abroad compared with 4.99 per cent cast for ANO; in 2025 parliamentary elections, SPOLU's share increased to 39.26 per cent of votes from citizens residing abroad, while ANO received 3.95 per cent.

<sup>18</sup> See the [MoI Decree from 11 April 2025](#) on amending certain decrees implementing electoral laws.

<sup>19</sup> Such offences are punishable by a penalty of up to five years' imprisonment.

## V. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The 200 Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected for a four-year term through a proportional representation system in 14 multi-member electoral districts corresponding to the 14 administrative regions. Voters may mark up to four preferential votes for candidates on the chosen party list, and any candidate who receives over five per cent of the preferential votes cast for that party list in the district is moved to the top of the list; if multiple candidates cross the threshold, they are ranked by the number of preferential votes received.

Political parties and movements must surpass a 5 per cent nationwide threshold, two-party alliances 8 per cent, and coalitions of 3 or more parties 11 per cent to be assigned seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The number of seats for each constituency is determined by the proportion of the number of valid votes cast in the constituency against the total number of valid votes cast countrywide. The electoral districts vary substantially in terms of the number of votes and, consequently, the number of allocated seats.<sup>20</sup> The calculation of the so-called republican mandate number is done for every election, which means that some regions may lose and others gain seats. Moreover, the number of votes required to win a seat in some constituencies departs from the national average beyond what is considered acceptable in electoral good practice.<sup>21</sup>

*To ensure equality of vote and avoid a high number of wasted votes, the formula for seat distribution should be reviewed to address the disproportion in the ratio of voters to parliamentary mandates.*

The allocation of mandates among the contestants that passed the electoral thresholds is based on the number of votes received by each contestant in a given constituency in relation to the total number of valid votes cast in that constituency. Mandates not allocated in the first round are then assigned based on the remaining votes obtained by each party at the national level and distributed to the constituency where the party had the highest remainders of votes. This system may result in regional inconsistencies between the number of received votes and the number of seats won; for instance, in the Liberec region, a party that obtained more votes got fewer seats than another that received fewer votes.<sup>22</sup>

## VI. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

The elections are administered through a highly decentralized, four-tier system involving multiple bodies at the national, regional, municipal, and precinct levels. The State Election Commission (SEC) is a permanent body composed of ten members representing the ministries with responsibilities in the electoral process, CZSO and the Office of the President of the Republic. The SEC, chaired by the MoI, is responsible for co-ordinating the conduct of elections and for announcing and publishing the final results. Three of the ten SEC members are women. SEC meetings are not public, contrary to

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<sup>20</sup> The number of seats allocated per region ranges from 26 seats in the Central Bohemia Region to 4 seats in the Karlovy Vary region.

<sup>21</sup> For example, in Liberec a successful candidate needed to win 37 per cent of the votes more than the average, in Karlovy Vary an additional 21 per cent of votes were needed. Moreover, it was [calculated](#) that in the Pilsen region, 25,249 votes were enough to elect a deputy, whereas in Liberec - 38,355 votes. Paragraph I.2.2. of the the Council of Europe's Venice Commission [Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters](#) (Code of Good Practice) recommends that the "seats must be evenly distributed between the constituencies", while "[t]he permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10%, and should certainly not exceed 15% except in special circumstances".

<sup>22</sup> ANO with 34.40 per cent of votes won three seats in Liberec, SPOLU, with 18.06 per cent of votes – one seat, whereas STAN – with 16.34 per cent of votes – won two seats.

international standards.<sup>23</sup> At the decentralized level, there are 14 regional offices, 6,258 municipal offices, 142 municipal district offices; at the lowest level of election administration for these elections, 14,819 Precinct Election Commissions (PEC) were established.

*To ensure full transparency of its decision-making, election administration should hold public sessions, and publish the draft agendas and minutes of relevant sessions in a timely manner.*

The MoI is the main state institution responsible for election administration, including overall coordination of the electoral process, consolidation of candidate lists, distribution of data to municipalities for the preparation of voter lists, as well as the publication of a detailed election calendar and information for election officials, voters, and prospective candidates. Apart from the MoI, the CZSO and the MFA are instrumental in the election administration process. The CZSO verifies candidate lists submitted to the regional offices for possible duplicate registrations, prepares the system for the consolidation of results, and calculates and publishes the allocation of seats per region, as well as results by polling station, municipality, and region. For the tabulation of results, the CZSO operated a network of 507 data collection points.<sup>24</sup> The MFA manages voting abroad in 108 consular premises. It maintains a special voter register, receives requests for postal voting, and dispatches postal voting kits. The stakeholders expressed general trust in the impartiality and credibility of the state institutions involved in the administration of the electoral process.

The regional offices are responsible for registering candidate lists within their respective administrative units, requesting the printing of ballots and envelopes, providing logistical support to the CZSO, and operational support to municipal offices.<sup>25</sup> The 6,258 municipal offices are responsible for deciding the number of PECs, nominating and training PEC members, requesting and receiving ballots and envelopes, and mailing ballots to voters together with information leaflets. Municipal offices are required to send ballots to the voters no later than three days before election day. In line with the law, larger municipalities established municipal district offices, to which they delegated some of the election-related responsibilities; 142 municipal district offices were functioning for these elections.

The election administration established 14,819 PECs, including 108 abroad. The MoI recommends that a PEC should have approximately 1,000 registered voters. Each municipality is responsible for determining the number of PECs and amending it if the number of registered voters increases or decreases by more than one-third. A PEC needs to be composed of at least 5 members, or 4 members in PECs with fewer than 300 registered voters. Each political party, movement, or coalition contesting the elections in a particular municipality may nominate one member and one substitute to each PEC. If there is not a sufficient number of PEC members, the municipal office is responsible for recruiting volunteers. The election administration informed ODIHR EAM that political parties demonstrate little interest in nominating their members to the PECs in smaller localities. The CZSO provided training to PEC members on election days operations procedures, mandatory for the chairperson,

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<sup>23</sup> Paragraph 19 General Comment on Article 34 of the ICCPR provides that “States parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest. States parties should make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information”. Article 10(a) of the UNCAC states: “Adopting procedures or regulations allowing members of the general public to obtain, where appropriate, information on the organization, functioning and decision-making processes of its public administration and [...] on decisions and legal acts that concern members of the public”. Paragraph 68 of the [Code of Good Practice](#) provides that “[o]nly transparency, impartiality and independence from politically motivated manipulation will ensure proper administration of the election process”, whereas paragraph 81 recommends that “[t]he meetings of the central electoral commission should be open to everyone, including the media”.

<sup>24</sup> There were 506 data collection points to gather results from PECs and one at the MFA for votes from abroad.

<sup>25</sup> Printing of ballots and envelopes is outsourced to a private printing company; the MoI provides the Regional Offices with access to the printing house. The number of requested ballots equals the number of registered voters, who get ballots by mail, plus an additional 30 per cent that are delivered to the PECs.

vice-chairperson, and registrar.<sup>26</sup> In addition, the MoI opened a YouTube channel with training videos for PEC members.<sup>27</sup>

The law does not guarantee a gender-balanced composition of the election management bodies, and no gender-disaggregated data on staff engaged in the election administration is collected.<sup>28</sup> The MoI informed the ODIHR EAM that the establishment of a digital election information system, which centralizes the registration process of the PEC members, would allow for collecting gender-disaggregated data from the 2026 senate and municipal elections onwards.

*To facilitate the development of targeted strategies for enhancing women's participation, disaggregated data on gender representation in the election administration should be collected and published in a comprehensive manner.*

The MoI used its webpage to provide information about the electoral process. It also launched targeted information campaigns regarding new elements of the electoral process, such as the use of electronic identification and postal voting for out-of-country voters. Voter information was also provided in Czech Sign Language through dedicated videos and made accessible via a QR code printed on the official leaflet delivered to all voters along with their ballots. Civil society organizations ran voter mobilization campaigns, including initiatives promoting women and young candidates, and advocating for support for specific political platforms (*see Campaign Finance*).<sup>29</sup>

## VII. VOTER REGISTRATION

Citizens who are 18 years or older, including those who reach the age of 18 by the second day of voting, are eligible to vote. The 2024 amendments removed restrictions on the right to vote based on legal capacity, in line with previous ODIHR recommendations. However, this amendment enters into force only in 2026.

The voter registration is passive. Pursuant to the 2024 amendments, the voter register will be centralized as of 2026, in line with ODIHR recommendations.<sup>30</sup> The 2025 parliamentary elections were held on the basis of decentralized voter registers maintained at the municipal level. Municipalities could request the extracts from the civil register from the Digital Information Agency (DIA) via the Czech Filing Verification Information National Terminal (Czech POINT), to compare their data and eliminate possible discrepancies.<sup>31</sup> The voter lists for respective PECs were printed one day before the first day of voting to ensure the highest possible accuracy. Citizens could ask their

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<sup>26</sup> The registrar was always nominated by the municipality.

<sup>27</sup> See [Volby 2025](#). Positively, all training videos were subtitled, facilitating accessibility for persons with hearing impairments interested in serving as PEC members.

<sup>28</sup> See Article 48d of the [CEDAW General Recommendation No. 23](#), the States parties should provide “statistical data, disaggregated by sex, showing the percentage of women relative to men who enjoy those rights”. Paragraph 40.13 of the [1991 OSCE Moscow Document](#) commits participating States to “ensure the collection and analysis of data to assess adequately, monitor and improve the situation of women”.

<sup>29</sup> For instance, the [30 under 30 Bold News campaign](#) promoted young candidates, the [Circle a Woman](#) campaigned for choosing women candidates via the preferential voting.

<sup>30</sup> [Act No. 88/2024 Coll](#) mandates the MoI to establish the register.

<sup>31</sup> According to DIA, 3,947 municipalities submitted such requests by 30 September 2025. Others relied solely on the extracts from the Civil Registry and their monthly updates.

municipality to confirm whether they were registered, and if not, request their inclusion.<sup>32</sup> For these elections, 8,253,316 voters were registered.

Voters may apply to the electoral authorities to request registration in a special voter list and an absentee voting certificate (AVC), which allows for voting at any PEC in Czechia or abroad. The AVC could be requested via the “Citizens’ Portal” and “digital box” applications, managed by the DIA, until 26 September or in person at a municipal office until 1 October 2025. These certificates could be picked up at municipal offices or received by mail from 18 September onwards. According to representatives of the municipal offices met by ODIHR EAM, the overall number of requests has increased notably compared to past elections. Voters residing abroad interested in participating in the elections had to be registered in the special electoral register no later than 40 days before the elections, by 24 August 2025.<sup>33</sup> For these elections, 3,017 AVCs were issued for voters registered abroad. Detention centres, prisons, healthcare, and long-term residential care facilities compiled special voter lists based on individual requests submitted by voters.

*To increase accessibility of voting methods, measures to facilitate the registration and participation of citizens residing abroad, including outreach and other options, should be considered.*

Voters registered abroad were able to vote by post for the first time, pursuant to the provisions of the new Act on Election Administration. Requests for postal voting packages sent by mail or via the “data box” were accepted until 29 August 2025, while requests submitted in person at consular premises were accepted until 1 October.<sup>34</sup> In order to cast their vote, voters were required to print out a ballot from a dedicated MoI webpage, enclose it in an envelope, and send it together with a copy of an identification document to a consular representation responsible for their place of long-term residence.<sup>35</sup> The concerns about alleged vulnerability of postal voting to electoral fraud were raised by some opposition parties and amplified by disinformation campaigns, which adversely affected the trust in the integrity of the postal voting.<sup>36</sup> The final number of voters registered abroad for these elections was 37,654, of whom 10,918 requested to vote by mail. The introduction of postal voting contributed to the greater enfranchisement of Czech citizens abroad, as the number of registered out-of-country voters doubled compared to the 2021 elections.<sup>37</sup>

## VIII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

Candidates must be citizens of the Czech Republic who will reach the age of 21 no later than on the second election day, and whose voting rights are not restricted. They can be nominated by political parties, movements, or coalitions. Independent candidates are not allowed, at odds with OSCE

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<sup>32</sup> The MoI informed ODIHR EAM that due to provisions on personal data protection, voter lists are not public. If a voter was not on the voter list at the PEC of their place of residence on the election days, the PEC requested clarification from the municipal office, and in case of an established error, the person was allowed to vote, and their name was recorded in the PEC protocols.

<sup>33</sup> According to the [Code of Good Practice](#), paragraph I 1.2.ii the electoral registers must be updated at least once a year.

<sup>34</sup> A postal voting package included: an identification card, an official envelope, a delivery envelope and information on the voting method. The “data box” (*datová schránka*) is a secure government-operated electronic mailbox used for official communication with public authorities.

<sup>35</sup> A voter who sent the postal vote kit (ballot, envelope, certificate) by mail to the consulate, could still change the vote if coming in person to a consular representation on 3 or 4 October.

<sup>36</sup> The MFA provided voter information on postal voting through its website and social media (*Facebook, YouTube, X, and Instagram*) and organized two global conferences with Czech diaspora representatives. Nonetheless, according to the poll conducted by [Central European Digital Media Advisory](#), 48 per cent of voters were concerned about potential fraud and manipulation in connection with postal voting.

<sup>37</sup> In 2021, 18,808 voters registered to vote abroad.

commitments.<sup>38</sup> There were 25 political parties and movements and one coalition which registered their candidate lists at the Regional Offices by 29 July 2025. Only 18 electoral contestants registered their lists of candidates in all 14 regions. The majority of political parties did not perceive the registration fee of CZK 19,000 per list as an obstacle to candidacy.<sup>39</sup>

*To further promote pluralism in candidate registration, the law should be amended to allow for citizens to stand independently in line with OSCE commitments.*

A coalition candidate list is considered to be one that has a specific name and is formally recognized as a coalition by candidates of all political parties and political movements running on its list. Coalitions must be composed of the same political parties or political movements in all electoral regions. In these elections, a number of political entities decided to run on a single candidate list registered under one political party, in order to avoid the higher thresholds applicable for coalitions to qualify for seat allocation.<sup>40</sup> This practice was challenged for circumvention of legal provisions before the Constitutional Court, which ruled that only formally declared coalitions have to be held to the higher threshold. A number of ODIHR EAM interlocutors pointed to a significant disparity between the statutory and effective thresholds in the current design of the electoral system. In smaller electoral districts, the limited number of seats results in a *de facto* electoral threshold that is substantially higher than stipulated by law.<sup>41</sup>

*Legal framework should be clarified to define permissible forms of electoral co-operation and coalition formation to ensure legal certainty and consistency.*

A candidate may stand on one list only. Upon receipt of the candidate lists, the regional offices verified that all candidates complied with the legal requirements and subsequently forwarded the lists to the CZSO for cross-checking to verify that no candidate was registered in more than one region.<sup>42</sup> A total of 4,466 candidates were registered for these elections, of whom 1,398 were women (31.3 per cent). Among the main electoral contestants, the highest proportion of women candidates was registered on the lists of the Pirate Party (38.5 per cent), while the lowest was on the lists of the Motorists for Themselves (15.6 per cent). Women led 69 of the total 287 registered candidates lists (24 per cent). The candidate registration process was completed within the legal deadlines, and no significant concerns regarding its implementation were raised with the ODIHR EAM.

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<sup>38</sup> Paragraph 7.5 of [1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document](#) commits participating States to “respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination”.

<sup>39</sup> Regional Office in Hradec Králové informed the ODIHR EAM of a [political satire project](#) that withdrew from the registration process due to the inability to pay the deposit. CZK 1 is equivalent to approximately EUR 0.041.

<sup>40</sup> Each political party and political movement can be a member of only one coalition and can submit only one candidate list in each electoral district. SPOLU was the only official coalition, composed of the ODS, KDU-ČSL, and TOP 09. The Pirate Party, SPD, and Stačilo registered candidate lists that included candidates affiliated with other political parties, effectively forming informal coalitions. The Pirate Party included on their lists representatives of the Greens, the SPD lists encompassed representatives of the Tricolour Citizens’ Movement, Svobodní – Party of Free Citizens, and the Law Respect Expertise – PRO, the Stačilo incorporated on their lists the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), Social Democracy (SOCDEM) as well as a number of smaller parties and individual candidates.

<sup>41</sup> In the 2025 parliamentary elections, in the smallest region, Karlovy Vary, the seats were allocated to only two of the six electoral contestants that passed the threshold. ANO with 42.49 per cent of votes got three seats and SPOLU with 15.40 per cent of votes got one seat. STAN, SPD, the Motorists for Themselves, and the Pirate Party, which also passed the threshold, did not win any seat in the region.

<sup>42</sup> CZSO found 11 possible duplicates, on the basis of verification of the first name, last name and age. Finally, four candidates were rejected.

## IX. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

The campaign can be undertaken by the registered contestants, and individuals and legal persons can campaign for or against an electoral contestant if registered as third parties. Municipalities may offer free-of-charge spaces for display of the campaign materials no later than 16 days prior to election days. All campaign materials must bear a disclaimer identifying the contestant, candidate, or third-party that commissioned and financed them. The legal framework applicable to the 2025 parliamentary elections did not include explicit provisions prohibiting the misuse of administrative resources, contrary to ODIHR recommendations.<sup>43</sup> The legislation does not establish a clear and timely mechanism for campaign-related complaints.<sup>44</sup>

The official campaign period started on the day the elections were called and continued until the announcement of the final results.<sup>45</sup> Given the length of the campaign period, the campaign activity fluctuated, gaining momentum during the final weeks preceding election days. The 26 registered electoral contestants and individual candidates campaigned freely, presenting a wide range of political platforms. Special focus was given to issues related to the economy, energy security, and consumer prices. A strong emphasis on foreign policy issues, migration and border control, support for Ukraine, and relations with the EU and NATO, was a distinctive feature of the campaign. The contestants engaged in outdoor campaigning, distributed leaflets and newsletters, and purchased online advertisements, including on social networks.

The campaign took place in a polarized environment and was characterized, at times, by divisive language and imagery. A number of political parties campaigned on scepticism towards Czechia's membership in the EU and NATO, as well as criticism of EU migration and environmental policies. The SPD campaign 'Czech Fortress' used inflammatory language and manipulative messages supported by AI-generated images, targeting people perceived as Muslim and Ukrainian migrants.<sup>46</sup> SPOLU ran a billboard and online campaign, warning voters against supporting its opponents due to their alleged ties with the Russian Federation. While all of the main political parties included different proposals for family support in their programmes, only the programmes of the Pirate Party and STAN included policies addressing gender equality, the gender pay gap, and supporting same-sex marriages.

While only a limited number of incidents of physical violence were reported during the campaign, ODIHR EAM interlocutors raised concerns about violence and intimidation in the online sphere,

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<sup>43</sup> The Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements (ÚDHPSH) informed the ODIHR EAM of instances where incumbent politicians used official social media accounts for campaign purposes, blurring the distinction between their roles as candidates and holders of public office. The 2025 Act on Election Campaigns and on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising, which enters into force on 1 January 2026, introduces a sanction of up to CZK 100,000 for the free use of state or other public resources for an election campaign.

<sup>44</sup> On 18 September 2025, the former Head of the Muslim Community in Prague, filed a lawsuit to the Prague 1 District Court against the SPD party regarding election billboards depicting a woman wearing a burqa alongside the SPD logo. The court denied the plaintiff's request to apply the interim measures, namely the removal of the advertisement, while acknowledging that the imagery could be considered potentially discriminatory. The case illustrates limitations in obtaining timely relief in campaign-related disputes before election day.

<sup>45</sup> There is no campaign silence period, but campaigning is prohibited on election days within and in the immediate vicinity of polling stations. Publication of election-related opinion polls is prohibited during the three days before election days and on the election days.

<sup>46</sup> Billboards and social networks circulated images juxtaposing a woman in burqa along with the logos of Pirate Party, STAN, and ODS and a woman dressed in Western style with a logo of SPD, implying a burqa could become a dress code in Czechia if SPD's opponents govern the country. Another images pictured an individual perceived to be Muslim with a knife with a statement "In Berlin, ten knife attacks happen every day. Most attackers are immigrants. We will not allow this here!", or crowds with Ukrainian flags, and a call to send Ukrainian refugees back home. Article 20(2) of the [ICCPR](#) requires states to prohibit by law "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence."

particularly targeting women candidates and politicians.<sup>47</sup> All ODIHR EAM interlocutors stated that such violence tends to be more personal, often including threats of sexualized violence. Online violence against women in politics was prevalent, and all women MPs and candidates the ODIHR EAM spoke with reported having been targeted. At the same time, human rights watchdogs pointed out problems related to the underreporting of online violence cases and the limited capacity of the police to investigate them.<sup>48</sup> Both the National Police Service and the Office of the Prosecutor General informed the ODIHR EAM that they have no specific programmes in place to address gendered threats or gender-based political violence. On 24 September 2025, the Speaker of the Senate urged state authorities to act more effectively against insults and verbal attacks targeting women in politics.<sup>49</sup>

*The legal and institutional framework should be reinforced to timely and effectively address cases of electoral violence and violence against women, including online violence. Electoral contestants could consider undertaking voluntary measures, such as subscribing to common principles of non-violent campaign conduct.*

The online campaign lacked a regulatory framework applicable to these elections, as the disclosure requirements for online political advertising included in the EU regulations on transparency and targeting of political advertising entered into force only on 10 October 2025, after the election days. Meanwhile, the Digital Economy Act, which would transpose the Digital Services Act (DSA) to Czech legislation, was not endorsed by the outgoing parliament.<sup>50</sup> Opponents of the DSA cited concerns regarding the Act's possible undue limitation on freedom of expression. The Czech Telecommunication Office was appointed as the Digital Services Co-ordinator (DSC).<sup>51</sup> In the absence of relevant legislation, the Czech DSC is not empowered to act *ex officio* to secure evidence of online violations, or to appoint trusted flaggers, including domestic experts tasked with identifying illegal online content, such as incitement to hatred, and notifying online platforms accordingly. The Telecommunication Office informed the ODIHR EAM that it only forwards complaints received about content published on Very Large Online Platforms like *Google*, *Meta*, *TikTok* and *X* to the Irish DSC, in accordance with DSA provisions, using as a basis provisions on referral for lack of jurisdiction.<sup>52</sup> As a result of the absence of legal transposition, the Czech DSC was not able to effectively follow up on the submitted complaints.

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<sup>47</sup> On 1 September 2025, ANO leader Andrej Babiš, was hit in the head with a metal crutch during a campaign rally.

<sup>48</sup> Paragraph 55 of the [Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence \(GREVIO\) 2021 General Recommendation No. 1](#), recommends to “increase capacity-building efforts for criminal justice and law-enforcement professionals to equip them with the necessary expertise and resources on how to use existing legal frameworks to address the digital dimension of violence against women”.

<sup>49</sup> Paragraph 51 of the [GREVIO 2021 General Recommendation No. 1](#) on the digital dimension of violence against women recommends States Parties to “[c]onsider reviewing any relevant legislation in place and adopt new legislation where needed to prevent, provide protection from and prosecute the digital dimension of violence against women”.

<sup>50</sup> The DSA was to be transposed to the national legislations of the EU member States by 17 February 2024. On 7 May 2025, the European Commission initiated legal proceedings against Czechia at the EU Court of Justice for the country's failures to effectively follow the DSA obligations.

<sup>51</sup> The Telecommunication Office is directed by a five-member Council, whose members are appointed by the Government for a five-year term. Each year, one member of the Council is appointed. The Council takes decisions by an absolute majority.

<sup>52</sup> Pursuant the Administrative Procedure Act 500/2004, Section 12 “[i]f a submission made to the administrative body not territorially or substantively competent, it shall without delay refer it to the competent body and inform the submitter about the referral”.

Reported disinformation and propaganda content were disseminated via online outlets, social media platforms, and chain emails.<sup>53</sup> Some of the ODIHR EAM interlocutors noted that disinformation materials amplified the campaign narratives of electoral contestants such as the Motorists for Themselves, SPD, and Stačilo. *TikTok* informed the ODIHR EAM of the measures it undertook to combat disinformation in general and to protect the integrity of Czech elections, including through media literacy campaigns.<sup>54</sup> Nonetheless, during the weeks prior to election days, independent online monitoring groups identified hundreds of fake *TikTok* accounts disseminating what they characterized as pro-Russian propaganda narratives.<sup>55</sup> The campaign discourse was influenced by allegations of threats of election manipulation, including through postal voting, political litigation, criminalization of the opposition, or alleged EU influence. The government's Co-ordinator for State Strategic Communication, along with the National Cyber and Information Security Agency, and the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats, are mandated to address different aspects of disinformation and possible foreign interference. Yet, the majority of ODIHR EAM interlocutors assessed that the institutional framework to combat disinformation and possible foreign interference remains insufficient, and would benefit from an expanded mandate, increased resources, and improved inter-institutional co-operation.<sup>56</sup>

*To provide for mechanisms and to address disinformation and manipulative content, the Digital Services Act should be transposed into Czech legislation. Awareness should be raised among relevant stakeholders on available mechanisms to address disinformation and manipulative content.*

Social networks were an important campaign tool for all electoral contestants, who used their social media accounts predominantly to report on campaign events.<sup>57</sup> Criticism of both the government and the opposition, as well as the cost of living, were the most frequently raised topics. The topic of alleged Russian interference featured prominently, mostly on accounts related to the SPOLU coalition, namely the accounts of ODS, KDU-ČSL, and TOP 09, as well as, to a lesser extent, on accounts affiliated with the Pirate Party and STAN. Among the key electoral contestants, the largest number of posts were published by SPOLU-affiliated accounts. The majority of posts by the key electoral contestants enjoyed a moderate level of engagement.<sup>58</sup> A number of ODIHR EAM interlocutors noted anonymous accounts and social media groups conducting unregulated campaign activities. The tone of the social media content was frequently negative, especially on accounts of

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<sup>53</sup> In August 2025, investigative journalists [identified](#) 16 disinformation websites which produced around 4,000 articles monthly, with 10 per cent of the content being direct translations of such Russian outlets like Sputnik, RT, and RIA Novosti. For more information on chain emails with disinformation content, see the [Czech Elves database](#).

<sup>54</sup> TikTok is a signatory of the [EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation](#), and informed the ODIHR EAM of its continuous work on [detecting and disrupting covert influence operations](#), [countering harmful disinformation](#), as well as of [measures undertaken to protect integrity of Czech elections](#) on its platform. TikTok [informed](#) as well that since 1 August 2025, it removed more than 187,000 fake accounts, almost 2.9 million fake likes, and over 2 million fake followers in Czechia.

<sup>55</sup> According to the monitoring of the [Online Risk Labs](#), hundreds of fake *TikTok* accounts disseminated content that the organization characterized as disinformation, including narratives legitimizing the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and content portraying the strength of the Russian army. The [Czech Elves](#), an activist group combating the disinformation, reported of social media narratives picturing Ukrainian refugees and Czechia's support to Ukraine as an economic burden taken against the interests of Czech citizens.

<sup>56</sup> The position of a Commissioner for Disinformation in Media, created in the Government's Office in March 2022, was discarded in February 2023, with the Commissioner's duties being assigned to the Prime Minister's Security Advisor. The Strategic Communications Co-ordinator, Otakar Foltýn, resigned from his post on 3 October 2025, considering his task as completed within the available resources and support.

<sup>57</sup> Between 17 September and 4 October, the ODIHR EAM conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the activities of 55 accounts of contestants and other elections-related stakeholders on *Facebook*, *TikTok* and *X*.

<sup>58</sup> On average, the posts were receiving less than 1,000 likes per account per day. SPOLU affiliated accounts resonated the strongest among the internet users, their posts received most frequently above 1,000 likes (cumulatively per day) within 24 hours. The posts on the social network accounts of SPOLU, SPD, and Stačilo received the biggest number of comments.

SPD and Stačilo. Accounts affiliated with SPD and its informal coalition partners resorted to inflammatory rhetoric. Most online campaign videos were subtitled, facilitating, to some extent, access to campaign content for persons with hearing impairments.<sup>59</sup>

*State institutions should undertake measures, including media and digital literacy initiatives, to strengthen the ability of voters to identify and critically assess disinformation and divisive language.*

## X. CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Campaign and political party financing are regulated by the 1991 Act on the Association in Political Parties and Political Movements, as amended in 2016, and by the 1995 Law on Parliamentary Elections, as amended in 2024. The legal framework sets rules on sources of funding, limits on donations and expenditures, and establishes disclosure and oversight mechanisms. Several ODIHR and the Council of Europe (CoE) Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations remain unaddressed, including those calling for the introduction of interim reporting of campaign expenses, the allocation of sufficient resources to oversight, and stronger regulation of third-party financing.<sup>60</sup> Several ODIHR EAM interlocutors advocated for further strengthening of the campaign finance laws, in particular regarding the lack of a reporting requirement for candidates who undertake individual campaigns for preferential votes within their parties' lists.

The political parties and campaign finance oversight is performed by the Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements (ÚDHPSH), which is an independent body led by a board composed of a chairperson and four members. The Chairperson is appointed by the President from two candidates proposed by, respectively, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, for a six-year term, with eligibility for one reappointment. Members of the Board are appointed by the President from the candidates proposed by the Senate, for a six-year renewable term.

### A. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

Political parties are financed from both public and private sources. The amount of public funding is related to electoral results. For parliamentary elections, all political parties that receive no less than three per cent of the votes are entitled to a permanent annual contribution of CZK 6 million, plus CZK 200,000 per year for each additional 0.1 per cent of votes up to the 5 per cent threshold.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, a party receives an annual contribution of CZK 900,000 for each MP.<sup>62</sup> For SPD, ANO, and the Oath Movement, public funding constituted the major source of income, exceeding 70 per

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<sup>59</sup> The ODIHR EAM reviewed the websites of the main political parties with reference to the [Web Content Accessibility Guidelines](#) for adjusting the online formats to the needs of persons with disabilities, including accommodations for persons with visual, hearing, mobility, speech, and photosensitivity-related impairments. Based on this assessment, the Pirate Party websites were the most user-friendly for persons with disabilities, whereas the websites of the Motorists for Themselves and SPD had the lowest levels of accessibility.

<sup>60</sup> The Act on Campaigns, Transparency and Political Advertisement Targeting introduces additional procedural obligations related to campaign finance transparency and reporting, these changes enter into force only after the 2025 elections. For example, the mandatory use of the ÚDHPSH online reporting platform by political parties for the submission of financial reports, in line with the GRECO recommendation, will enter into force in 2026. See Paragraph 38 of the [2016 GRECO Fourth Interim Compliance Report on the Czech Republic](#).

<sup>61</sup> The parties which received the highest amount of public funding in 2024 were ANO, ODS, and STAN. In 2024 [ANO](#) received CZK 176 million of the public funding, [ODS](#) 97.5 million, and [STAN](#) 80.7 million..

<sup>62</sup> In addition to yearly contributions per each parliamentary mandate, political parties are also eligible to receive CZK 250,000 for each member elected to regional councils and the Council of the Prague Capital City. Political parties, which won seats in the Chamber of Deputies in two out of the last three elections, are also eligible for public funding to support the activities of a political institute.

cent of their total yearly revenues.<sup>63</sup> Political parties and coalitions that receive at least 1.5 per cent of valid votes in the parliamentary elections are also eligible for a single state contribution to cover campaign expenses, amounting to CZK 100 per vote. Following the results of the 2025 elections, seven political parties are expected to be eligible for public funding for the incurred campaign expenses.<sup>64</sup>

Political parties may also use private sources of funding such as membership fees, donations from legal entities and natural persons, in-kind contributions, as well as income from the management of property and financial assets. Donations from foreigners are allowed for EU citizens residing in Czechia. Monetary and in-kind donations are limited to CZK 3 million per year per donor. Every donation exceeding CZK 1,000 needs to be supported by a written contract between the party and its donor. Political parties can also take loans and credits. Party income from public funding and donations must be kept in a designated account, which allows for public oversight of all financial transactions.

Within five days after the elections are called, political parties need to open special election accounts for the purposes of campaign donations and expenditures. Cash payments are allowed for transactions not exceeding CZK 5,000. Funds deposited in election accounts can be used exclusively for campaign finance purposes. The campaign expenses are capped at CZK 90 million per electoral contestant, regardless of whether it is a political party or coalition. According to some ODIHR EAM interlocutors, a number of political parties started campaign activities before the elections were officially called, thereby effectively circumventing the expenditure limit.<sup>65</sup> Smaller parties stated that it is difficult to compete with those eligible for public funding and/or benefiting from the support of affluent donors.

Individual candidates may run their own campaigns. While their expenses are counted against the overall ceiling of expenditures of a party or coalition they represent, individual candidates are not required to report the sources of their income, other than through annual tax returns, which are not public.<sup>66</sup> Some of the candidates met by the ODIHR EAM ran their own campaigns, informing their respective parties of the expenses incurred. Representatives of the SPOLU coalition informed the ODIHR EAM that, in order to ensure compliance with the expenditure limit, their individual candidates were required to seek prior approval for their expenses from the campaign managers of the respective coalition parties.

*To ensure transparency, the campaign finance provisions, including those related to limits and disclosure of incomes and expenditures, should be extended to candidates campaigning separately from their political parties, movements or coalitions.*

The ÚDHPSH issued an advisory clarifying that informal coalition partners were bound by the standard limit on donations of CZK 3 million when contributing to the special election accounts of the Pirate Party, SPD, or Stačilo.<sup>67</sup> The legal stance regarding the limits of financial support the

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<sup>63</sup> According to the [political parties' financial reports for the year 2024](#), for SPD public funding constituted 93.6 per cent of its incomes, for ANO - 84.2 per cent, and the Oath Movement – 73.2 per cent.

<sup>64</sup> These are: ANO, SPOLU, STAN, the Pirate Party, SPD, Motorists for Themselves and Stačilo. According to the [initial calculations](#), the parties will receive in total some CZK 545 million.

<sup>65</sup> Of the seven [monitored](#) political contestants, only STAN opened the special bank account at the beginning of 2025 to reflect all the campaign expenses.

<sup>66</sup> See Paragraph 52 of the [2016 GRECO Fourth Interim Compliance Report on the Czech Republic](#), which recommends “to subject, to the greatest extent possible, election candidates campaigning separately from political parties/movements to transparency standards, which are comparable to those applying to the political parties/movements themselves”.

<sup>67</sup> See the [ÚDHPSH advisory from 18 February 2025](#).

informal coalition partners can render was reiterated by the Constitutional Court decision from 24 September 2025.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, the Constitutional Court observed that formal coalitions enjoy clearer access to state funding once elected, as each party in the coalition qualifies for financial contributions. Representatives of parties that ran on the Pirate Party, the SPD, and the Stačilo lists informed ODIHR EAM of having different internal agreements related to campaign financing and division of public funds after the elections.<sup>69</sup>

All political parties met by the ODIHR EAM reported their reliance on paid online advertising.<sup>70</sup> Over the three months preceding election days, the main competitors spent an estimated CZK 23.2 million on paid advertising on Google and Meta platforms.<sup>71</sup> Oversight of expenses on campaigning online remains a challenge, as it is difficult to capture the full spectrum of pages and accounts running campaign-related ads.<sup>72</sup>

The law allows for campaigning by third parties. If a third-party campaigns with the knowledge of the party it supports, its campaign expenses are counted towards the overall ceiling of CZK 90 million per electoral contestant. Where an entity campaigns without the knowledge of a party or its candidate, it is required by the law to register as a third-party with the ÚDHPSH. Consequently, such entities are required to open a special electoral account, and their campaign expenditures may not exceed CZK 1.8 million. Registered third parties are required to publish a statement of expenses on their registered website within ten days after the end of the election campaign; such statements must remain publicly available for at least three months.<sup>73</sup>

In these elections, 20 third parties registered with the ÚDHPSH (8 legal entities and 12 natural persons), but only 10 opened the special electoral accounts. According to the ÚDHPSH, the other 10 registered third parties supported their candidates through in-kind contributions, such as office rentals. In addition, a number of activist groups actively campaigned for certain political platforms without registering as third parties.<sup>74</sup> CSOs and activists met by the ODIHR EAM stated that their campaigns fall under regular statutory work, and that registration as a third-party would constitute an

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<sup>68</sup> See the [Constitutional Court Decision Pl. ÚS 36/25](#) from 24 September 2025.

<sup>69</sup> Stačilo representative informed ODIHR EAM that the party did not request donations from the other parties running on their lists, namely, the KSČM and the SOCDEM. After the elections, the party announced it would not share the public funding it is eligible for with its coalition partners.

<sup>70</sup> Paid political advertising was available on Google and Meta platforms during these elections. In response to the [EU Regulation 2024/900](#) on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, [Google](#) and [Meta](#) withdrew in the EU the option of political advertising for political parties, electoral contestants and the supporting them third-parties.

<sup>71</sup> An estimation of political parties' expenditures of Meta and Google Ads by [Who Targets Me](#) shows that the SPOLU coalition spent CZK 10.1 million, the STAN CZK 6.3 million, the ANO CZK 3.8 million, the Pirate Party CZK 1.1 million, the SPD CZK 0.7 million, Stačilo CZK 0.6 million, and the Motorists for Themselves CZK 0.5 million.

<sup>72</sup> See the analyses of Transparency International, [Transparentní Volby](#), 25 September 2025, and GLOBSEC, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), Debunk.org, and EU DisinfoLab, [Czechia: Country Election Risk Assessment](#).

<sup>73</sup> A registered third-party is obliged to keep statements from its electoral account and records for a period of five years and to submit these statements and records to the Office upon request.

<sup>74</sup> Among those “Million Moments for Democracy”, “Thanks that we can”, “Vote like your children”, or on the local level, for instance, “Network of Active Citizens Hradec Králové.”

undue limitation to their activities and related expenditures.<sup>75</sup> These interlocutors further indicated that it was not sufficiently clear which activities would qualify them to register as a third-party.<sup>76</sup>

*To ensure greater transparency of campaign financing, the legal provisions on third-party campaigning should be strengthened and clarified, with their application grounded in clear, objective, and foreseeable criteria to ensure consistency.*

## **B. DISCLOSURE AND OVERSIGHT**

The law does not require interim financial reporting, at odds with prior ODIHR recommendations.<sup>77</sup> The electoral contestants are required to publish the identification data of all their donors three days before election day. However, the law does not require the electoral contestants to disclose information about the amounts of received donations and in-kind contributions, detracting from transparency.<sup>78</sup> The main political parties complied with the legal requirements, but the information disclosed varied in format and level of detail.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, the income disclosure so close to election days allowed little time for public oversight and hence decreased voters' ability to make a well-informed choice.

*To enhance transparency of campaign finance, the law should require detailed income and expenditure reports, as well as publication of their expenditures before election days. To enable public scrutiny, disclosure should be made in an easily accessible, user-friendly, and searchable manner.*

Each electoral contestant must publish the campaign finance report within 90 days after the elections. It should include information about incomes and expenses, including the expenses of the contestant's individual candidates, as well as information on received loans. Goods and services obtained at a discounted price or in-kind must be reported at their market value. The report should be submitted in line with the template provided by the ÚDHPSH. The use of the ÚDHPSH online platform for reporting, which allows for the submission of reports in a reader-friendly format, is not mandatory until January 1, 2026, under the new Act on Campaigns, Transparency and Political Advertisement Targeting.

The majority of the ODIHR EAM interlocutors had stated confidence in the work of ÚDHPSH and their professionalism, but voiced concerns with the insufficient resources allocated to the oversight

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<sup>75</sup> In 2021 the “Million Moments for Democracy” was sanctioned by the ÚDHPSH for not registering as a third-party. The CSO appealed the decision; in January 2024 the Supreme Administrative Court [ruled](#) that “the work of volunteers in non-governmental non-profit organizations is an independent form of freedom of political expression and is unpaid” and pointed out the continuous watchdog activities of the group that deserve special protection. For information on the case, see the [ÚDHPSH webpage](#).

<sup>76</sup> Paragraph 256 of the [2020 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#) provides that “[t]hird parties should be free to fundraise and express views on political issues as a means of free expression, and their activity should not be unconditionally prohibited. However, it is important that some forms of regulation, with comparable obligations and restrictions as apply to parties and party candidates, be extended to third parties that are involved in the campaign, to ensure transparency and accountability”.

<sup>77</sup> According to Paragraph 261 of the [2020 ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#), “It is good practice to require [...] reports providing oversight bodies and the public with preliminary information on campaign incomes and expenses of parties and candidates several days before election day”.

<sup>78</sup> Article 7.3 of the [2003 UN Convention Against Corruption](#) states that “each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures [...] to enhance transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political parties.”

<sup>79</sup> Following entry into force of the 2025 Act on Campaigns, Transparency and Political Advertisement Targeting all electoral contestants will be obliged to report on received donations in a unified format via an online portal of the ÚDHPSH.

body, contrary to electoral good practice as well as to ODIHR and GRECO recommendations.<sup>80</sup> Some advocated for an expansion of the ÚDHPSH mandate to include issues such as conflict of interest and lobbying.<sup>81</sup> ÚDHPSH agreed that a broader mandate would allow for more comprehensive oversight.

*To ensure an effective campaign finance oversight, the Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements should be provided with adequate financial and human resources.*

The ÚDHPSH informed the ODIHR EAM that, in the framework of the 2025 parliamentary elections, they monitor the political party finance and campaign finance both in-house and through contracted organizations. However, they lack the capacity to analyze the available data and compare it with the information provided by the political parties and campaign finance reports. There is no legal deadline for auditing the campaign finance reports. Publishing the audit reports well after the elections, diminishes both institutional and public oversight.<sup>82</sup>

*To ensure timely disclosure and effective supervision of campaign finance, shorter deadlines for reporting on campaign financing and clear deadlines for auditing the financial reports should be considered.*

The ÚDHPSH can issue sanctions for violations of political and campaign finance provisions. It can act *ex officio* or upon complaint, which can be submitted by any legal or natural person, including by email, using a template available on the ÚDHPSH webpage. The oversight body has three months to initiate the proceedings on a received complaint. ÚDHPSH sanctions for administrative offences related to violation of the campaign finance provisions can reach up to CZK 500,000 per offence. Experts in the field questioned the level of sanctions, finding them insufficiently dissuasive.<sup>83</sup> The ÚDHPSH and political parties' representatives opined that the reputational damage of a sanction is a sufficient deterrent. Out of 50 received election-related complaints, the ÚDHPSH dismissed 35. In six cases, it imposed sanctions for an aggregate amount of CZK 115,000, and in three cases issued an official warning. The submitted complaints and the respective ÚDHPSH decisions are not public.<sup>84</sup>

*To enhance transparency and public confidence in campaign finance oversight, the Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements should publish election-related complaints and decisions in a timely manner.*

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<sup>80</sup> Article 14 (a) of the [Council of Europe Recommendation Rec\(2003\)4](#) indicates that "a. States should provide for independent monitoring in respect of the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns." GRECO recommended to Czechia to " (ii) provide [...] mechanism with the mandate, the authority, as well as adequate resources to effectively and pro-actively supervise the funding of political parties/movements and election campaigns, to investigate alleged infringements of political financing regulations and, as appropriate, to impose sanctions" See paragraph 26 of the [2018 GRECO Third Evaluation Round, Second Compliance Report on the Czech Republic](#), GrecoRC3(2018)1.

<sup>81</sup> [Legislative proposal 1008](#), Draft Act on the Office for Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of Interest, submitted on 24 September 2025, envisions establishing an office which would be in charge of overseeing the management of political parties, and the enforcement of provisions of laws on conflict of interests and recently adopted law on whistle-blower protection and law on lobbying.

<sup>82</sup> According to the [2020 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#), paragraph 261 "[t]he deadline for submitting the final report to the oversight body should be precisely defined in the law. It is critical that the timeframe be sufficient, yet not too long, to allow those with reporting obligations, time to assemble the information, and to allow the oversight body to undertake thorough and expedient auditing and, where necessary, initiate proportionate and timely sanctions" Paragraph 271 of the same document provides that "any deadlines that the respective authority is obliged to adhere to need to be drafted in such a way as to provide this body with enough time to substantively monitor and analyse reports submitted by political parties".

<sup>83</sup> See GLOBSEC, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), Debunk.org, and EU DisinfoLab, [Czechia: Country Election Risk Assessment](#), 12 September 2025.

<sup>84</sup> The ÚDHPSH runs [a public register of sanctions](#) issued for violations of political and campaign finance provisions.

## XI. MEDIA

### A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

The media environment is diverse. Online media, including social networks, are the primary news sources, followed by television; nonetheless, the use of both to seek news has declined continuously in recent years, as has the trust in news more generally.<sup>85</sup>

The public service media, Czech Television (ČT), which is overall the most watched television (TV) broadcaster, and Czech Radio (ČR), are ranked among the most trusted media in the country.<sup>86</sup> The public Czech News Agency (ČTK) remains the main news producer for many smaller media outlets.<sup>87</sup> The 2025 amendments, strengthening the financial independence of the public broadcasters by increasing the license fee has been contested by opposition parties including ANO and SPD, and by commercial broadcasters.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, these political parties campaigned in favour of the financing of public media from the state budget and a merging of ČT and ČR into one institution.<sup>89</sup>

The 2023 amendments, in line with a previous ODIHR recommendation, repealed the power of the lower chamber of the parliament to dismiss the ČT and the ČR councils in their entirety, following two consecutive non-approvals of their annual reports by the Chamber of Deputies. The ČT and the ČR council members are elected from the candidates nominated by legal entities.<sup>90</sup> In a step welcomed by most stakeholders, the election procedure was diversified by electing one-third of the 18 Council members by the Senate and two-thirds of the members by the Chamber of Deputies. In addition, the law now requires nominating legal entities to be registered for at least ten years. However, according to many ODIHR interlocutors, the appointment procedure ultimately remains politicized, with political parties exerting significant influence on the nomination of candidates.<sup>91</sup>

*Additional legal safeguards could be considered to further depoliticize the appointment procedure of the public service media oversight bodies, the Czech Television, Czech Radio, and Czech News Agency Councils, in order to further strengthen their independence.*

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<sup>85</sup> According to the [Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2024](#) the use of online/social media and TV as a news source has fallen from 90 and 85 per cent respectively in 2015 to 80 and 60 per cent respectively in 2025. Overall trust in news media has slightly increased in 2024, from an all-time low in 2023, equalling the 11-year average of 33 per cent.

<sup>86</sup> See [Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2024](#).

<sup>87</sup> According to the [ČTK 2024 Annual Report](#), ČTK news constitute between 30 and 70 per cent of the overall content of the subscribed media outlets.

<sup>88</sup> In addition, any future increase of the fee was tied to the inflation rate. Furthermore, now, every household that owns any equipment providing Czech TV and Radio is obliged to pay the fee.

<sup>89</sup> [ANO](#) called for the abolishment of the license fee and financing from the state budget, as well as merging ČT and ČR into one institution. [SPD](#) campaigned on the financing from the state budget and the merge of ČT, ČR and ČTK into one institution. [Stáčilo](#) directly called for their transformation from public into state media. The governing parties, as well as the Pirates and Greens, repeated their support for independent and financially stable public service media.

<sup>90</sup> Nominating entities may “represent cultural, regional, social, trade union, employer, religious, educational, scientific, environmental, and national interests”. Council members are prohibited to act on behalf or in the interest of political parties or other interests.

<sup>91</sup> Paragraph 16 of the [General Comment 34](#) to the ICCPR requires States parties to guarantee the independence and editorial freedom of public broadcasting services. The CoE [CM/Rec\(2012\)1 - Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on public service media governance](#) stipulates “securing and safeguarding independence” as “a primary role of any framework of public service media governance”. See also European Broadcasting Union [Governance Principles for Public Service Media](#).

The commercial media landscape is characterized by the dominance of a limited number of news media providers and ownership concentration.<sup>92</sup> As a result, alternative media are financially fragile, in particular, local media.<sup>93</sup> Information on beneficial ownership is accessible through a publicly available register. The June 2023 amendments to the Act on Conflict of Interest *inter alia* prohibited political actors from transferring media assets to close associates or trust funds, required annual submission of asset declarations, and imposed further restrictions on media ownership.<sup>94</sup> However, in December 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled the amendments on procedural grounds, leaving the regulatory gap unaddressed.

In June 2023, the Office for the Protection of Competition approved the *Seznam.cz* group's acquisition of the Borgis media company, which publishes the daily newspaper *Právo* and supplies content for the *novinky.cz* portal, potentially further limiting the plurality of news providers. The online platform *Seznam.cz*, competing with Google and Meta in terms of user traffic, hosts other news media outlets, thereby providing for increased traffic, but also receives a significant portion of the advertising revenue.<sup>95</sup> Several, primarily online, news media outlets contribute to a plurality of news and investigative journalism but depend on donations or subscriptions. However, according to many ODIHR EAM interlocutors, the plurality of news at the local level is diminished, and journalists are increasingly exposed to interference in editorial freedom by political and business interests.<sup>96</sup>

*The authorities should consider additional safeguards to protect media pluralism, including measures addressing ownership concentration and the impact of media mergers.*

## B. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting (Broadcasting Act) requires broadcasters to observe the principle of “objectivity and balance” in their news and current affairs programmes, but does not provide a definition of the principle.<sup>97</sup> The implementing body for the Broadcasting Act, the Council for Radio and TV Broadcasting (RRTV), is legally required to monitor the content. Members of the RRTV Council are elected by the Chamber of Deputies by a simple majority, following nomination by parliamentary groups represented in the Chamber.<sup>98</sup> Several ODIHR EAM interlocutors expressed concerns regarding the impartiality of the RRTV Council appointment method which does not allow for broad political representation.

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<sup>92</sup> According to [mediaguru.cz](https://www.mediaguru.cz), in 2023 the top three broadcasters/publishers accounted for over 70 per cent of market share in audience measurement. In television these were *ČT* (30 per cent), *FTV Prima* (27 per cent) and *TV Nova* (27 per cent). In publishing, *Mafra* (28 per cent), Czech News Center (24 per cent) and *Vitava Labe Media* (22 per cent). In online media, these were *Seznam.cz* (57 per cent), *Mafra* (14 per cent) and *Economia* (6 per cent).

<sup>93</sup> According to the [News Deserts in Europe](#) Report, the *Vltava-Labe-Media* publishing house holds a monopoly over regional publications.

<sup>94</sup> After the 2017 amendments to the Act on Conflict of Interest, prohibiting political actors to operate TV and radio and publish periodicals, the at that time Prime Minister Andrej Babiš moved his media assets into a trust fund.

<sup>95</sup> By traffic measurement, *seznam.cz* accounts for 16 per cent of online traffic, following Google with 33 per cent and Meta with 28 per cent. See the [EUI Media Pluralism Monitor](#) 2025, page 17.

<sup>96</sup> According to the [Recommendation CM/Rec\(2018\)11 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership](#) media-ownership regulation can include restrictions on horizontal, vertical and cross-media ownership, including by determining thresholds of ownership in line with [Recommendation CM/Rec\(2007\)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on media pluralism and diversity of media content](#). These thresholds may be based on a number of criteria, such as capital shares, voting rights, circulation, revenues, audience share or audience reach.

<sup>97</sup> A [2021 Supreme Administrative Court decision](#) on the issue of objectivity and balance does elaborate on the concept but does not provide further guidance on the allocation of coverage for electoral contestants in news.

<sup>98</sup> The [2003 Joint declaration](#) by UN, OSCE and Organization of American States (OAS) states that “all public authorities which exercise formal regulatory powers over the media should be protected against interference [...] including by an appointments process for members which is transparent, allows for public input and is not controlled by any particular political party”.

*To strengthen its independence, the appointment procedure for members of the Council for Radio and TV Broadcasting could be revised.*

The RRTV conducts quantitative and qualitative monitoring, but the information on the monitored sample and methodology is not made public because they are considered internal procedures.<sup>99</sup> Monitoring reports related to the election campaign are expected to be published several months after the elections. The RRTV informed the ODIHR EAM that they have received 11 complaints during this election period, but no measures were taken prior to the election days, failing to observe the complainants' right to an effective remedy.<sup>100</sup> According to several ODIHR EAM interlocutors, some major commercial TV stations are perceived to display bias in their political coverage; similar concerns were raised regarding certain regional media outlets.<sup>101</sup>

*In order to effectively implement requirements on objective and balanced coverage in news and current affairs programmes, systematic quantitative and qualitative monitoring should be conducted, and monitoring reports should be published in a timely manner, in particular during the electoral campaign.*

*The Council for Radio and TV Broadcasting could consider applying effective measures for violations within expedited timeframes, allowing for effective remedy.*

The European Media Freedom Act extends the competences of national regulators, *inter alia*, to assessing market concentration and the allocation of state advertising. However, a draft Law on Media Services, intended to transpose the European Media Freedom Act into Czech legislation, had not been adopted. Defamation remains criminalized, contrary to international standards and a long-standing ODIHR recommendation. Furthermore, ODIHR EAM interlocutors reported cases of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) against public interest reporting, and their impact on investigative journalism and local journalists, who are particularly vulnerable.<sup>102</sup> While, in general, courts are perceived to rule in favour of freedom of expression in defamation cases, regional courts, according to ODIHR EAM interlocutors, often lack sufficient experience to deal with SLAPP cases. The CoE and the EU provide legislative and procedural guidance, as well as non-judicial remedies to counter SLAPPs.<sup>103</sup>

*Legislative and policy frameworks to counter strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) should be further developed and strengthened, particularly regarding structural and*

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<sup>99</sup> Previous RRTV reports indicate that no systematic comparative quantitative content analysis is conducted; instead, the RRTV conducts qualitative assessments of selected programmes of selected broadcasters. The RRTV informed the ODIHR EAM about their limited human and technical capacity comparing to the high number of licensed broadcasters.

<sup>100</sup> Deadline for adjudication of complaints by the RRTV is 30 days. Section II.3.3.g of the [Code of Good Practice](#) refers to an effective system of appeal and recommends that “time-limits for lodging and deciding appeals must be short (three to five days for each at first instance)”.

<sup>101</sup> In January 2021, a local CSO [reported](#) on public funds being misused for favourable coverage of local authorities on a local TV station in Liberec; subsequently, the CSO filed a [complaint](#) with the RRTV. The latter took [measures](#) against the TV only in January 2023. For detailed information, see [coverage](#) on the issue by the investigative online portal HlidaciPes.org.

<sup>102</sup> The March [2025 Report by the Government Council for Human Rights](#) noted that SLAPP cases in Czechia are systematically underreported due to low professional organization of journalists and weak advocacy. Investigative journalists, as reported, frequently encounter SLAPPs and, “at least in the context of regional journalism, these practices have contributed significantly to the silencing of critical journalism”.

<sup>103</sup> See [Recommendation CM/Rec\(2024\)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on countering the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation \(SLAPPs\)](#) and [EU Directive 2024/1069](#) on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation”), the provisions of which need to be transposed by 7 May 2026.

*procedural safeguards and remedies, support for targets and victims, and the development of education, training, and awareness-raising programmes.*

### C. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Between 17 September and 1 October, as required by law, ČT and ČR broadcast a total of 14 hours of free airtime each, equally divided among contestants. However, ODIHR EAM interlocutors noted that due to the broadcasting of free airtime in blocks and predominantly out of prime time, its outreach to voters was limited. Paid political advertising is allowed only in print and online media.

While the major TV stations, including ČT, reported covering both the opening and closing campaign events of all major contestants, the main feature of campaign coverage was a significant number of debates broadcast on public TV and radio and commercial TV stations. ČT broadcast a series of 14 thematic debates and 1 debate involving the leaders of the 8 major contesting entities, the so-called “super debate”, based on public opinion polls.<sup>104</sup> The chairwoman of the Communist Party, who was the leading candidate of the Stačilo movement, was the only woman among the eight top party representatives participating in the debates on public TV. While the debates on ČT mainly focused on political parties’ programmes and potential post-election coalitions, debates on Nova TV addressed issues including the economy and the European Green Deal. A final ČT debate was envisaged to include the leaders of the two strongest political parties; however, the ANO leader, Andrej Babiš, refused to participate in any debate on public TV.<sup>105</sup> Nonetheless, he took part in debates on commercial TV. Overall, the information provided through the media enabled voters to make a well-informed choice.

## XII. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The legal framework governing election disputes for parliamentary elections is primarily set out in the Law on Parliamentary Elections. Voters may request corrections to the voter list at their municipality, and if no remedy is provided within two working days, the decision can be appealed to the regional administrative court, which must issue a ruling within three days. Complaints regarding the registration of candidate lists can be filed by an independent candidate, political party, political movement or coalition that submitted a candidate list or an application for registration. It must be lodged with the competent regional court within two days of the decision; rulings are final and must be issued within 15 days.

The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) has a specialized Electoral Senate which adjudicates on disputes relating to the election results. Appeals on the overall validity of elections, or the election of individual candidates, can be filed within ten days of the official announcement of results. The SAC has 20 days to rule on such cases. In addition, complaints related to violations of constitutional rights or principles, including proportional representation, voting rights, legal certainty, and principles of fair electoral competition may be filed with the Constitutional Court. Filing fees are waived for election-related litigation before the courts.

Prior to election days, the political party Volt Czechia filed a total of 28 complaints in 14 regional administrative courts (one per target party in each electoral region) to annul the candidate lists of two other political parties, SPD and Stačilo, on the grounds that they were undeclared coalitions

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<sup>104</sup> The ‘Super Debate’ reached 22.6 per cent audience share.

<sup>105</sup> Before that, ‘duels’ of the leaders of the other six parties had been broadcasted.

circumventing higher electoral thresholds.<sup>106</sup> Volt Czechia was unsuccessful at the regional court level, and the reasoning adopted by the regional courts was not uniform.<sup>107</sup> In certain cases, the court accepted the applicant's argument but declined to order a substantive remedy.<sup>108</sup> Similarly, the Oath movement filed a lawsuit in the Ústí nad Labem Regional Court against the Pirate Party's candidate list, which included Green Party members, on the grounds of an unrecognized coalition.<sup>109</sup> The Ústí nad Labem Regional Court rejected Oath's complaint as unfounded. Decisions at the regional court level varied, but all complaints failed to be granted the remedy they were seeking and all originally submitted candidate lists were ultimately approved to proceed. The divergence of legal opinions and decisions among the regional courts underscored ambiguities in existing electoral legislation, contrary to electoral good practice.<sup>110</sup>

On 15 September 2025, the Volt party filed complaints with the Constitutional Court challenging both the registration of SPD and Stačilo candidates lists as being informal coalitions, and provisions defining a coalition in the Law on Parliamentary Elections.<sup>111</sup> On 24 September, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaints, holding that the law defines coalitions in formal, rather than substantive, terms and that differential legal treatment of declared versus undeclared political alliances is permissible under the law.<sup>112</sup> Complaints related to registration of candidate lists led to delays in the printing of ballots, which had been scheduled to begin on 22 August but was postponed until 3 September, the last legally permissible date for printing to commence. ODIHR EAM interlocutors generally reported a strong trust in the justice system, and particularly high public trust in the independence of the Constitutional Court.

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<sup>106</sup> On 9 February 2021, [the Constitutional Court ruled](#) to annul several provisions of election law, particularly the additive thresholds of 10, 15 and 20 per cent for coalitions of respectively two, three and four or more political parties, and the combination of constituency structure with the *D'Hondt* method, on grounds of violating the constitutional principle of equality of vote, as well as the principle of equal opportunities for parties and coalitions. Following that decision, the legislative framework underwent amendment to improve compliance with constitutional requirements. Most notably, the electoral thresholds for coalitions were lowered to 8 per cent for coalition of two parties or movements and 11 per cent for a coalition of three and more political entities.

<sup>107</sup> In the decision [64 A 7/2025 - 175 - Brno Regional Court, Volt Czechia v. Stačilo](#), the court leaned towards the material or purposive argument, and stated that a formal interpretation of the election law would allow for circumvention of higher legal thresholds for coalitions, however the court ultimately rejected the claim based on upholding the principles of legal certainty and minimal interference in elections. In contrast, in the decision [115 A 1/2025-40 - Ústí nad Labem Regional Court, Volt Czechia v. SPD](#), the court rejected the applicant's material argument and stated that the administrative authority is not authorized to deny registration of the candidate list on any other than a formal basis, and that political parties are not limited to their own members by law when it comes to nominating candidates.

<sup>108</sup> For example, the Regional Court in Brno found that the candidate list shows characteristics of a "hidden/unacknowledged coalition," but nevertheless denied the remedy of annulling the registration. See the court's decision [No 64 A 7/2025-175, Volt Czechia v. Stačilo](#).

<sup>109</sup> The Oath representative informed the ODIHR EAM that their complaint was underpinned by the willingness to ensure that all informal coalitions are treated equally, rather than by contestation of the practice. In the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the Oath movement fielded candidates on the basis of an informal coalition with Motorist for Themselves.

<sup>110</sup> The [Code of Good Practice](#), Paragraph 63 of the Explanatory Report provides that "stability of the law is crucial to credibility of the electoral process", whereas paragraph 114 specifies that "stability of the rules must be such as to exclude any suspicion of manipulation". The [ODIHR Guidelines for Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections](#), state that "[e]lectoral legislation should be written in clear and unambiguous language. Interpretation of electoral legislation should not be a matter of subjective opinion".

<sup>111</sup> On 17 September 2025, these two cases were joined to be decided together by the Constitutional Court. See the [Constitutional Court Decision Pl. ÚS 36/25](#) from 24 September 2025.

<sup>112</sup> The Court emphasized that parties retain the freedom to choose whether to associate or cooperate as declared coalitions or as informal alliances, and the courts are not empowered by law to assess whether a list is constructively or substantively a coalition. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the regional and administrative authorities that applied the formal legal criteria had acted correctly, and that any ambiguity or tension should be addressed by legislative reform rather than judicial annulment.

Once final results are announced by the SEC, electoral contestants and voters may file complaints with the administrative courts challenging the conduct of the elections, including issues related to vote counting, tabulation, and certification. The SAC Electoral Senate is the court of the highest instance for election cases. Complaints must be filed within a 10-day period after the final results are made public, and subsequently, the Court has 20 days to issue a written decision on all complaints that are granted standing. Further review is available by the Constitutional Court; however, such complaints are subject to strict admissibility criteria under constitutional case law. In this election, the SAC received, within the statutory deadlines, 39 complaints, notably a decrease in comparison with previous elections.<sup>113</sup> Out of the 39 complaints, 20 were dismissed on procedural grounds, and the remaining 19 were dismissed as unfounded. The complaints concerned *inter alia* the legality of informal coalitions, malfunctioning of the mobile application for electronic identification of voters (*Doklady*), errors in vote counting, postal voting, and violations in election campaigning.<sup>114</sup>

### XIII. ELECTION OBSERVATION

The 2024 amendments to the election legal framework provide for international election observation, but not for domestic observers, contrary to the OSCE commitments and ODIHR recommendations.<sup>115</sup> The amendments will enter into force in 2026, hence the ODIHR EAM operated in the absence of explicit legal provisions for international observers. The MoI informed the ODIHR EAM that, whereas opening and polling are accessible to anyone, observation of closing and counting required a special MoI permit, and observation in the results collection points required *in situ* permits of the CZSO. A separate request to the SEC was needed to be granted access to observe its session at which the final results were announced. Pursuant to the requests for permits submitted to respective institutions, ODIHR EAM was granted access to all the phases of the electoral process.

Apart from ODIHR EAM and journalists, no other national or international groups asked to be accredited as observers for these elections. Interlocutors inquired by the ODIHR EAM about the lack of national observers, pointed out the fact that the presence of political parties' representatives in the PECs constitutes a sufficient safeguard against any election manipulation. However, few PEC members were political parties' representatives in the polling stations observed by the EAM on the election days. Many interlocutors stated that overall, the electoral process in Czechia enjoys a very high level of trust, whereas the inquired CSOs expressed little interest in election observation.

*In line with the OSCE commitments, the legal framework should include provisions on the access of citizen and international observers to all stages of the electoral process and their rights and obligations.*

### XIV. ELECTION DAYS

In line with the ODIHR methodology, the EAM did not conduct a comprehensive and systematic observation of the two election days proceedings. EAM members observed election procedures in 51 PECs in 25 municipalities or municipal districts in Prague, Central Bohemia, and Ústí nad Labem

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<sup>113</sup> In 2021 SAC received 210 complains related to parliamentary elections and in 2017 – 77.

<sup>114</sup> See the [SAC Press Release from 6 November 2025](#).

<sup>115</sup> Art 54 of the [Act No. 88/2024 Coll.](#), to be implemented from 2026 onwards, establishes the right only for international observers. Paragraph 8 of the [1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document](#) provides that “the participating States consider that the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in which elections are taking place”. The Code of Good Practice, Explanatory Report, paragraph 91 provides that “[t]he law must be very clear as to what sites observers are not entitled to visit, so that their activities are not excessively hampered”.

regions. The use of mobile ballot boxes was also observed. Due to the lack of a regulatory framework on international observers combined with the lack of information about the deployment of ODIHR EAM to Czechia, a few times ODIHR observers faced problems in accessing the opening and voting.<sup>116</sup>

At the opening of the PECs on 3 October, the ODIHR EAM observed instances of overcrowding, which compromised the secrecy of vote. The regulatory framework does not provide guidelines on a queue control system or limits on the number of people allowed inside the PEC at one time. The safeguarding of election materials between 3 and 4 October was assessed by all EAM teams as adequate at the polling stations visited. The opening and voting on 4 October were very calm. Counting was conducted immediately after closing the PECs on 4 October. Overall, the voting process in the visited PECs was assessed as good or very good. Counting in the observed polling stations revealed some problems. The presence of different types of ballot boxes, standard and mobile, and various voter lists, permanent and special, caused, in several cases, arithmetical mistakes that took some time to correct.

*To reinforce the secrecy of the vote, the election administration should provide further guidelines on the management of the voting process.*

A person with a disability can request assisted voting by any person other than a PEC member. Although the MoI requested the municipalities to identify and prioritize the most accessible premises for polling stations, the majority of the polling stations observed by the ODIHR EAM were not accessible for persons with reduced mobility.<sup>117</sup> The existing possibility for a person with reduced mobility to request an AVC and vote at polling stations located in more accessible premises was not promoted. Persons with disabilities could request a mobile ballot box to be brought to their residence or opt for curb-side voting if a polling station infrastructure did not allow for unassisted access. No solutions were provided for unassisted voting for persons with visual impairments.<sup>118</sup>

*The state authorities should undertake measures to ensure fully inclusive participation of persons with disabilities in elections, especially in terms of accessibility to polling stations and possibilities for voters with visual impairments to vote independently.*

Pursuant to the 2024 amendments to the Act on the Right to Digital Services, the voters were offered for the first time the possibility to use the mobile application *Doklady* for electronic identification at the PECs on election days. The DIA, in charge of designing, functioning, and maintaining the application, reported that on 3 October 2025, it had 830,366 registered users. On election days, the application was not working properly, and voters who could not be identified were not allowed to vote. The DIA informed that the problems occurred due to the use of an outdated application by many voters and a subsequent overload of the system with requests for the application's update.<sup>119</sup> The first-time use of *Doklady* for voters' identification did not follow good practices, which require that

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<sup>116</sup> IN several instances, the ODIHR EAM observers faced restrictions on access to electoral process. In one case, they were denied access to the opening of the polling station, with the PEC members citing the lack of instructions as the reason; in another case, they were not allowed to observe the voting process, and in several cases, access was granted only after the PEC members consulted municipal authorities.

<sup>117</sup> Article 29 of the [CRPD](#) provides that the States should ensure “that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use”.

<sup>118</sup> The Committee on the Right of Persons with Disabilities expressed its concern that “election materials are reportedly rarely accessible to blind persons or to persons with intellectual disabilities, that polling stations are often not physically accessible, and that ballots may not be accessible to blind persons” and recommended the Czech Republic to “ensure, through legislative and other measures, the accessibility of ballots and election materials, and of polling stations”. See paragraphs 57 and 58 of the [2015 CRPD, Concluding observations on the initial report of the Czech Republic](#).

<sup>119</sup> The DIA Director took responsibility for the situation and resigned after the elections.

any introduction or change to election technologies should allow sufficient time for piloting, auditing, and certification of equipment and its functioning, as well as for testing its capacity in the conditions of a substantially higher demand.<sup>120</sup> The issue is to be further analysed by the DIA at the request of the SEC.

*The use of electronic identification of voters should be preceded by a thorough audit of its functioning based on the 2025 parliamentary elections and by dedicated voter information.*

On election days, each consular representation had a PEC. The results from the PECs were transmitted via a secure transmission line to a dedicated CZSO office at the MFA, and consequently to the overall results database. In the 2021 parliamentary elections, all votes were counted towards the Prague region. In 2025, depending on the voter's residence abroad, their vote was counted for one of four different regions selected by lot by the SEC on 21 May 2025.<sup>121</sup> The measure aimed to avoid an excessive impact of votes from abroad on the results in one specific region.

## XV. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS

The SEC held its final session on 6 October to announce the final election results and discuss issues related to election day procedures, in particular the issues with the electronic identification, as well as the allocation of seats to constituencies.<sup>122</sup> The overall turnout was 68.95 per cent. Turnout of voters registered abroad amounted to 79.38 per cent, with 29,888 voters participating, compared to 13,236 in 2021 (70.37 per cent turnout). Of these, 8,978 persons voted by mail, representing 82.23 per cent of those who had requested postal voting kits. The number of seats allocated to the regions on the basis of the number of cast votes changed with regard to 2021, with four regions losing seats and five regions gaining seats.<sup>123</sup>

Six electoral contestants passed the electoral thresholds; however, due to the presence of both formal and informal coalitions, a total of eleven political parties will be represented in the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>124</sup> The voters marked 2,677,170 preferential votes, contributing to the election of a higher number of women, younger candidates, and candidates who had not always been placed in winnable positions.<sup>125</sup> The elected 67 women MPs in the new Chamber of Deputies represent an increase of 8 percentage points, from 25 to 33 per cent, compared to the 2021 elections' results. In addition, voters elected 12 MPs under the age of 30, four times more than in 2021, largely as a result of the use of preferential voting.

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<sup>120</sup> See paragraphs 7 and 8 of the [2022 Council of Europe's Guidelines on the use of information and communication technology \(ICT\) in the electoral processes](#).

<sup>121</sup> Those regions were Prague, Central Bohemia, Moravian-Silesian and South Moravia.

<sup>122</sup> In November 2025, pursuant to the complaint of the Pirate Party, SAC found significant irregularities in the vote counting process in Blansko. Although the Court dismissed the party's motion to invalidate the election result in the South Moravian Region, at the same time decided to file a criminal complaint. See [SAC Press Release from 6 November 2025](#).

<sup>123</sup> In 2025 parliamentary elections Olomouc, Pardubice, Pilsen, South Moravian Region, and Vysocina gained one seat each in comparison to the 2021 allocation; Karlovy Vary, South Bohemian region and Ústí nad Labem lost one seat each; Liberec region lost two seats in comparison to the 2021 allocation.

<sup>124</sup> See the final results in the Annex I.

<sup>125</sup> For example, in Ústí nad Labem the candidate placed last on the STAN list (number 26) was the only candidate elected from the list. ANO's successful candidates were placed on 26. position in Ústí nad Labem, 23. in Olomouc, and 19. and 20. in Pilsen. See the CZSO [data](#).

## XVI. RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations, as contained throughout the text, are offered with a view to further enhance the conduct of elections in Czechia and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. These recommendations should be read in conjunction with past ODIHR recommendations that remain to be addressed.<sup>126</sup> The legislative reforms should be undertaken well in advance of elections and through an inclusive consultation, including with civil society. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of Czechia to further improve the electoral process and to address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports.

### A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To ensure equality of vote and avoid a high number of wasted votes, the formula for seat distribution should be reviewed to address the disproportion in the ratio of voters to parliamentary mandates.
2. The legal and institutional framework should be reinforced to timely and effectively address cases of electoral violence and violence against women, including online violence. Electoral contestants could consider undertaking voluntary measures, such as subscribing to common principles of non-violent campaign conduct.
3. To ensure an effective campaign finance oversight, the Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements should be provided with adequate financial and human resources.
4. The authorities should consider additional safeguards to protect media pluralism, including measures addressing ownership concentration and the impact of media mergers.
5. Legal framework should be clarified to define permissible forms of electoral co-operation and coalition formation to ensure legal certainty and consistency.
6. In line with the OSCE commitments, the legal framework should include provisions on the access of citizen and international observers to all stages of the electoral process and their rights and obligations.

### B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Women's Participation in Elections

7. Authorities should undertake a comprehensive assessment of the political environment to determine and consequently eliminate obstacles to women's participation in public and political

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<sup>126</sup> According to paragraph 25 of the [1999 OSCE Istanbul Document](#), OSCE participating States committed themselves “to follow up promptly the ODIHR’s election assessment and recommendations”. The follow-up of prior recommendations is assessed by the ODIHR EAM as follows: recommendation 1 of the [final report of the 2021 parliamentary elections](#) and recommendation 9 of the [final report of 2017 parliamentary elections](#) are fully implemented; recommendation 10 of the final report of the 2021 parliamentary elections and recommendations 4 and 9 of the [final report of the 2023 presidential election](#) are mostly implemented; recommendations 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 17, and 18 of the final report of 2017 parliamentary elections; recommendations 5, 6 and 8 of the final report of the 2021 parliamentary elections and recommendations 1 and 3 of the final report of the 2023 presidential election are partially implemented. See also the [ODIHR Electoral Recommendations Database](#).

life. Political parties could consider including in their statutes provisions that promote women's membership and participation, also in leadership positions.

### **Legal Framework**

8. In line with international standards and OSCE commitments, authorities should consider introducing temporary special measures, such as legislative gender quotas and gender-targeted party funding, to enhance opportunities for the equal representation of women in elected bodies.

### **Election Administration**

9. To facilitate the development of targeted strategies for enhancing women's participation, disaggregated data on gender representation in the election administration should be collected and published in a comprehensive manner.
10. To ensure full transparency of its decision-making, election administration should hold public sessions, and publish the draft agendas and minutes of relevant sessions in a timely manner.

### **Voter Registration**

11. To increase accessibility of voting methods, measures to facilitate the registration and participation of citizens residing abroad, including outreach and other options, should be considered.

### **Candidate Registration**

12. To further promote pluralism in candidate registration, the law should be amended to allow for citizens to stand independently in line with OSCE commitments.

### **Electoral Campaign**

13. To provide for mechanisms and to address disinformation and manipulative content, the Digital Services Act should be transposed into Czech legislation. Awareness should be raised among relevant stakeholders on available mechanisms to address disinformation and manipulative content.
14. State institutions should undertake measures, including media and digital literacy initiatives, to strengthen the ability of voters to identify and critically assess disinformation and divisive language.

### **Campaign Finance**

15. To ensure transparency, the campaign finance provisions, including those related to limits and disclosure of incomes and expenditures, should be extended to candidates campaigning separately from their political parties, movements or coalitions.
16. To ensure greater transparency of campaign financing, the legal provisions on third-party campaigning should be strengthened and clarified, with their application grounded in clear, objective, and foreseeable criteria to ensure consistency.
17. To enhance transparency of campaign finance, the law should require detailed income and expenditure reports, as well as publication of their expenditures before election days. To enable

public scrutiny, disclosure should be made in an easily accessible, user-friendly, and searchable manner.

18. To ensure timely disclosure and effective supervision of campaign finance, shorter deadlines for reporting on campaign financing and clear deadlines for auditing the financial reports should be considered.
19. To enhance transparency and public confidence in campaign finance oversight, the Office for the Supervision of the Management of Political Parties and Movements should publish election-related complaints and decisions in a timely manner.

## **Media**

20. Additional legal safeguards could be considered to further depoliticize the appointment procedure of the public service media oversight bodies, the Czech Television, Czech Radio, and Czech News Agency Councils, in order to further strengthen their independence.
21. To strengthen its independence, the appointment procedure for members of the Council for Radio and TV Broadcasting could be revised.
22. In order to effectively implement requirements on objective and balanced coverage in news and current affairs programmes, systematic quantitative and qualitative monitoring should be conducted, and monitoring reports should be published in a timely manner, in particular during the electoral campaign.
23. The Council for Radio and TV Broadcasting could consider applying effective measures for violations within expedited timeframes, allowing for effective remedy.
24. Legislative and policy frameworks to counter strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) should be further developed and strengthened, particularly regarding structural and procedural safeguards and remedies, support for targets and victims, and the development of education, training, and awareness-raising programmes.

## **Election days**

25. To reinforce the secrecy of the vote, the election administration should provide further guidelines on the management of the voting process.
26. The state authorities should undertake measures to ensure fully inclusive participation of persons with disabilities in elections, especially in terms of accessibility to polling stations and possibilities for voters with visual impairments to vote independently.
27. The use of electronic identification of voters should be preceded by a thorough audit of its functioning based on the 2025 parliamentary elections and by dedicated voter information.

**ANNEX: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS<sup>127</sup>**

Total number of registered voters	8,253,316
Total number of votes cast (turnout)	5,690,635 (68.95 per cent)
Number of valid votes	5,621,717 (98.88 per cent)
Total number of voters registered abroad	37,654
Total number of votes cast abroad	29,888
Number of abroad voters who requested mail voting kits	10,918
Number of abroad voters who voted by mail	8,978

<b>Party, movement or coalition</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Mandates</b>
ANO 2011	1,940,507	34.51	80
SPOLU (ODS, KDU-ČSL, TOP 09)	1,313,346	23.36	52
Mayors and Independents (STAN)	631,512	11.23	22
Czech Pirate Party	504,537	8.97	18
Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD)	437,611	7.78	15
Motorists for Themselves	380,601	6.77	13
Stačilo	242,031	4.3	0
Oath Civic Movement	60,503	1.07	0
Generation Movement	25,176	0.44	0
Czech Republic in 1st place!	12,455	0.22	0
Swiss Democracy	12,097	0.21	0
Czech Sovereignty of Social Democracy	10,263	0.18	0
Voluntia	7,375	0.13	0
Czech Crown	7,313	0.13	0
Challenge 2025	6,338	0.11	0
A Clear Signal from the Independents	4,937	0.08	0
Rebels	4,185	0.07	0
Moravian Land Movement	3,842	0.06	0
Movement of Citizens and Entrepreneurs	3,718	0.06	0
Volt Czechia	3,639	0.06	0
Left	3,318	0.05	0
SMS - State Must Serve	2,881	0.05	0
Circle Movement	2,209	0.03	0
Balbín's Poetic Party	612	0.01	0
Vote the Right Bloc	429	0	0
Urza.cz: We don't want your votes	282	0	0

<sup>127</sup> Data according to the [final results published by the CZSO](#).

## ABOUT ODIHR

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is OSCE's principal institution to assist participating States "to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and (...) to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society" (1992 Helsinki Summit Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human dimension.

ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland) was created as the Office for Free Elections at the 1990 Paris Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the name of the Office was changed to reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and democratization. Today it employs over 150 staff.

ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of **election observation**. Every year, it co-ordinates and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers to assess whether elections in the OSCE region are conducted in line with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections and with national legislation. Its unique methodology provides an in-depth insight into the electoral process in its entirety. Through assistance projects, ODIHR helps participating States to improve their electoral framework.

The Office's **democratization** activities include: rule of law, legislative support, democratic governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender equality. ODIHR implements a number of targeted assistance programmes annually, seeking to develop democratic structures.

ODIHR also assists participating States' in fulfilling their obligations to promote and protect **human rights and fundamental freedoms** consistent with OSCE human dimension commitments. This is achieved by working with a variety of partners to foster collaboration, build capacity and provide expertise in thematic areas, including human rights in the fight against terrorism, enhancing the human rights protection of trafficked people, human rights education and training, human rights monitoring and reporting, and women's human rights and security.

Within the field of **tolerance and non-discrimination**, ODIHR provides support to the participating States in strengthening their response to hate crimes and incidents of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance. ODIHR's activities related to tolerance and non-discrimination are focused on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring, reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding.

ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on **Roma and Sinti**. It promotes capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities, and encourages the participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making bodies.

All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations.

More information is available on the ODIHR website (<https://odihr.osce.org/>).