



Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

GENERAL ELECTIONS

4 October 2026

ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report

5-7 May 2026



Warsaw
8 July 2026

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I. INTRODUCTION

In accordance with its mandate, following an official invitation to observe the 4 October 2026 general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) undertook a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) from 5 to 7 May. The ODIHR NAM included Kseniya Dashutsina, ODIHR Senior Election Adviser and Vittoria Zanellati, ODIHR Election Adviser. The NAM was joined by Sherif Abdili, Senior Adviser of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

The purpose of the mission was to assess the pre-election environment and the preparations for the general elections. Based on this assessment, the NAM should recommend whether to deploy an ODIHR election-related activity for the forthcoming elections, and if so, what type of activity best meets the identified needs. Meetings were held with officials from state institutions as well as with representatives of political parties, media, civil society, and international organizations. A list of meetings is annexed to this report.

ODIHR would like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina for their assistance and co-operation in organizing the NAM. ODIHR would also like to thank all of its interlocutors for taking the time to meet with the NAM and share their views.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 7 May, the Central Election Commission (CEC) decided for the general elections to be held on 4 October for the state, entity and cantonal levels. Election preparations are taking place in a highly polarized environment marked by increasing challenges to the constitutional order. The deepening institutional standoff between the entity and state level authorities has been intensified by increasingly divisive actions and narratives, particularly from the political leaders of Republika Srpska (RS).

The elections will be conducted under a significantly revised legal framework following amendments imposed by the Office of the High Representative in 2024, the United Nations body mandated to oversee the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These amendments, along with the reforms imposed in 2022, introduced integrity safeguards and addressed a number of previous ODIHR recommendations. The amendments also introduced election technologies to be used throughout the country for the first time in the upcoming elections. However, some ODIHR NAM interlocutors emphasized the need to amend the law to further regulate their use. Several previous ODIHR recommendations remain unaddressed, including on lifting residency and ethnicity-based restrictions on passive and active suffrage rights for general elections.

The three-member presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the president and vice-presidents of RS are elected along ethnic lines by simple majority vote. Parliamentary seats at the state and entity levels are filled from open proportional candidate lists. After these direct contests, four indirect elections will be held for the upper houses of parliaments of the state and both entities, as well as for the president and two vice-presidents of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

General elections are administered by the CEC, 143 Municipal Election Commissions, and some 5,200 Polling Station Committees (PSCs). Election preparations are ongoing, with the CEC adopting decisions and by-laws, a new ballot layout, and recruiting polling stations staff. The CEC informed the ODIHR NAM that its operational capacity is strained by a longstanding shortage of permanent personnel in key positions, and several stakeholders raised concerns that such shortage could undermine the CEC's ability to effectively fulfil its mandate. Overall, stakeholders' confidence in the independence and impartiality of the election administration varied and was particularly low for the PSCs, despite the revised appointment mechanism introduced in 2024, which was aimed at enhancing their impartiality.

Ballot scanners and biometric voter identification devices will be used in all polling stations for the first time in the upcoming elections. The implementation of election technologies has faced a number of challenges, including delays in securing the necessary budget and legal disputes throughout the procurement process. Once resolved, the CEC identified a private vendor, Smartmatic, to deliver the equipment (some 12,000 devices overall), software and a wide range of technical and operational support actions. The CEC established a dedicated unit to supervise the implementation, and informed the ODIHR NAM of its plans to conduct large-scale voter education on the use of such technology, as well as dedicated trainings for PSC staff. All ODIHR NAM interlocutors welcomed the use of election technologies as a means to restore voters' trust in the elections and minimize malpractices. Some, however, raised concerns that the compressed implementation timeline, combined with potential lack of adequate and timely training might negatively impact the process.

Voter registration is passive, and the Central Voter Register (CVR) is maintained by the CEC, based on the data drawn from the population register. Citizens of at least 18 years of age are eligible to vote, unless explicitly revoked of this right by a court decision for a grave criminal offence or due to declared legal incapacity. Some ODIHR interlocutors expressed concerns over the accuracy and transparency of the CVR, citing the inclusion of deceased and non-resident voters as well as limited opportunities for independent verification of voter register data, as the aggregated preliminary voter list is reportedly not made available online. Most interlocutors welcomed the introduction of biometric voter identification to prevent voter impersonation.

The right to stand is restricted by ethnicity and residency requirements as only voters self-declared as Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs may stand as candidates for the state and entity presidencies, provided they reside in the appropriate entity. Candidates for all contests can be nominated by parties and their coalitions or stand independently. ODIHR NAM interlocutors did not express any concerns with the registration procedures or their impact on inclusiveness. However, some expressed dissatisfaction with the 40 per cent gender quota requirement for candidate lists within the current electoral system, as it has proven ineffective in ensuring a corresponding allocation of seats for the less represented gender as a result of the elections.

The official campaign period starts one month prior to election day. Despite being prohibited by law, early campaigning is reportedly widespread. Some ODIHR NAM interlocutors noted that the electoral system, particularly the contest for the state presidency, contributes to a highly polarized campaign along ethnic lines. Most interlocutors met by the ODIHR NAM expressed concerns about possible vote-buying, misuse of state resources and pressure on voters, including public sector employees. Further concerns included the spread of manipulative narratives online, also due to the absence of a comprehensive government policy to fight disinformation and clearly defined institutional responsibilities regarding the online space. While the law extends existing campaign regulations to social networks, some ODIHR NAM interlocutors questioned the capacity of the election administration to oversee and enforce these regulations in an effective and impartial manner.

The 2024 amendments to the electoral framework did not fully address prior ODIHR recommendations related to effectiveness of campaign finance oversight. The legislation provides for both public and private funding, sets donation limits, and prohibits foreign, anonymous, religious, and publicly funded contributions. The CEC oversees compliance and has the authority to sanction violations. Despite the recent introduction of a new application for the submission of financial statements by political parties, the CEC anticipated challenges in effectively and timely monitoring campaign finances, including potential breaches, given its lack of human resources. Some ODIHR NAM interlocutors noted that the overall transparency of campaign finances should be improved, as in practice many transactions remain unreported.

The media environment is diverse but reportedly divided along ethnic and political lines. According to ODIHR NAM interlocutors, several restrictive legislative initiatives adopted since the previous general elections, combined with an increasing number of threats against journalists, continue to encourage self-censorship among media professionals and undermine freedom of expression. Long-standing financial difficulties affecting the state broadcaster remain unresolved. The law requires broadcasters to cover elections in a fair, balanced and impartial manner but compliance with this is not comprehensively monitored, as the media regulator informed the ODIHR NAM that it performs its oversight functions based solely on complaints.

The law provides for administrative and judicial remedy of election disputes. Some ODIHR interlocutors questioned the election administration's willingness and capacity to meaningfully review such disputes in a timely manner due to its limited human resources, and noted the need to broaden rules for legal standing. The CEC maintains a public database of complaints, but the law does not explicitly require their publication; however, the CEC informed the ODIHR NAM that these will be made public for the first time in the upcoming elections. Representatives of the judiciary met by the ODIHR NAM expressed the need to receive comprehensive information on the use of election technologies and on the updated voting procedures.

The law provides for election observation and grants observers access to the entire electoral process. Civil society organizations met by ODIHR NAM plan to carry out long-term observation, as well as to deploy observers throughout the election period and on election day, while also organizing voter education activities on the use of election technologies.

All ODIHR NAM interlocutors underlined the need for an extensive presence of an ODIHR election observation activity through all stages of the process citing the highly polarized political environment, and viewed observation by ODIHR as a means to promote confidence in the electoral process. All ODIHR NAM interlocutors welcomed an external review of the revised legal framework and its implementation, the full-scale introduction of the election technologies, and the overall conduct of the elections, including on election day. Particular concerns were raised about the conduct of the campaign, including online, and media coverage of the elections. Interlocutors also highlighted issues that would merit the attention of an ODIHR election observation activity, including allegations of vote-buying, the potential for the misuse of administrative resources and undue pressure on voters.

Based on this, the ODIHR NAM recommends the deployment of an Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the upcoming general elections. In addition to a core team of experts, the ODIHR NAM recommends the secondment of 24 long-term observers from OSCE participating States to follow the electoral process countrywide, and 300 short-term observers to follow election day proceedings. In line with ODIHR's standard methodology, the EOM will include a media monitoring component, and will assess the campaign environment and activities across traditional media, online outlets, and social media platforms. The mission will also assess the institutional preparedness and effectiveness in identifying

and responding to disinformation, misinformation, and potential foreign and domestic interference, as well as existing co-operation mechanisms with social media platforms.

III. FINDINGS

A. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS).¹ In addition, Brčko District holds a special status as a unit of local self-government. The state Constitution, established by the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace, known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), grants the status of “constituent peoples” to Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.² Citizens may also declare themselves as “others”, either by identifying with another ethnic group or by choosing not to affiliate with any group.

Following the 2022 general elections, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP BiH), People and Justice (NiP), Our Party (NS), the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH), and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) formed the state level government.³ The governing coalition split in January 2025 and negotiations amongst all coalition partners did not lead to a new coalition, leaving the government and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina without a stable majority. On 23 November 2025, the early election for the president of RS was held following the conviction of its former President Milorad Dodik by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the subsequent revocation of his mandate by the Central Election Commission (CEC).⁴ A repeat vote was held on 8 February in 136 polling stations in 17 constituencies by CEC decision, following identification of irregularities that affected the outcome, and confirmed the victory of Siniša Karan, nominated by Mr. Dodik’s party.⁵

On 7 May, in line with the law, the CEC announced that general elections will be held on 4 October for the state, entity and cantonal levels. Election preparations are taking place in a highly polarized environment marked by increasing challenges to the constitutional order of Bosnia and

¹ Each entity has its own distinctive ethnic composition and an important degree of autonomy including its own constitution, political structure, governing institutions, administrative and judicial bodies.

² The DPA also established the Office of the High Representative, an international body charged with overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the peace settlement. [In 1997](#), the High Representative was granted the power “to make binding decisions” and “take measures against public officials to ensure the effective functioning of state institutions”.

³ The SDP BiH, NiP and NS are commonly referred to as ‘the Trojka’. In the FBiH, SDP BiH, the Alliance for Better Future, the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), as well as the Democratic Front feature on the Bosniak political scene, while the HDZ BiH, the Croat Democratic Union 1990 and others draw voters from the Croats. In RS, among others the SNSD, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Party for Democratic Progress, Socialist party, People’s Democratic Movement and Democratic People’s Alliance compete for the Serbs’ votes.

⁴ On 26 February 2025, Mr. Dodik was sentenced to one year of imprisonment and a six-year ban on holding public office, for defying decisions by the High Representative (HR), based on a criminal offence introduced by the HR in July 2023. On 12 June, the Appellate Division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina upheld the verdict but allowed to convert the prison sentence into a fine later. On August 6, the CEC terminated the mandate of Mr. Dodik. Preceding that, the Republika Srpska National Assembly (RS NA) had consistently adopted decisions and conclusions that contested the authority of state institutions and the HR, while former President Dodik openly defied decisions of the HR and publicly urged RS’s bodies to resist state and HR interventions.

⁵ According to the [CEC decision](#), 908 voters voted without any valid documents at these PSCs. A total of 731 votes were found to be wrongfully evaluated and allocated to contestants, specifically 474 votes were added to the result for SNSD candidate, and 257 votes were taken off the result for SDS candidate.

Herzegovina.⁶ The functioning of state institution is affected by institutional deadlocks, which stalled key reforms, including those related to the European Union (EU) integration process.⁷ Since the early election of the president of RS, the institutional standoff between the entity- and state-level authorities has been intensified by increasingly divisive narratives, particularly from the political leaders of this entity.

Women's participation in political life is guaranteed by the Constitution and the Law on Gender Equality. Some ODIHR NAM interlocutors noted women continue to be underrepresented in political life due to entrenched gender norms and male-dominated political practices. In the current state and entity parliaments, women comprise between 17 and 28 per cent of the elected members. The Serb member of the presidency and the chairperson of the Council of Ministers are women. Young people are underrepresented in political life.⁸

ODIHR has previously observed 13 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, most recently the November 2025 early election of the president of RS.⁹ The final report, issued in May 2026, contains 22 recommendations, including 7 priority ones, for the authorities to improve the electoral process and bring it closer in line with OSCE commitments.¹⁰

B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

General elections are primarily regulated by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 2001 Election Law and the 2012 Law on Financing of Political Parties.¹¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina is a party to the main international and regional instruments related to democratic elections.¹²

The electoral legal framework was significantly amended in 2022 and 2024 through reforms imposed by the High Representative (HR), following the protracted stalling of negotiations and repeated calls to national political stakeholders to collaboratively adopt the necessary changes. The amendments

⁶ In [his address](#) to the United Nations Security Council on 12 May 2026, the HR noted that “(...) the constitutional order continues to be weakened from within. Ongoing disagreements over the interpretation and implementation of Dayton, disrespect for the ruling of the highest Court of the country, and, at times, deliberate blockages, continue to affect State institutions, gradually undermining their functionality to the point where the narrative of Bosnia and Herzegovina not being viable becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.” The HR, Mr. Schmidt, [resigned from his post](#) on 11 May, noting that “critical reforms remain to be implemented by Bosnia and Herzegovina and so the work of OHR remains essential.” In response, on 26 May the RS NA adopted a [resolution](#) addressed to the UN Security calling for the closure of the OHR and for the full return of all competences to domestic institutions.

⁷ In March 2024, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. In November 2025, the European Commission approved the Reform Agenda and its financing under the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which was submitted by the authorities with a delay of two months, causing a reduction of 108.4 million EUR, (10 per cent of the amount initially earmarked for the country). Several conditions for formally launching negotiations have not been fulfilled to date, including the adoption of the laws on Courts and on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, and of the National Programme for the Adoption of the EU Acquis, and no chief negotiator has been appointed.

⁸ There are no members of the state parliament below 30 years old, and those below 40 years old represent 17 per cent for the lower and 14 for the upper chamber.

⁹ See all previous [ODIHR election-related reports](#) on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹⁰ In paragraph 25 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document, OSCE participating States committed themselves “to follow up promptly the ODIHR’s election assessment and recommendations”.

¹¹ The laws of the entities contain details regulating their electoral systems as well as the registration and activities of political parties.

¹² This includes the [1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights](#), [1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination](#), [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights \(ICCPR\)](#), [1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women \(CEDAW\)](#), [2003 UN Convention against Corruption](#), [2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities \(CRPD\)](#), [1950 European Convention on Human Rights](#), and 1994 Council of Europe [Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities](#).

addressed a number of prior ODIHR recommendations and introduced several integrity safeguards.¹³ The amendments also introduced the use of ballot scanners and biometric voter identification devices throughout the country.

Several ODIHR recommendations remain unaddressed, including a priority one based on international human rights standards and jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on lifting residency and ethnicity-based restrictions on passive and active suffrage rights for general elections, which would require constitutional changes.¹⁴ Other outstanding recommendations relate to robust regulation to prevent the misuse of public resources, women's participation, transparency and effectiveness of the election dispute resolution, effective oversight of campaign finance rules and dissuasive sanctions for possible violations. Moreover, some ODIHR NAM interlocutors emphasized the need to amend the law to further regulate the use of election technologies.¹⁵

C. ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Six distinct contests will take place in the general elections at three different levels, with all mandates allocated for four-year terms. At the state level, the electorate will vote for the presidency and the composition of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH HoR). At the entity level, voters registered in the FBiH will vote for the House of Representatives (FBiH HoR), while those registered in RS will cast their votes for the president and two vice-presidents of RS, as well as the Republika Srpska National Assembly (RS NA). In addition, voters in the FBiH will elect ten cantonal assemblies.¹⁶

The presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a three-member institution elected by simple majority from the two entities, with voters from the FBiH electing Bosniak and Croat candidates and those from RS voting for a Serb candidate. The presidency rotates every eight months among its elected members from each of the constituent peoples. The president and vice-presidents of RS are also elected by a simple majority vote.¹⁷

Most BiH HoR, FBiH HoR and RS NA members are elected through a preferential voting system in multi-member constituencies (MMCs) with compensatory seats.¹⁸ The 2024 amendments decreased the

¹³ The July 2022 amendments introduced a definition of “hate speech”, banned the misuse of administrative resources for executive office holders and elected officials, prohibited the trade of Polling Stations Committees (PSCs) positions among political parties, and increased fines for election-related violations. The March 2024 amendments reviewed the system of appointment of PSCs to enhance their impartiality, strengthened regulation on the misuse of public resources by executive office holders and campaign violations, prolonged the timeframes for submission and review of complaints, enhanced reporting of campaign finances, required the CEC to disclose information about complaints and decisions, and parties to promote gender equality during campaigning.

¹⁴ See ECtHR judgements in [Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), [Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), [Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), [Šlaku v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#) and [Kovačević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#).

¹⁵ The CEC submitted a set of [draft technical amendments](#) to the Election Law for consideration to the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2025. On 12 December, the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly (BiH HoR) adopted amendments to the Election Law, introducing measures to strengthen electoral integrity and modernize procedures, including biometric voter authentication, electronic ballot transmission, and clearer rules for vote counting and recounts; the draft passed 29–9 and was forwarded to the House of Peoples (BiH HoP), where they remain pending.

¹⁶ Voters in Brčko District vote either for contestants standing in the FBiH or RS, depending on their “entity citizenship”.

¹⁷ The candidate who receives the most votes is elected president, and the top candidates from the two other constituent peoples are elected vice-presidents.

¹⁸ The BiH HoR is comprised of 42 members: 21 elected from 5 MMCs in the FBiH and 9 from 3 MMCs in RS. Seven and five mandates, respectively, are assigned through a compensatory system. The FBiH HoR is composed of 98 members, with 73 elected from 12 MMCs, and 25 receiving compensatory seats. The RS NA comprises 83 members, with 63 elected from 9 MMCs, and 20 receiving compensatory seats.

number of candidates each voter can mark from 15 to a maximum of 3. The compensatory mandates are allocated to candidates from separate closed party lists to ensure the proportional representation of parties and coalitions.¹⁹ Further, for the FBiH HoR and the RS NA, the law guarantees a minimum representation of four seats per constituent people.

After the direct contests, four indirect elections will be held for the upper houses of parliaments of the state and both entities, as well as for the president and two vice-presidents of the FBiH.²⁰ The amendments to the Election Law and Constitution of the FBiH imposed by the HR on election day in 2022 increased the number of seats in the upper house of the parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the House of Peoples (FBiH HoP), and introduced significant changes to the body's decision making procedures with respect to the appointment of the Federation's president and vice presidents, as well as key judicial positions.²¹

Despite a legal requirement to review the number of mandates per MMC every four years, the state and FBiH parliaments have not done so since 2001 and the RS NA only did it once in 2012. Some ODIHR NAM interlocutors reiterated longstanding concerns of significant deviations in the number of voters per parliamentary seat.

D. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

General elections are administered by the CEC, 143 Municipal Election Commissions (MECs), and some 5,200 Polling Station Committees (PSCs). By law, the composition of the election bodies at all levels must reflect the ethnic composition of their respective constituencies. At least 40 per cent of the members of each commission must be from the less represented gender.²²

The CEC is a permanent independent body composed of seven members appointed by the BiH HoR for a seven-year mandate, with the chairperson elected from among the members on a rotational basis, for a 21-month period, based on their ethnic self-declaration.²³ Only two CEC members are women, falling short of the legally required quota. MECs are permanent bodies appointed by municipal and city authorities for seven-year terms, subject to CEC approval, and composed of either three, five, or seven members, depending on the size of the constituency and its electorate. PSCs consist of three or five members, appointed prior to each election. Following the 2024 changes, the chairpersons and their deputies are appointed by the CEC from among non-partisan applicants, the members and their deputies

¹⁹ Mandates in the MMCs are allocated to political subjects receiving at least 3 per cent of the total number of valid votes in the corresponding MMC, while compensatory mandates are distributed among the parties receiving 3 per cent of the valid votes at the entity level.

²⁰ Ten cantonal assemblies elect the delegates to the FBiH House of the People (FBiH HoP), comprising 80 members, 23 each representing the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, and 11 representing "others" from each canton electing delegates of their respective constituent people. The RS NA elects the RS Council of Peoples (RS CoP). Delegates to the BiH House of Peoples (BiH HoP) are elected by the FBiH HoR and the RS NA. The president and vice-presidents of the FBiH are elected by the FBiH HoP and the FBiH HoR, with a majority of votes.

²¹ The amendments increased the number of seats in each constituent people's caucus from 17 to 23, and the caucus of "others" from 7 to 11; in addition, they prescribed that the latest (2013) census be used for the elections of delegates to the FBiH HoP. Each constituent people and now also "others" have one delegate from each canton which has at least one such a delegate in its cantonal assembly; if a canton does not have such delegate in its body, the required number of delegates are elected from other cantons.

²² In three-member commissions both genders should be represented.

²³ The seven CEC members include two Bosniaks, two Croats, two Serbs and one member representing "others" communities. The current chairperson represents the "Serbs". The members are nominated by the Commission for Selection and Nomination, which comprises two members from the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, three from the Administrative Commission of the BiH HoR, and two from the incumbent CEC, following an open recruitment procedure.

are nominated in equal numbers by the contesting parties represented in the state and respective entity level assemblies.²⁴

The CEC has commenced preparations, adopted the electoral calendar, as well as decisions and by-laws, designed a new ballot layout, identified some 12,000 candidates for PSC chairpersons and deputies to be appointed, and some 6,000 technical operators. The CEC also received the elections budget of BAM 24.3 million BAM (EUR 12.476 million).²⁵ The CEC informed the ODIHR NAM of its plans to conduct robust voter education, with a particular focus on the voting process and how to fill in the ballots, as well as to provide training to PSC members on the use of technologies in the polling stations and election day procedures. The CEC noted that the physical accessibility of polling stations remains problematic, as a high number of polling stations do not provide independent access for persons with physical disabilities. Positively, election technologies will include accessibility features for voters with hearing and visual impairments.

The CEC informed the ODIHR NAM that it is preparing to conduct elections in line with the law, and implement all the new aspects of the process, but noted that its operational capacity is strained by a longstanding shortage of permanent personnel in key positions. While the 2022 and 2024 amendments significantly expanded its functions and workload, a recent request of the CEC to increase its staffing capacity was not approved, leaving it with only one third of the personnel required to operate at full capacity.²⁶ Several stakeholders raised concerns that such shortage could undermine the CEC's ability to effectively fulfil its mandate. Overall, stakeholders' confidence in the independence and impartiality of the election administration varied. Despite the revised appointment mechanism, confidence was particularly low for PSCs due to malpractices reported in past elections, including in the most recent early election for the president of RS.²⁷

E. ELECTION TECHNOLOGIES

Ballot scanners and biometric voter identification devices will be used in all polling stations for the first time in the upcoming elections.²⁸ After being identified through biometric fingerprint authentication, voters will be required to express their choice by fully filling the circle next to their chosen political subject to ensure accurate electronic scanning. The results counted and generated by the ballot counters will be considered preliminary, and only the results of the manual count of the votes will be reflected

²⁴ Each chairperson and all members should have a deputy. Prior to the 2024 amendments, all PSC members were appointed by political subjects contesting in the respective constituency.

²⁵ EUR 1 equals some BAM 1.95 (Bosnian Convertible Mark). The CEC was required by law to receive the requested funds the latest 15 days after the call of the elections, by 22 May. The funds were released on 25 May upon decision of the Deputy Minister of Finance and Treasury of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁶ While the law defines the CEC as an independent body which derives its authority solely from the BiH Parliamentary Assembly and reports directly to it, the internal organization of personnel within the secretariat is subject to approval of the BiH Council of Ministers. Currently, the CEC Secretariat comprises around 60 staff; which also includes ancillary staff. Based on the new proposed CEC rulebook on internal organization, the CEC staff is short of 120 employees.

²⁷ A number of ODIHR NAM interlocutors opined the CEC would face difficulties in hiring PSCs chairpersons and their deputies, citing the replacement of several chairpersons in past elections after the CEC determined that they were ineligible due to previous political affiliations. Some other interlocutors opined that the introduction of election technologies could reduce the interest of politically affiliated individuals in seeking nomination to PSCs, as the new safeguards would make manipulation of the process more difficult.

²⁸ The full introduction follows a smaller-scale pilot project in the 2024 local elections, including fingerprint authentication and electronic transfer of polling station election results directly to the CEC (implemented in 65 polling stations in 11 municipalities); optical ballot scanners for ballot counting (145 polling stations in 7 municipalities); and biometric identification of voters at all 138 polling stations in Brčko District. The last project, a video surveillance system, was piloted at 10 polling stations in 5 municipalities.

in the final results protocols.²⁹ Voter authentication devices will also enable comprehensive and timely collection and publication of voters' data disaggregated by gender and age for the first time, a feature welcomed by the CEC.³⁰

The implementation of election technologies has faced a number of challenges, including delays in securing the budget and legal disputes throughout the procurement process.³¹ These significantly compressed the timeline for implementation. As a result, the CEC signed the contract for the provision of services with the selected provider, Smartmatic, only on 18 May, after the official announcement of the elections.³² A temporary unit was established within the CEC to co-ordinate and oversee the roll-out of technologies.³³ The CEC informed the ODIHR NAM of its plans to conduct large-scale voter education on the use of election technologies, as well as dedicated trainings for PSC staff. It also plans to carry out an independent external audit of the devices and to publish the findings ahead of the elections.

All ODIHR NAM interlocutors welcomed the use of election technologies as a means to restore voters' trust in the elections and minimize malpractices but some noted the need to communicate in an effective and transparent manner about all stages of implementation to further nurture such trust.³⁴ Some interlocutors raised concerns that the compressed implementation timeline, combined with the potential lack of adequate and timely training for PSC members might negatively impact the process. Several ODIHR NAM interlocutors raised cybersecurity as a concern. The CEC informed the ODIHR NAM of its key role in co-ordinating the response to potential cybersecurity incidents targeting election infrastructure in the absence of a fully-functioning national institution mandated to detect and protect state institutions from cyber threats.³⁵

²⁹ All election materials will be transferred to the CEC Main Counting Center for verification and possible recounts in cases of significant discrepancies between electronic and manual results.

³⁰ Some other interlocutors raised concerns about the quality of fingerprint data, particularly for older voters, while the Agency for Identification Documents, Registers and Data Exchange (IDDEAA) anticipated very limited cases of authentication failure based on the results of the 2024 pilot project. During pilots in the 2024 local elections, IDDEAA reported successful biometric authentication for 96 per cent of voters at participating polling stations.

³¹ The required funding was secured after the High Representative imposed amendments to the [Law on Financing of Bosnia and Herzegovina Institutions](#) in July 2025 to unlock the necessary funds from the Central Bank; however, these were disbursed only in February, once the High Representative issued an [Authentic Interpretation](#) of his July decision and the Deputy Minister of Finance and Treasury approved the transfer of funds. The procurement process launched by the CEC in November faced a number of complaints, both during the period of submission of offers and after finalization of the procurement results, which were adopted by CEC decision on 19 March. All complaints were dismissed.

³² The CEC carried out a tender procedure and purchased 6,000 optical scanners as well as voter identification devices along with reserve batteries, and identified a private vendor, Smartmatic, to be responsible for delivery of the equipment, software, technical support, printing of ballots, as well as storage and distribution to the competent election authorities.

³³ Including supervising execution of contracts, co-ordinating with suppliers and other lower levels of election administration, managing technical, operational and logistical aspects, overseeing cybersecurity and information protection, co-ordinating testing activities, and handling crisis management.

³⁴ Some interlocutors noted that in RS the introduction of such technologies has been accompanied by polarizing narratives to question their impact on the integrity of the electoral process. See statement from SNSD leadership [here](#) and [here](#). See also a [statement from the CEC](#) denying false information spread on the procurement process.

³⁵ Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and legislative initiatives related to this area have stalled. The establishment of a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), initiated in 2011, has yet to result in a functioning state body. While the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Strategy for establishment of CERT proposed by the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2011, which was followed by the adoption of a Decision on Establishment of the CERT in 2017 and, between 2023 and 2025, by two other decisions on the systematization of jobs in the State Ministry of Security and on the allocation of premises, the CERT is not yet operational, [reportedly](#) due to budgetary constraints.

F. VOTER REGISTRATION

Citizens aged 18 or older have the right to vote, except those disenfranchised for serious crimes, including war crimes, and those who have been declared legally incapable by a court decision, including on the basis of intellectual or psychosocial disability.³⁶ Voting rights for the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina are limited by residence, and voters in RS can only vote for a Serb candidate, while voters in the FBiH may only vote for either a Bosniak or Croat candidate for state presidency.

Voter registration is passive. The CEC maintains the Central Voter Register (CVR), based on permanent residency data from the population register managed by the Agency for Identification Documents, Registers and Data Exchange (IDDEAA). Throughout the year, voters can verify their data and request corrections online or at municipal registration centres. For these elections, the CEC will finalize the CVR by 20 August and subsequently forward the voter lists to the respective MECs. In case of omissions, a voter can be additionally registered at the polling station and vote by special “tendered” ballots, provided he or she demonstrates valid residency within the precinct. Citizens temporarily residing abroad may register to vote by post or at diplomatic representations by 21 July; otherwise, they may vote in the country according to their last place of residence. As of 6 May, the CEC announced the preliminary number of eligible voters at 3,414,364.

Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed concerns regarding the accuracy of the CVR stating it reportedly contains a significant number of deceased people and citizens who maintain official residence in the country despite living abroad. In this regard, most interlocutors welcomed the introduction of biometric voter identification to prevent voter impersonation. Some ODIHR NAM interlocutors also expressed concerns about the limited opportunities for independent verification of voter register data, as the aggregated preliminary voter list is reportedly not made available online, despite a legal requirement to do so.³⁷ However, registered candidates may obtain an electronic copy of the aggregated voter list upon request before election day.

G. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

All eligible voters may stand as candidates, except for the state and entity presidencies, for which, discriminatory ethnicity and residence requirements remain in place.³⁸ Persons convicted by or under indictment before an international or domestic court for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes are legally disqualified.³⁹

Candidates may be nominated by political parties and their coalitions or may stand independently. Prior to nomination, prospective contestants have to certify their eligibility with the CEC and the requirements include the collection of support signatures from voters and the payment of a financial

³⁶ See Articles 12 and 29 of the 2006 CRPD. Paragraph 48 of the 2014 [General Comment No. 1](#) to the CRPD states that “a person’s decision-making ability cannot be a justification for any exclusion of persons with disabilities from exercising their political rights, including the right to vote, the right to stand for election and the right to serve as a member of a jury”.

³⁷ The 2024 amendments stipulate the public nature of the CVR and require the publication of the preliminary voter lists online, including twice a year in non-election years, taking into account the principles of protection of personal data. The law does not specify the scope of voters’ data that shall be included in the excerpts posted online.

³⁸ Only Serb candidates may stand for the presidency of the state in RS, while in the FBiH the state presidency is contested only by Bosniak and Croat candidates. “Others” are not eligible to stand for the state and entity presidencies. Only Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs may be indirectly elected to the BiH HoP and as president and vice-presidents of the FBiH.

³⁹ Some categories of state officials and civil servants, including members of the police, armed forces, judiciary and diplomatic staff, may only stand as candidates if they resign or step down temporarily.

deposit.⁴⁰ A voter may sign in support of only one political party or independent candidate per contest. Between 22 May and 16 June, the CEC certified 75 political parties, 4 independent candidates and 29 coalitions.

Candidate lists may be submitted by registered political parties, pre-electoral coalitions and independent candidates between 24 June and 6 July, and must include at least 40 per cent of candidates of each gender with a progressive placement requirement.⁴¹ Candidate lists must be certified by 31 July. Following the 2024 amendments, candidate nominations as well as candidate lists are submitted in electronic form via a dedicated online platform, which enables automatic verification of all supporting signatures, as well as fulfilment of the gender requirement.

ODIHR NAM interlocutors did not express any concerns with regards to registration procedures or their impact on inclusiveness. However, some expressed dissatisfaction with the gender quota requirement for candidate lists within the current electoral system, as it has proven ineffective in ensuring a corresponding allocation of seats for the less represented gender as a result of the elections.⁴²

H. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

The official electoral campaign period begins one month in advance of election day, with a silence period 24 hours before election day. The 2022 and 2024 amendments further strengthened campaign regulations, extended them to social network platforms, and empowered the CEC to sanction contestants for any such violations.⁴³ Despite being prohibited by law, early campaigning is reportedly a widespread practice, and the CEC informed the ODIHR NAM of its plan to monitor such cases and impose sanctions.

Political parties met by the ODIHR NAM stated they plan to campaign through a mix of traditional and online campaign. While only a few parties mentioned substantive issues, some ODIHR NAM interlocutors noted that the campaign is highly polarized along ethnic lines due to the electoral system centered on the contest for the state presidency. Most ODIHR NAM interlocutors expressed concerns about possible vote-buying, and the potential for misuse of state resources and pressure on voters, including public sector employees.

Further concerns were related to the spread of manipulative narratives in the online space. While the law extends existing campaign regulations to social networking platforms and forbids contestants from

⁴⁰ A total of 5,000 supporting signatures is required to contest for the state presidency and the BiH HoR, and 3,000 for the president of RS, as well as for FBiH HoR and RS NA. With the exception of presidential races, parties and independent candidates holding a mandate at the same or higher level are exempted from this requirement. The deposit was increased since the last elections to 30,000 KM for parties contesting in the BiH presidential and BiH HoR elections, and BAM 20,000 for entity-level elections, while independent candidates shall deposit half of these amounts. The deposit is returned to political subjects who receive at least 3 per cent of the votes in a parliamentary race or who win the presidential or vice-presidential contests or receive one-third of the votes. By law, the CEC shall verify the authenticity of support signatures and take a decision within 15 days.

⁴¹ At least one candidate of the less represented gender among the first two candidates, two among the first five candidates, three among the first eight candidates, etc.

⁴² While the gender quota was complemented by some amendments introduced in 2024 to increase the participation of women in the campaign, a long-standing [recommendation](#) by ODIHR and the Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) regarding a system which would ensure a minimal percentage of each gender in elected bodies remains unaddressed.

⁴³ Early campaigning is prohibited from the day the elections are called up until the start of the official campaign period. The law forbids contestants from engaging in "hate speech", spreading disinformation, preventing journalists from performing their duties, promising financial rewards to voters for their support, or using children for political purposes, among other violations. During the campaign period, the law provides contestants with equitable access to public places and facilities, and requires them to ensure equal promotion of candidates of both genders in campaign activities, including media appearances and public gatherings.

engaging in “hate speech” and spreading disinformation, including online, some ODIHR NAM interlocutors questioned the capacity of the election administration to oversee and enforce these regulations in an effective and impartial manner. Others noted that in the absence of a comprehensive government policy to fight disinformation and clear institutional responsibilities, the detection and reporting of disinformation and manipulative content is primarily dependent upon non-state actors.

I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Campaign finance is primarily regulated by the Law on Financing of Political Parties and the Election Law.⁴⁴ The 2024 amendments did not fully address prior ODIHR recommendations, in particular with regard to proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for violations and effective campaign finance oversight.

Political parties represented at the state and entity level are entitled to public funding from the state and entity budgets, which may also be used for campaign purposes.⁴⁵ The law provides for private financing of campaigns and sets donation limits for individuals and legal entities, while prohibiting donations from foreign and anonymous sources, religious organizations, as well as those from publicly funded sources, including holders of public contracts with executive institutions. Third-party campaigning and spending are not regulated. Campaign expenditures are capped at BAM 0.30 per registered voter and contestants are required to open a dedicated bank account for campaign incomes and expenses.

The CEC is mandated with campaign finance oversight and the investigation of violations. Contestants have to submit an initial declaration at the time of registration, as well as interim reports three days before election day and a final report within 30 days of publishing final election results.⁴⁶ The CEC shall publish these reports on its website within 30 days of receipt but has no deadline for completing the auditing. The CEC may impose sanctions either *ex officio* or based on complaints. Despite the recent introduction of a new application for the submission of political party financial statements, the CEC anticipated challenges in effectively and timely monitoring campaign finances, including potential breaches, given its lack of human resources.⁴⁷ Some ODIHR NAM interlocutors raised concerns about the overall transparency of campaign finances and noted that in practice many transactions remain unreported, including alleged payments to PSC members and party observers.

J. MEDIA

Television remains the most influential news source but online portals, including social networks, have significantly grown in importance. While the media environment remains diverse, ODIHR NAM

⁴⁴ These are supplemented by the laws on political parties of RS and the Brčko District as well as the CEC regulations.

⁴⁵ Public funding was suspended in RS and reinstated only recently for most parties. In April 2025, the HR suspended all public funding of SNSD and its coalition partner, United Srpska, conditioning its reinstatement upon their compliance with the Dayton Agreement. In response, the RSNA abolished all party funding from the entity and municipal budgets and adopted the RS Law on Financing of Political Parties in May 2025. The law prescribed different donation limits, did not define prohibited sources of party funding and mandated the entity-level election commission with oversight. The party For Justice and Order challenged the abolishment of public funding at the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, citing inconsistency with the law. On December 9, the Constitutional Court suspended the law pending a final decision on constitutionality and, on 27 March, repealed it as unconstitutional due to the absence of public funding.

⁴⁶ Non-compliance with the requirement to submit the initial report results in denial of registration of the electoral contestant, and failure to submit the final report leads to revocation of a mandate.

⁴⁷ The CEC informed the ODIHR NAM that the auditing of the 2022 election campaign finance reports has recently been finalized.

interlocutors noted limited balanced reporting across both private and state media, and editorial policies divided along ethnic and political lines, and a lack of transparency on media ownership.⁴⁸

Since the last general elections, several key legislative initiatives have affected the legal and operating environment for media professionals.⁴⁹ In RS, the re-criminalization of defamation and libel in 2023 was followed by the brief implementation of a law on transparency of non-profit organizations, which also applied to many media outlets, and contributed to the stigmatization of alleged “foreign influence” beyond the law’s short period of application.⁵⁰ According to several ODIHR NAM interlocutors, these legal restrictions, combined with an increasing number of threats against journalists, continue to encourage self-censorship among media professionals and undermine freedom of expression.⁵¹

The public broadcasting service is provided by the Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BHRT) at the state level, as well as the Radio Television of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FTV) and Radio Television of Republika Srpska (RTRS) at the entity level. Long-standing financial difficulties affecting BHRT remain unresolved and unmitigated despite a 2025 decision by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirming BHRT’s legal entitlement to a share of the RTV tax collected in RS.⁵²

During the campaign period, contestants are entitled to both free and paid airtime, and public and private broadcasters have to provide contestants with equal and fair coverage.⁵³ Public broadcasters met by the ODIHR NAM shared their plans to organize debates among prospective candidates but noted difficulties in securing participation, particularly of candidates for state presidency. The 2024 amendments extended transparency obligations to reveal ownership details also to online media that intend to cover elections. However, most ODIHR NAM interlocutors noted the ineffectiveness of this provision in the

⁴⁸ According to the [Media Ownership Monitor](#), in Bosnia and Herzegovina the eight major media owners including public broadcasters have a market share of 89.29 per cent while their market share without the public broadcasters is 80.14 per cent, which represents a high risk.

⁴⁹ In 2024, a working group to draft legislation on transparency of media ownership was established but, to date, did not achieve tangible results. Despite a new state law on access to information (2023), most media met by the ODIHR NAM noted that lengthy procedures continue to make access to data difficult. A new law on the protection of personal data (2025) contains an exemption for data processing for journalistic purposes, which lacks clarity and predictability. Public order regulations at the cantonal and municipal levels were interpreted to initiate misdemeanor proceedings against individuals critical of local authorities on social media. See the [Mediacentar](#) monitoring report for more details on these initiatives.

⁵⁰ The 2023 [ODIHR Urgent Comments on the Draft Criminal Offences against Honour and Reputation in the Republika Srpska](#) noted that “[c]riminal convictions, given their chilling effect, inherently endanger freedom of expression; even criminal fines are disproportionate interferences and therefore contribute to or amount to a violation of the right to freedom of expression”. In 2025, the RSNA adopted a law on transparency of non-profit organisations, applicable also to the many media outlets registered as non-profit organisations. The law was annulled by the BiH Constitutional Court in May 2025.

⁵¹ In Reporters Without Borders’ [2026 World Press Freedom Index](#), Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 90th out of 180 countries, up from 86th in 2025, and 67th in 2022. According to data from the [Media Freedom Rapid Response](#) platform, 25 violations of media freedom were documented in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025, affecting a total of 45 media professionals and organizations, including verbal threats and attacks, followed by the obstruction of journalistic work, legal pressure, physical attacks and attacks on property. In 2024, 17 cases were recorded.

⁵² Funding is mainly provided through a broadcast tax collected by the entity broadcasters and shared with BHRT. The failure by the entity broadcasters to transfer the legally prescribed part of the funds to the BHRT has been a longstanding issue and ODIHR has previously recommended to introduce a stable system of funding to the public broadcaster. On 26 February, BHRT [suspended its programmes](#) for a day in sign of protest, while [another public protest](#) by BHRT workers took place on 27 November in front of the state parliament. In addition to disputes over the distribution of collected tax revenues, the low level of tax collection in the FBiH remains a serious concern, amounting to only 50.58% in the first half of 2025. BHRT reportedly carries debts of around EUR 51 million, including EUR 11.5 million owed to the European Broadcasting Union.

⁵³ Public broadcasters must allocate three minutes of free airtime to each political subject during the timeslots with the highest viewership; political subjects may also purchase advertising time, up to a maximum of 30 minutes per week on each public broadcaster and 60 minutes per week on each private broadcaster.

absence of a comprehensive regulatory framework for online media, as well as due to unclear oversight and enforcement mechanisms.⁵⁴

The Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) is the broadcast media regulator with a mandate to resolve media-related complaints and apply sanctions for violations. The CRA informed the ODIHR NAM that it does not conduct media monitoring of the election-related content, citing a lack of capacity and human resources, and performs its oversight functions based on complaints. Several ODIHR NAM interlocutors questioned the impact of its oversight powers given the limited resources at its disposal. The Press and Online Media Council, a self-regulatory body that issues non-binding decisions, reviews complaints on the electoral content published by print and online media.

K. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Legal standing is limited to voters and contestants whose rights are affected. The CEC reviews complaints on certain campaign violations, including “hate speech” and misuse of administrative resources, violations of media rules by political subjects as well as appeals against MEC decisions. The CEC is also obliged to start proceedings *ex officio* upon receiving information notices on alleged violations.⁵⁵ The MECs handle complaints on voter registration and other campaign matters. Appeals against CEC decisions are dealt with by the Appellate Division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not all decisions are subject to judicial review.⁵⁶ The Constitutional Court accepts applications from any individual whose fundamental rights have been violated and when all other remedies have been exhausted.⁵⁷ Despite a previous ODIHR recommendation, court sessions on election-related disputes are not open to the public, and according to the representatives of judiciary hearings are practically impossible due to compressed timelines and the very high number of electoral disputes to be adjudicated.

Some ODIHR NAM interlocutors questioned the CEC’s capacity to meaningfully review electoral disputes in a timely manner due to its limited human resources, while also noting the need to broaden rules for legal standing in line with a recent ODIHR recommendation. Representatives of the judiciary met by the ODIHR NAM expressed the need to receive comprehensive information on the use of election technologies and on the updated voting procedures in order to consider any potential related complaint. The CEC maintains a public database of complaints, but the law does not explicitly require publishing decisions and the text of complaints; however, the CEC informed the ODIHR NAM that these will be made public for the first time in the upcoming elections.

L. ELECTION OBSERVATION

Citizen observer organizations, international organizations as well as representatives of contestants can observe elections. Observers have access to the entire electoral process and the right to request information and documents, attend sessions of election commissions at all levels, access all electoral premises, and notify election commissions of irregularities. By law, the CEC accredits international observers and all other observers observing at the national level or the work of the CEC, while MECs accredit citizen observers as well as observers nominated by political subjects and candidates in the

⁵⁴ According to data from the [Press and Online Media Council](#), there are 488 registered as of 2025, of which only 40 per cent are transparent about their ownership.

⁵⁵ However, a CEC communication declining to initiate or continue *ex officio* proceedings is not appealable to the court as it does not constitute a formal decision.

⁵⁶ The Court does not review decisions on merits. Moreover, not all decisions are subject to judicial review, such as those on complaints lodged against the appointment of PSC presidents and deputy presidents.

⁵⁷ It is operating with seven judges instead of nine due to RS refusal to appoint judges.

respective municipalities. The CEC informed the ODIHR NAM of the introduction of a new online portal to apply for accreditation.

Pod Lupom informed the ODIHR NAM of its plans to deploy some 65 long-term observers and some 1,000 short-term observers to follow election day proceedings, while Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina will monitor the election period with a focus on campaign finances and campaign regulations. *Pod Lupom* also plans to conduct voter education activities, including mock elections involving the technologies.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

All ODIHR NAM interlocutors underlined the need for an extensive presence of an ODIHR election observation activity through all stages of the process citing the highly polarized political environment, and viewed observation by ODIHR as a means to promote confidence in the electoral process. All ODIHR NAM interlocutors welcomed an external review of the revised legal framework and its implementation, the full-scale introduction of the election technologies, and the overall conduct of the elections, including on election day. Particular concerns were raised about the conduct of the campaign, including online, and media coverage of the elections. Interlocutors also highlighted issues that would merit the attention of an ODIHR election observation activity, including allegations of vote-buying, the potential for the misuse of administrative resources and undue pressure on voters.

Based on this, the ODIHR NAM recommends the deployment of an Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the upcoming general elections. In addition to a core team of experts, the ODIHR NAM recommends the secondment of 24 long-term observers from OSCE participating States to follow the electoral process countrywide, and 300 short-term observers to follow election day proceedings. In line with ODIHR's standard methodology, the EOM will include a media monitoring component, and will assess the campaign environment and activities across traditional media, online outlets, and social media platforms. The mission will also assess the institutional preparedness and effectiveness in identifying and responding to disinformation, misinformation, and potential foreign and domestic interference, as well as existing co-operation mechanisms with social media platforms.

ANNEX: LIST OF MEETINGS

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Emina Merdan, Acting Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs

Inda Hrapović, Second Secretary, Department of OSCE, Council of Europe and Regional Initiatives

Central Election Commission

Jovan Kalaba, President

Irena Hadžiabdić, Member

Suad Arnautović, Member

Vanja Bjelica-Prutina, Member

Ahmet Šantić, Member

Vlado Rogić, Member

Goran Mišković, Secretary General

Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Zvezdana Antonović, Judge

Mirsada Džindo, Judge

Communications Regulatory Agency

Amela Odobašić, Director of Broadcasting

Azra Maslo, Head, Department for Programs and Complaints

Agency for Identification Documents, Registers and Data Exchange

Dijana Joldžić, Assistant Director

Darkon Ljuboje, Networks Administrator

Political Parties (Alphabetical order)

Aida Baručija, Caucus of People and Justice and BH initiative Kasumović Fuad

Jasmin Emrić, Mixed Caucus

Šemsudin Mehmedović, Mixed Caucus

Predrag Kojović, Our Party

Šerif Špago, Party of Democratic Action

Šemsudin Dedić, Party of Democratic Action

Mira Pekić, Party of Democratic Progress

Jasmin Imamović, Social Democratic Party of BiH

Civil Society

Dario Jovanović, Project Coordinator, Coalition *Pod Lupom*

Damjan Ožegović, Senior Researcher/Legal Associate, Transparency International BiH

Biljana Livancic Milic, Editor-in-Chief, Citizens' Association "*Zašto ne* (Why not)"

Emir Zulejhić, Editor, Citizens' Association "*Zašto ne* (Why not)"

Maida Bahto Kestendzic, Project Coordinator, Press and Online Media Council

Mirna Stanković-Luković, Co-ordinator of the Free Media Helpline, *BH Bovinari*

Lejla Bicakcic, Director, Centre for Investigative Reporting

Maida Muminovic, Executive Director, *Mediacentar*

Bojana Mrkić, Operations Manager, *Mediacentar*

Media

Mirza Huskic, editor in chief of news programs, BHRT

Željko Tica, editor in chief of TV programs, BHRT

Dejan Petrović, Editor of news programs, Radio and Television of FBiH
Željko Tica, Editor of TV programs, Radio and Television of FBiH
Slađana Jašarević, Journalist, *BN TV*
Vildana Selimbegović, Director, *Oslobođenje*

International Community

Representatives of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Office of the High Representative and EU Delegation. Representatives of embassies of OSCE participating States: Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Moldova, Portugal, Russian Federation and United Kingdom.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ The ODIHR NAM extended an invitation to representations of all OSCE participating States resident in Bosnia and Herzegovina.