



Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

NORWAY

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 8 SEPTEMBER 2025

ODIHR Election Expert Team
Final Report



Warsaw
27 March 2026

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
II.	INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	3
III.	BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT	4
IV.	LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM.....	4
V.	ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTER REGISTRATION	6
VI.	ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN.....	8
VII.	CAMPAIGN FINANCE.....	10
	A. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE.....	11
	B. DISCLOSURE AND OVERSIGHT	13
VIII.	PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES.....	14
	A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK.....	14
	B. ACCESSIBILITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS	14
	C. ELECTION CAMPAIGN, MEDIA AND REPRESENTATION	17
IX.	ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION	18
X.	ELECTION DAY.....	20
XI.	RECOMMENDATIONS	21
	ANNEX: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS	23
	ABOUT ODIHR	25

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following an invitation from the Norwegian authorities and in line with its mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Expert Team (EET) for the 8 September parliamentary elections. The EET focused its assessment on the legal framework, the work of the election administration, the campaign environment, including online activities, campaign finance, and the participation of persons with disabilities in the electoral process.

The elections were well administered and took place in an environment that respected fundamental freedoms and enjoyed a high level of public trust. The election administration operated professionally, impartially, and with high stakeholder confidence. The campaign was competitive and pluralistic, but the growing engagement of third parties and digital actors, and insufficient regulation reduced transparency. The system of party and campaign finance is generally trusted; however, the absence of donation and spending limits and the lack of timely disclosure resulted in disparities in resources and insufficient oversight. Recent legal amendments further improved accessibility and strengthened independent voting for persons with disabilities, though some polling stations remain inaccessible and the low political representation of persons with disabilities persists.

The 2023 Election Act, implemented for the first time in these elections, replaced the 2002 law and was adopted after comprehensive and inclusive consultations, enjoying broad cross-party consensus. It consolidated the legal framework, reinforcing the basis for democratic elections, and introduced changes to voter and candidate registration, advance and election-day voting, counting procedures and the publication of results, and established a permanent National Electoral Committee (NEC). The Act implemented several prior ODIHR recommendations, including on voter identification, publishing polling-station level results, and requiring the testing of digital election administration systems. However, several ODIHR recommendations remain unaddressed, including those related to individual candidacy, involvement of candidates in the election administration and gaps in relation to campaign finance regulation and the lack of rules for online campaigning. The recommendation on candidate consent was not implemented; however, election officials are required to notify candidates of their inclusion on candidate lists, and candidates may request to be removed.

The 169 members of the Parliament (*Storting*) are elected for a fixed four-year term through proportional representation, with 150 seats filled in 19 multi-member districts and 19 compensatory seats allocated to parties that pass the four-per-cent national threshold. The 2023 Election Act replaced the former semi-open system with fully closed lists but retained the long-standing seat-allocation formula that combines population and territory, resulting in notable variations in district size and voter-to-seat ratios.

The election administration conducted the process impartially, with a high level of professionalism, and enjoyed stakeholder confidence. The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (MLGRD) and its Directorate of Elections administered the process nationally, while 19 District Election Committees, 357 Municipal Election Committees, and 1,638 polling stations operated at subnational levels. Under the amended law, polling stations are now chaired by officials selected

¹ The English version of this report is the only official document. An unofficial translation is available in Norwegian.

through open competition and are required to conduct the first count of votes at the polling station. The Directorate provided comprehensive oversight of training managed the electronic election system used for registration, ballot scanning, and results management, and provided voter information in multiple languages. District and municipal commissions, largely composed of elected councillors, performed their duties efficiently. While contestants are no longer permitted to serve as polling station officials, they may still be on district and municipal election commissions, leaving a potential for conflicts of interest.

Women are well represented in political life, and they held around 45 per cent of seats in the outgoing *Storting*, and five of the nine parliamentary parties were led by women. Ten of the twenty ministers in the outgoing government were women. While there are no legal requirements for gender-balanced or minority representation, most parties applied internal rules or practices, such as zippered lists, and generally sought to promote diversity among candidates, and women made up 43 per cent of all 4,912 registered candidates.

Election campaigns are largely unregulated, and there is no legally defined campaign period. A range of contestants represented a variety of political views, and parties informed the ODIHR EET that they were able to campaign freely. Third-party actors also played a significant role, including labour unions, party youth organisations, other associations, and influencers.

Online campaigns are not regulated, despite online media and social networks being used extensively in the campaign, both by parties and by third-party actors. The prominent role of digital campaigning, and the markedly higher engagement achieved by the largest parties, raised some questions about equality of opportunity among contestants. All nine parliamentary parties signed a pledge not to use deepfakes or AI-manipulated content during the campaign. A government interagency working group under the MLGRD was tasked with strengthening resilience against foreign interference and disinformation in elections; no significant cases of such interference were noted during the campaign period. Several parties reported difficulties in communicating with certain social media platforms regarding anonymous or misleading content, noting that responses were often delayed or insufficient.

Campaign finance is regulated by the 2005 Political Parties Act, which provides for annual public funding to parties but does not set limits on donations or expenditures nor requires disclosure of campaign spending, impacting transparency, at odds with international standards and international good practice. Anonymous donations are prohibited, and a July 2025 amendment extended this ban to organisations acting as intermediaries, but its late entry into force limited its impact on these elections. Undue influence of donations and the involvement of unregulated third-party campaigners further reduced transparency and contributed to an uneven playing field. The Political Party Act Committee (PPAC) is mandated with oversight but lacks sufficient powers and human and financial resources to ensure effective oversight. Overall, the campaign finance regulatory framework does not fully ensure transparency, accountability, and integrity of party and campaign finances.

The 2023 Act addressed some prior ODIHR and Council of Europe Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) recommendations on dispute resolution, including the possibility to appeal election-related matters to a competent body, including the judiciary, and the possibility to challenge parliament's decision on the validity of elections to the Supreme Court. The NEC is now mandated with dispute resolution. However, the law does not require the NEC to hold hearings and does not set a deadline for review of complaints, at odds with good electoral practice and prior recommendations. The NEC received and considered 68 complaints, mainly related to candidate registration. As required by law, all complaints were reviewed before the convocation of the new parliament. The NEC published on its website information on the complaints and decisions in a timely manner.

The legal framework guarantees the right to vote and stand for office for persons with disabilities. The 2023 Election Act ensures free choice of assistance for voters and introduces stricter accessibility requirements for polling stations. A wide range of voting methods, including mobile and homebound voting, facilitates participation in elections, including for those living in residential institutions. The law requires municipalities to ensure accessibility but allows for exceptions, which led to diverging practices across municipalities and some inaccessible locations. The participation of persons with intellectual disabilities was impacted by the lack of election-related information by election authorities and campaign materials by political parties in easy-to-read formats, as well as the ballot design. Persons with disabilities remain underrepresented in electoral campaigns and among national elected officials and candidates.

This report offers a number of recommendations to support efforts to bring elections in Norway closer in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. Recommendations focus on reviewing seat-allocation principles to strengthen equality of the vote, prohibiting candidates from serving on election commissions, enhancing safeguards for personal data in voter list data, regulating online campaigning, considering limits on private donations and campaign expenditures, subjecting third-party actors to the same transparency rules as political parties, improving disclosure of income and expenditure, prescribing expedited deadlines and public hearings for complaints, further strengthening legal requirements for accessibility of polling stations, harmonising the use of Braille ballots, improving ballot design to enhance usability, and adopting comprehensive measures to promote the participation of persons with disabilities in political life at all levels. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities in further improving the electoral process and addressing the recommendations in this and previous reports.

II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Following an invitation from the Norwegian authorities and based on the findings and conclusions of a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) conducted from 2 to 5 June 2025, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Expert Team (EET) to observe the 8 September parliamentary elections. The ODIHR EET consisted of three experts drawn from three OSCE participating States.

The ODIHR EET focused its assessment on the legal framework and its implementation, the election administration, voter and candidate registration, the election campaign, political party and campaign finance, and the accessibility of the electoral process and participation of persons with disabilities. The report is thus limited in scope and does not offer an overall assessment of the elections. Specific areas under review were assessed for compliance with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, and national legislation. In line with the ODIHR's methodology, the EET did not undertake comprehensive and systematic observation of election-day procedures. This final report should be read in conjunction with the 2025 ODIHR NAM report and previous reports, which provide additional detail on electoral processes in Norway.²

The ODIHR EET wishes to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Local Government and Regional Development (MLGRD), the Directorate of Elections and the National Election Committee (NEC), political parties, civil society organizations, academia, and other interlocutors for their cooperation and assistance.

² See previous [ODIHR election-related reports on Norway](#).

III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

The Kingdom of Norway is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of representation. Formally, the King-in-Council heads the executive branch, with executive power vested in the Council of State, comprising of ministers selected by the Prime Minister. Legislative authority is vested in the 169-seat unicameral parliament (*Stortinget* or *Storting*). The Norwegian political actors are broadly divided into two main blocs (left and right). To pass legislation, incumbent governments frequently reach out to non-government parties to secure issue-by-issue majorities; this practice of ad hoc cross-bloc co-operation helps ensure wider consensus on key laws.

In the 2021 parliamentary elections, nine parties were elected to the *Storting*: Labour Party (48 seats), Conservative Party (36 seats), Centre Party (28 seats), Progress Party (21 seats), Socialist Left Party (13 seats), Red Party (8 seats), Liberal Party (8 seats), Green Party (3 seats), and Christian Democratic Party (3 seats). In addition, one seat was won by the organization Patient Focus.

Women are well represented in political life, and constituted approximately 45 per cent of the outgoing *Storting*, and at the time of elections, five of the nine parliamentary parties were led by women. Ten out of the twenty ministers in the outgoing government were women.

Following the 2021 parliamentary elections, the Labour Party and Centre Party formed a minority coalition government.³ In January 2025, the Centre Party, strongly opposed to EU integration, left the coalition over the adoption of EU energy directives, which Norway, as a member of the European Economic Area, is obliged to adopt into national legislation. In line with established practice in Norway, where incumbent minority governments generally remain in office until elections without seeking new parliamentary alignments, there was no attempt to form a new majority, and both the government and the *Storting* operated regularly in the following months.

Norway continues to enjoy high levels of public trust in its institutions.⁴ However, in recent years, business-related actions by some senior politicians or their spouses have raised concerns about conflicts of interest and ethical misconduct, prompting public censure, inquiries by economic crime authorities, and, in a few cases, criminal prosecution or conviction, contributing to a moderate decline in public trust in the political establishment.

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Parliamentary elections are regulated by the 1814 Constitution (last amended in 2024) and the newly adopted 2023 Act on Elections to the Parliament, County Councils and Municipal Councils (Election Act). The legal framework is supplemented by regulations issued by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (MLGRD).⁵ Norway is a party to major international and regional instruments related to democratic elections.⁶

³ The Labour-Centre coalition government jointly had 76 of the 169 MPs.

⁴ See the 2024 [OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions](#). On 10 June 2025, the [Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption \(GRECO\)](#) concluded its compliance procedure for Norway, having positively assessed the country's implementation of reforms aimed at promoting integrity and preventing corruption in government and law enforcement.

⁵ See the [MLGRD Regulation on Elections](#).

⁶ Including the 1966 [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights](#), 1965 [International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination](#), 1979 [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women](#), 2003 [UN Convention against Corruption](#), 2006 [Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities](#), and 1950 [European Convention on Human Rights](#). Norway is also a member of the [Council of Europe's Venice Commission](#) and [Group of States against Corruption \(GRECO\)](#).

The electoral legal framework overall provides a sound foundation for the conduct of democratic elections. The 2023 Elections Act, which replaced the 2002 Act, was applied for the first time in these elections.⁷ The Act was adopted following comprehensive and inclusive public consultations and enjoyed broad consensus.⁸ The new Act re-established a permanent National Electoral Committee (NEC) mandated with adjudication of election disputes, removed the mechanism for preferential voting for parliamentary elections, introduced provisions to ensure greater accessibility for voters with disabilities, rules that allow for postponing or extending elections under extraordinary circumstances, and rules regarding the number of signatures needed for list proposals. It also clarified responsibility for overseeing the vote in polling stations and prescribed a mandatory first count of the ballots cast on election day to be conducted in all polling stations.

The new Act implemented a number of prior ODIHR recommendations, including clarifying the acceptable forms of identification for voting, publishing election results disaggregated per polling-station, requiring the consent of candidates for their nomination, and requiring testing of digital election administration systems. However, several ODIHR recommendations remain to be addressed, including those related to allowing for individual independent candidates, barring candidates and elected officials from serving as election commissioners and as members of the Political Parties Act Commission, prescribing timely campaign finance disclosure, and regulation of third-party campaigning.

The unicameral parliament consists of 169 members directly elected for a four-year term. A total of 150 members are elected in 19 multi-member electoral districts through a system of proportional representation. In addition, 19 compensatory seats, one per district, are distributed among the parties that receive at least four per cent of the vote nationwide.⁹ The new Election Act eliminated the possibility of preferential voting; voters select a party list containing a predetermined order of candidates (closed lists).¹⁰ The Constitution and the Election Act do not provide for pre-term dissolution of parliament and holding of early elections or any by-elections in case of resignations.

By law, the boundaries of the electoral districts are fixed, and the distribution of allocated seats is reviewed before each parliamentary election to reflect demographic changes. Pursuant to the recent administrative reform, the electoral districts no longer coincide with the counties.¹¹ The new Act mandates a review of the number of seats per electoral district prior to each election instead of every eight years, based on the demographic data as of the end of the penultimate year before the elections. The number of seats per district is determined according to a formula based on the number of inhabitants and geographic surface area. In addition, each district is guaranteed at least four seats.¹² However, as a result, there are significant discrepancies in the population size among some districts, at odds with

⁷ The new Election Act was adopted in June 2023 and entered into force on 1 May 2024.

⁸ The Election Act Commission, established in 2017 by the MLGRD, was tasked to propose changes to the Election Act. Many amendments were based on its [2020 report and recommendations](#).

⁹ The compensatory seats are awarded to the eligible parties with the largest remainder of votes nationwide while each eligible party receives the compensatory seat in the district where it has the largest remainder.

¹⁰ Under the old Election Act, voters could vote for a candidate, cross out names of candidates or add names of candidates from other lists but preferential votes were taken into account only if a candidate had received at least 50 per cent of the votes cast. The ODIHR EET was informed that in past elections, no candidate was elected based on preferential votes.

¹¹ In 2020, the number of Counties (*fylker*) was reduced from 19 to 11. In 2024, some of the merged counties were reinstated and there are [currently 15 counties](#). In 2020, the number of municipalities was [reduced](#) from 422 to 356; while some municipalities were fully merged, others had their boundaries adjusted and some were switched to a different county. In 2025, there were 357 municipalities, following reinstatement of some recently merged municipalities.

¹² Each inhabitant is given 1 point while each square kilometer is given 1.8 points. The modified Sainte-Laguë method (first divisor 1.4) is applied for seat distribution. In its report, the Election Act Commission had recommended reducing the weight of geographic surface area while ensuring a minimum number of representatives in smaller constituencies, but this was not taken on board in the government's bill.

international good practice.¹³ While these discrepancies do not ensure equality of the vote, most ODIHR EET interlocutors noted that the deviations aim to ensure effective representation of the large, sparsely populated areas.¹⁴

To ensure equal suffrage, election authorities should further review whether the current system is duly proportionate to the principle of equality. In line with international good practice, the review should aim to ensure that the seat-allocation principles offer stronger protection of the equality of the vote while maintaining adequate representation of sparsely populated regions.

V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTER REGISTRATION

The elections are administered by the MLGRD and its Directorate of Elections, the 19 District Election Committees (DECs), and on the municipal level by the 357 Municipal Election Committees (MECs) and officials at 1,648 polling stations. The election administration conducted its work impartially and demonstrated a high level of professionalism at all levels. Its performance enjoyed the full confidence of electoral stakeholders.

The MLGRD is mandated with the oversight of the conduct of elections; it drafts and proposes amendments, provides interpretation of the legal framework, issues regulations and guidelines for counties, municipalities, and election commissions. The MLGRD performed all its duties professionally and efficiently. The Directorate of Elections provides guidance and training for election officials and, among other functions, develops and administers the Electronic Administration System for Elections (EVA), which is used for the registration of voters and candidate lists, identifying and marking voters who cast ballots, ballot scanning, and tabulation and management of election results.¹⁵ In line with legal requirements, the Directorate provided online and in-person trainings of trainers for election officials, focusing on new counting procedures and the use of EVA and conducted extensive voter information

and education campaigns in several languages.¹⁶ Mock elections were also held for the municipalities on two occasions in June and August and for the DECs in August. The MLGRD and the Directorate co-operated effectively with other state institutions on securing EVA, which is designated as critical infrastructure. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the National Security Authority and the

¹³ In Finnmark a seat corresponds to 18,763 inhabitants while in Akerhus to 38,358. Akershus has 20 seats; Aust-Agder: 4; Buskerud: 8; Finnmark: 4; Hedmark: 7; Hordaland: 16; Møre og Romsdal: 8; Nordland: 9; Nord-Trøndelag: 5; Oppland: 6; Oslo: 20; Rogaland: 14; Sogn og Fjordane: 4; Sør-Trøndelag: 10; Telemark: 6; Troms: 6; Vest-Agder: 6; Vestfold: 7; Østfold: 9. For 2025, Akershus gained one seat (20 in total), while Finnmark lost one (4 seats). All other districts retained the same number of seats as in 2021. See the [number of inhabitants, territory and seats per district and the number of voters per district](#). In the districts of Vestfold, Aust-Agder and Nordland, the number of inhabitants per seat deviates by more than 10 per cent from the national average, while in the sparsely populated Finnmark deviates by more than 30 per cent. The Code of Good Practice, I. 2.2 reads: “Equal voting power: seats must be evenly distributed between the constituencies. [...] iv. The permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10%, and should certainly not exceed 15% except in special circumstances (protection of a concentrated minority, sparsely populated administrative entity).”

¹⁴ Section I.2.2.iv. of the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) 2002 [Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters](#) states: The permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10%, and should certainly not exceed 15% except in special circumstances (protection of a concentrated minority, sparsely populated administrative entity); See also the Venice Commission 2017 [Report on Constituency Delimitation and Seat Allocation](#).

¹⁵ The Directorate operates an [Election portal](#) with guidance and instructions for election officials. The system documentation for EVA’s components and source code are available on the Directorate’s website.

¹⁶ In addition to the two Norwegian languages (Bokmål and Nynorsk), voter-information was conducted and official brochures were provided in Arabic, English, Farsi, Polish, Russian, Somali, Southern Sami, Thai, Tigrinya, Turkish, Urdu, Northern Sami, and Lule Sami. The Directorate’s voter pages also highlight Norwegian Sign Language resources and “information in several languages” sections for voters.

Police Security Service provided input and assistance on cybersecurity, disinformation resilience and contingency planning, contributing to the security and integrity of the electoral process.

DEC members are elected by the corresponding county councils and were often composed of the elected county council members, as provided by the law.¹⁷ The 357 Municipal Election Committees (MECs) were appointed by the respective municipal councils in a timely manner and comprised at least three members. The Election Act does not specify how MEC members can be nominated or the criteria for their selection. In practice, they were party representatives, often also members of the municipal councils. Both DEC and MECs performed their tasks efficiently and within the legal deadlines. Several municipalities complemented the national campaign with their own voter-information initiatives in multiple languages, most prominently through the production and dissemination of short “how to vote” video guides.¹⁸

The new Election Act restructured the composition of officials responsible at polling station. Instead of political party representatives, the boards now consist of a chair and deputy chair appointed by municipalities. The polling station officials are now by law required to conduct the first count of votes at the polling station. Candidates may not serve as polling station officials, but they may still serve as DEC and MEC members and may, at the same time, be municipal or county councillors. The participation of candidates at any level of the election administration might create conflicts of interest, particularly in relation to candidate registration and results tabulation, and remains at odds with a prior ODIHR recommendation.

To safeguard the impartiality of the election administration, the law should be amended to prohibit candidates from serving as members of election commissions at any level.

All citizens aged 18 or older by the end of the year in which elections are held are eligible to vote. Voters are registered in the municipality of their residence as of 30 June of the election year. Citizens who have resided abroad for more than ten years are automatically removed from the voter register but, following the 2023 amendments, may vote without prior application and are subsequently re-entered in the voter register of their last municipality of residence.¹⁹

Voter registration is automatic, and is based on the National Population Register. The process of maintaining and updating the voter register is transparent, with the possibility for public inspection and verification at the municipal level, contributing to confidence in the integrity of the voter register. MECs are required to make the voter lists available for inspection at the municipalities in paper format or with limited access in electronic format, and to notify voters of the time period in which they may inspect the voter lists; for this election from 10 July until election day. Overall, the voter register is inclusive and comprehensive, reflecting broad suffrage rights and accurate population data.

Contestants are entitled to one free copy of the voter list, extracted by MECs through the EVA system, and may also request paid copies of specific subgroups, such as first-time voters, which parties use for campaign purposes.²⁰ Parties are obliged to destroy the obtained voter lists within two years of receipt; however, this measure has limited practical effect in protecting personal data, as elections are held every two years (alternating between parliamentary and local elections).

¹⁷ DEC approved candidate lists, printed ballots, tabulated election results on the district level and allocated seats in the district. The MEC of Oslo acts as the DEC for the Oslo electoral district.

¹⁸ Notably, the Municipality of Drammen developed a series of voter education videos, which was then republished or embedded by other municipalities, including Bergen, Klepp, Nes (Akershus), and Nome.

¹⁹ In the past, voters residing abroad were required to apply to vote for each election.

²⁰ For example, party representatives informed the ODIHR EET that they operated call centres during the campaign, calling voters to come out to vote, focusing on those who did not vote in past elections.

Polling cards are no longer produced, and voters are no longer instructed to present them at polling stations. Instead, the Directorate sent only informational notices digitally or by post, informing voters of their municipality of residence and the arrangements for advance and homebound voting.

To strengthen personal data safeguards, the use of official voter-register data could be legally confined to voter list verification, coupled with an obligation to irreversibly delete all copies within a narrowly defined period after election day.

VI. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

Election campaigns are largely unregulated, and there is no legally defined campaign period. In line with established practice, the campaign kicked off with a televised party-leaders debate on 11 August at the Arendal Week festival.²¹ In the campaign, a range of contestants represented diverse political views, and fundamental freedoms of association and assembly were respected, and election participants were able to campaign freely. However, the campaign was also marked by the prominent engagement of third-party actors, and the lack of legal expenditure limits, along with limited information regarding their sponsors, undermining transparency and potentially limiting voters' ability to assess information on the sources and interests behind campaign messages.

There are no regulations on online campaigning. Following public consultations which commenced on 2 July, the government plans to adopt national legislation to implement the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) in mid-2026.²² The Ministry of Digitisation and Public Administration has decided to designate the Norwegian Communications Authority (Nkom) as the DSA coordinator. For these elections, no authority was legally responsible for monitoring the conduct of the campaign online.

Consideration should be given to regulating online campaigns with the aim to ensure equality of opportunity for contestants and the protecting the ability of voters to make an informed choice.

Social media and online platforms were widely used by political parties and third-party actors, with Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok the most widely used.²³ Among the parties, Labour, the Conservatives, and the Progress Party achieved the highest levels of engagement. Parties combined organic content with paid advertising, while posts from party leaders were less frequent than those from party accounts. Some individual candidates with large audiences were notably active online, using varied digital content to promote their messages and connect with voters.²⁴ Party youth organisations, which are publicly funded and largely autonomous, also played a visible role in online campaigning, using social media to reach younger voters.

²¹ The Arendal Week is an [annual festival of democracy](#) that takes place every August.

²² See further information about the [consultation process](#) from 2 July to 1 October 2025, overseen by the Ministry of Digitisation and Public Administration. The Act will apply to large digital platforms, including Google, Meta, TikTok, and Amazon, to enhance online safety and consumer protection. The Act proposes bans on targeted advertising to minors and the use of sensitive personal data for ads, requires transparent advertising disclosures, easier reporting of illegal content, and prohibits manipulative design tactics. It also mandates risk assessments by major platforms on illegal content, election interference, disinformation, and user health, with the National Communications Authority coordinating enforcement alongside other national authorities.

²³ Between 26 August and 6 September, the ODIHR EET monitored 24 accounts of political parties, party leaders, candidates, action groups, labour unions, influencers/public figures on Facebook and Tik Tok as well as one prominent anonymous account on Facebook (Viral Videos), with a focus on the two most relevant and engaging posts per account per day. Engagements ('likes' on X, total reactions on Facebook) were counted per platform, prioritizing the one with the highest follower count.

²⁴ Including Simen Velle, the leader of the Progress Party's youth organisation, and a candidate in Oslo, Mimir Kristjánsson, a candidate of the Red Party, and Jonas Ali Ghanizadeh, a candidate of the Green Party.

In November 2024, all nine parliamentary parties signed a pledge not to use deepfakes or AI-manipulated content during the campaign, even if intended as satire.²⁵ This, in absence of specific regulation, contributed to a generally respectful campaign discourse and to preventing the spread of misleading or manipulative content. The Norwegian Data Protection Authority issued guidelines for parties on the processing of personal data and how it can be used for targeting political messages, in line with the Personal Data Act.²⁶ The agency informed the ODIHR EET they had received a number of complaints from voters regarding personal data used for direct messaging by parties.²⁷ The non-profit organisation *Faktisk.no*, a collaboration among several media outlets, worked to counter disinformation through fact-checking and education on media literacy.²⁸

Shortly before the election, the Police Security Service (PST) informed the public that several politicians had been subjected to threats or threatening behaviour during the pre-election period. The authorities informed the ODIHR EET that, in one case, three individuals were indicted for assaulting the leader of the Progress Party. Two parties reported that their campaign activists had been harassed by protesters over their positions on Gaza, while another party said it had to provide additional security for a candidate wearing a hijab. While incidents of threats and harassment against politicians and campaigners are of serious concern, the authorities' effective response demonstrated institutional readiness to maintain a secure campaign environment.

Third-party actors played a significant role in the campaign. The three largest trade union organisations, which have substantial followings on Facebook and TikTok, were active through organic content and paid advertisements on themes such as employment rights, taxation, and social welfare, supporting parties on the left. Business-oriented political action committees supported parties on the right, criticised the Labour government, and promoted policies advocating lower taxes and a smaller public sector.²⁹ High-profile influencers were active in the campaign, and were more prominent supporting parties on the right than those on the left.³⁰

A group of four young influencers, known as Gutta ("the Boys"), who produce conservative, informal content with a harsh tone on their YouTube channel, made a notable impact on the campaign through their "20 against 1" debates, in which party leaders engaged with 20 individuals holding opposing political views. These videos were not subject to editorial guidelines and at times featured sharp exchanges.³¹ Political parties informed the ODIHR EET that participating in these debates was an effective way to reach young voters and that, despite the *Gutta's* identifiable political leanings, the discussions were presented in a largely neutral manner.

²⁵ See information about this initiative [here](#).

²⁶ The [guidelines](#) were issued on 28 August 2025.

²⁷ The agency informed the ODIHR EET that they may follow up on some of these complaints.

²⁸ *Faktisk.no* is part of the Meta fact-checking network. It publishes corrections of false information in the media as well as on its own [website](#). If they identify false information, they inform Meta, which can reduce the post's visibility. *Faktisk* also promotes media literacy in schools.

²⁹ Two of these groups, Action for Norwegian Ownership and Joint Action for Value Creation and Private Norwegian Ownership, were active on Facebook and TikTok and also organized local campaign events. A third group, Action for a Right-wing Election Victory, was less active on social networks and focused instead on newspaper and radio advertisements.

³⁰ Among the most prominent influencers on the right was Sindre Wiig Nordby, a former professional cross-country skier. He was very active on Facebook and TikTok, with both paid ads and organic content. He also produced and posted a [documentary](#) on YouTube, about government spending, which was widely referred to by politicians and other influencers on the right. Notable influencers on the left, albeit with much less reach than Nordby, included journalist Jo Skårderud and trade union employee Snorre Rein, who [posted](#) videos on TikTok on themes such as defending the welfare state.

³¹ As of 5 September, the debates on the *Gutta* YouTube channel had been viewed 456,000 times and 285,000 times for the Labour and Progress Party leaders, respectively. Individual members of Gutta were also active on other platforms, notably TikTok, where they promoted calls for political change.

In response to growing concerns about the impact of artificial intelligence (AI), the MLGRD appointed an expert group in 2024 to assess how AI could influence elections, which *inter alia* recommended enhancing transparency in political communication, strengthening media and digital literacy, and establishing mechanisms for oversight and redress related to the use of AI in elections.³² A government interagency working group under the MLGRD was tasked with strengthening resilience against foreign interference and disinformation in elections.³³ The Norwegian National Security Authority (NNSA), part of this working group, acted as the contact point for the social network platforms, although this role is not defined in law. Cases of anonymous campaigning were noted both online and offline (through posters and leaflets).

In August, a series of paid ads were posted on an anonymous Facebook account, with content highly critical of the Labour Party and especially its leader, the prime minister, who was repeatedly referred to as a “liar.”³⁴ The Labour Party informed the ODIHR EET it contacted Meta about the account, copying the NNSA. Meta removed all the paid ads, but allowed the account to remain active, without providing any further information on its actions.³⁵ Several parties asserted to the ODIHR EET that Meta was often unresponsive to their communications, or responded in an untimely manner.³⁶ Another prominent example of anonymous campaign activity involved the distribution of leaflets in several cities shortly before election day, urging supporters of the Progress and Conservative parties to vote tactically for either the Christian Democratic or Liberal parties to help them reach the four per cent threshold, for the overall benefit of the bloc of parties on the right. Notably, the design and font of the leaflets mimicked the public information materials of the Directorate of Elections. The Christian Democrats and Liberals distanced themselves from the leaflets and criticised anonymous campaigning.

VII. CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Party and campaign finance are mainly regulated by the 2005 Act on Certain Matters Concerning Political Parties (Political Parties Act, PPA). The most recent amendment to the PPA introduce obligation for parties to know identities of donors who donated indirectly through another entity aiming to enhance transparency. However, as this change entered into force on 1 July 2025, five months into the donation disclosure period, its effectiveness was reduced for these elections. The PPA lacks detail on the rules concerning party finance and reporting, and lacks clarity in certain areas. Overall, the law does not sufficiently regulate campaign expenditure or third-party campaigning, lacks limits on private donations, and does not require timely reporting of campaign income and spending, and past ODIHR recommendations to introduce spending limits, and clarify the composition and mandate of the Political Parties Act Committee remain unaddressed. As previously announced, the MLGRD established in December 2025 a committee to review the PPA and offer recommendations on strengthening political finance regulation following these elections.³⁷

³² See the February 2025 [report](#) and recommendations published by the group.

³³ The working group includes several ministries and security agencies, as well as the Directorate of Elections. The government announced the [action plan](#) for the 2025 election in June.

³⁴ The account was registered under the pseudonym “Occultus Spiritus”.

³⁵ Information about the account was [printed in a newspaper article](#) in *Dagens Næringsliv*. The NNSA informed the ODIHR EET that Meta did not provide information as to why the ads were removed, but that the person behind them was resident in Norway.

³⁶ The Progress Party told the ODIHR EET there had been cases of the Facebook pages of their Chair and some local branches were taken down for months, without explanation, and that Meta had been slow to respond to communications about the matter.

³⁷ The committee comprises 18 members, including relevant experts and academics, representatives of all parties in the parliament, and a member from the National Council for Norwegian Children and Youth Organizations, with a mandate to conduct a comprehensive review of the PPA, focusing on party registration, financing, transparency, campaign regulation, including on third parties and contribution limits, as well as oversight, sanctions, and appeals.

A. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

Parliamentary political parties are entitled to annual public funding, which may also be used for campaigning.³⁸ Most of the funding is allocated proportionally to the votes received in the last parliamentary elections.³⁹ There is no public funding specifically for election campaigns. Parties and election campaigns may also be financed by private donations, membership fees, and their own profitable activities. Anonymous donations are prohibited, and private donations by state bodies and foreign donors are not allowed.

The law does not prescribe limits on donations and expenditure, at odds with good electoral practice.⁴⁰ A number of political parties noted a steady increase in private donations, especially by business donors to parties on the right, and financial support by trade unions to parties on the left.⁴¹ Several parties told the ODIHR EET that increasing private donations put pressure on others to raise more money, leading to more intensive fundraising, creating potential for undue influence of money on political agendas, and for distorting the playing field between parties, which is inconsistent with international standards.⁴² Some parties told the ODIHR EET that, as part of the proposed review of the PPA, limits on individual and overall donations could be considered.

To maintain a level playing field and limit the potential for individuals or groups to gain undue political influence, consideration should be given to establishing limits on private donations and campaign expenditures.

³⁸ In 2024, the ruling Labour Party [received](#) the highest public funding, totalling NOK 150,024,256 (approx. EUR 12,800,000), which amounted to 55 per cent of its total funding; the Conservatives received NOK 133,967,067 (approx. EUR 11,400,000), 65 per cent of their total funding; the Progressive Party received NOK 67,439,400 (approx. EUR 5,000,000), 62 per cent of their total; and the Centre Party received NOK 66,705,671 (approx. EUR 5,700,000), 77 per cent of their total.

³⁹ One-tenth of public support is provided on an equal basis, and nine-tenths is proportional to the number of votes received. Parties that received at least 2.5 per cent of the vote in the previous parliamentary election, or at least one parliamentary seat, are entitled to annual basic support, on an equal basis, which in 2025 amounted to NOK 4,331,689 (about EUR 37,000) for each eligible party. In addition, parties receive an equal amount per each vote received in the previous parliamentary elections, which in 2025 was set at NOK 117.79 (EUR 10) per vote. Public support is also provided to county and municipal organisations on a similar basis, based on their local election results, at much lower rates. Party youth organisations also benefit from public support, on the basis of their parent parties' performances in the previous parliamentary or local elections. See also the [Party Portal website](#) maintained by the government agency State Administrator's Joint Services (STAF).

⁴⁰ Article 3 of [Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec\(2003\) 4](#) on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns advises that consideration be given to limiting the value of donations to political parties. Further, Article 9 recommends that states should consider adopting measures to prevent excessive funding needs of political parties, such as limits on campaign expenditure. See also the 2020 [ODIHR and Venice Commission's Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#) (paragraphs 211 and 213) which recommend that, in order to limit the ability of persons or groups to gain political influence through financial advantages, reasonable limitations could be imposed on private donations.

⁴¹ Since 1 January, the Labour Party received the largest total donations, with almost double the donations received by the party with the next highest total donations, the Progress Party. The Labour Party's total included a substantial contribution from Norway's largest trade union organisation, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). For its part, the Progress Party's total included a significant contribution from the political action group "Action for a Right-wing Election Victory," which received anonymous donations, as allowed by law until 1 July 2025. The Conservative Party also received a relatively high level of donations.

⁴² Paragraph 19 of the [UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 25](#) states "reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party." See also Paragraph 248 of the [2020 ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#) which provides that "It is reasonable for a state to determine the criteria for electoral spending and a maximum spending limit for participants in elections, in order to achieve the legitimate aim of securing equity among candidates and political parties."

The campaign activities of third-party actors are unregulated, which, in terms of political finance is not in line with good electoral practice.⁴³ On the left of the political spectrum, in addition to donating to political parties, trade unions conducted their own campaign activities. The largest such organisation, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), informed the ODIHR EET that it campaigned both to promote its policy agenda and in favour of parties on the left. The LO also called on its members not to vote for the Progress Party. Some political parties on the right expressed to the ODIHR EET the view that when trade unions campaign directly for political parties or candidates, such spending should be included in the financial reporting of the party concerned. On the other hand, business-oriented political action committees, campaigned supporting parties on the right, in addition to making donations to them. One of the most prominent of these groups was viewed as controversial by most political parties, as it provided no transparency regarding its donors.⁴⁴

To enhance transparency and accountability in campaign finance, third-party campaigning should be regulated and subject to the same or similar rules on donations and spending that apply to political parties.

Substantial amounts were spent by both political parties and third-party actors on paid ads on social networks.⁴⁵ Whereas Meta provided data about paid ads on its platforms, Google and other platforms provided no such data for Norway.

⁴³ Article 6 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers' [Recommendation Rec\(2003\)4 on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns](#) states that "rules concerning donations to political parties, with the exception of those concerning tax deductibility referred to in Article 4, should also apply, as appropriate, to all entities which are related, directly or indirectly, to a political party or are otherwise under the control of a political party". Paragraph 219 of the [ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#) notes that the lack of regulation concerning the involvement of third parties in political activities can be problematic in terms of transparency in political finance.

⁴⁴ The political action group "Action for a Right-wing Election Victory" did not disclose information about its donors. As a result, most parties on the right declined its donations, with only the Progress Party accepting them. The group's representatives informed the ODIHR EET that, because some business donors were reluctant to make political contributions publicly, the group enabled them to donate anonymously. Following the amendment to the PPA outlawing anonymous donations to parties, the group could no longer contribute to the Progress Party after 1 July; however, it informed the ODIHR EET that it had donated some NOK 10,000,000 (approximately EUR 89,000) before the amendment took effect. The group continued to campaign independently thereafter, mainly through newspaper and radio advertisements supporting the Conservative, Progress, Liberal, and Christian Democrat parties.

⁴⁵ According to the [Meta ad library](#), the Labour Party was by far the highest spender on ads, spending NOK 2,697,752 (approx. EUR 230,000) in the 90 days prior to 2 September. Other big spenders among the parties included the Progress Party, spending NOK 1,881,084 (approx. EUR 160,000) over the same period, and the Conservative Party with NOK 1,140,166 (approx. EUR 97,000). Parties stepped up their spending notably towards the end of the campaign. The Liberal Party was one of the biggest spenders on advertisements on Meta, spending NOK 916,176 (approx. EUR 78,000) in the last 30 days of the campaign. Among third-party campaigners, in the 30 days until 2 September, the LO spent NOK 804,537 (approx. EUR 68,400) on ads; another union, the Norwegian Union of Municipal and General Employment, spent NOK 440,251 (approx. EUR 37,400) over the same period; the right-leaning influencer Sindre Wiig Nordby spent NOK 543,735 (approx. EUR 46,200); and the political action group "Joint Action for Value Creation and Private Norwegian Ownership" spent NOK 342,334 (approx. EUR 29,100).

B. DISCLOSURE AND OVERSIGHT

Parties are obliged to submit audited annual financial reports, within five months of the end of each year. The annual reports are published; however, the auditors' reports are not disclosed.⁴⁶ The published reports include the total amounts of income and expenditure by relevant categories, and not the individual donations and expenses. The annual reports must also disclose the identity of donors whose contributions exceed a set threshold.⁴⁷ Payments in kind, at market value, must be included in the accounts. In addition, in an election year, parties must disclose all donations of over NOK 10,000 (approx. EUR 850) within four weeks, and no later than the last Friday before election day.⁴⁸ However, there is no provision for financial reporting on election campaign income and expenditure at the time of elections, neither before nor soon after election day, which is not in line with electoral good practice.⁴⁹

To enhance the transparency and oversight of campaign finance, the law should require disclosure of the income and expenditure shortly prior to and after election day as well as the auditors' reports together with the annual party reports.

The Political Parties Act Committee (PPAC), an independent body administratively subordinate to the MLGRD, is responsible for overseeing compliance with the rules concerning campaign finance.⁵⁰ It monitors whether parties disclose received donations within the legally prescribed deadline of four weeks from receipt. The PPAC informed the ODIHR EET that, before election day, it had issued 13 formal warnings to political parties, mostly to local party organisations, and had sanctioned one party on two separate occasions.⁵¹ It also noted that it expected to issue a considerably higher number of formal warnings and possible sanctions related to the pre-election period in the months following the election.⁵² At odds with a prior ODIHR recommendation, the members of the PPAC are nominated by political parties, and may, at the same time, hold elected positions and run as candidates, which creates a potential for a conflict of interest.⁵³ An independent Party Audit Committee, also under the MLGRD, conducts checks on randomly selected annual party finance reports submitted by party organisations.⁵⁴

⁴⁶ See the [Party Financing website](#).

⁴⁷ The threshold for disclosure of donations was NOK 35,000 (approx. EUR 3,000) for donations to the national party organisation, cumulatively, from the start of the year, NOK 23,000 (approx. EUR 2,000) to county organisations, and NOK 12,000 (approx. EUR 1,000) to municipal organisations.

⁴⁸ The information on donations is posted in an [online repository](#).

⁴⁹ Annual reports for years that coincide with an election year will reveal campaign finance data when published no later than 1 June of the following year. Article 7(3) of the 2003 [UN Convention against Corruption](#) (UNCAC) obliges states to make efforts to improve transparency in election and political party financing. Paragraph 261 of the 2020 [ODIHR and Venice Commission's Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#) recommends that before an election campaign, parties should provide initial reports, including bank account information and identifying the persons accountable for campaign finance; preliminary reports providing information on income and expenditure should be provided to oversight bodies and the public before election day; and final reports after the election and certification of results should provide a complete and comprehensive account of all campaign financing.

⁵⁰ The PPAC comprises six members, [appointed](#) by the government for six years, and includes three experienced former politicians and three professional members including the chairperson. The law does not specify any further appointment criteria. The law explicitly states that the government may not interfere in its individual decisions.

⁵¹ The PPAC sanctioned the Red Party by withholding part of their annual public funding for non-compliance with the requirement to report cases when donations from a single donor had passed the NOK 10,000 threshold.

⁵² According to information published on the [PPAC website](#), in 2025, the PPAC made 66 decisions, mainly formal warnings, regarding election year donation reporting, as well as 10 decisions after Party Audit Committee revisions, and one decision regarding the obligation to be audited.

⁵³ As per established practice, the Storting appoints former politicians to such positions. Paragraph 156 of the [ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Political Party Regulation](#) recommends that the legislation should clearly state the required qualifications and nomination procedures if partisan representatives are included on election management bodies.

⁵⁴ The Party Audit Committee comprises two auditors from a firm of auditors appointed for this purpose, currently from Price Waterhouse Coopers. Every second year, the committee checks the accounts of 1 per cent of party organisations, which in practice includes both central and local party branches.

Consideration could be given to reviewing the composition of the Political Parties Act Committee to ensure its impartiality and defining an explicit oversight mandate throughout the campaign finance reporting period.

VIII. PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

There are over 600,000 persons with disabilities in Norway, representing 17 per cent of the total population.⁵⁵ The Constitution stipulates that “no human being must be subject to unfair or disproportionate differential treatment”. Norway ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2013, but it has not ratified the Optional Protocol.⁵⁶ A week before election day, the government presented a proposal to incorporate the CRPD into the Human Rights Act to be considered by parliament after these elections.⁵⁷ The primary legislation guaranteeing equal treatment to persons with disabilities is the 2018 Equality and Anti-discrimination Act.⁵⁸ The Act applies to all areas of society and prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on various grounds, including gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, and disability. Public and private entities open to the public have a statutory duty to ensure universal design, and failure to do so is considered discrimination unless it would impose an undue burden on the duty bearer.⁵⁹

Since the 2003 reform of the Election Act, all persons with disabilities, irrespective of their legal capacity, have had the right to vote and to stand as candidates. In 2022, constitutional provisions allowing the disenfranchisement of legally incapacitated persons were repealed, in line with international standards (see also the *Voter Registration* section). The 2023 Election Act introduced a free choice of assistance and stricter universal design requirements for polling stations.

Most ODIHR EET interlocutors from civil society organisations expressed satisfaction with their involvement in the consultations on the new Election Act, as well as with the resulting legislation, which they considered a solid basis for independent voting by persons with disabilities. However, several representatives of disability organisations continue to advocate for accessible internet voting, as an additional voting channel, as it is considered highly conducive to independent voting.

B. ACCESSIBILITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS

In addition to enhancing the right of persons with disabilities to vote independently, the new Election Act ensures free choice of assistance for such voters, in line with international obligations.⁶⁰ The legislation stipulates that voter with disabilities, at their request, may be assisted either by a person of their choice or by an election official, both of whom are bound by confidentiality. The election official must inform the voter’s assistant of their duty of secrecy. In previous elections, election officials were

⁵⁵ See Statistics Norway [Labour Force survey in 2020](#).

⁵⁶ The Optional Protocol complements the Convention by introducing a mechanism that allows individuals and groups to file complaints with the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

⁵⁷ The [proposal](#) presented on August 29 would make the CRPD prevailing over Norwegian legislation.

⁵⁸ See the 2018 [Equality and Anti-discrimination Act](#).

⁵⁹ Unlike other State Parties to the CRPD, in Norway, the law uses the term of universal design, instead of accessibility, and defines universal design as “designing or accommodating the main solution with respect to the physical conditions, such that the general functions of the undertaking can be used by as many people as possible, regardless of disability”.

⁶⁰ Article 29 of the CRPD stipulates that persons with disabilities, at their request, must be allowed assistance in voting by a person of their own choice.

required to assist voters with disabilities or to be present when assistance was provided by a third person, which was at odds with the CRPD and was widely criticised by the disability community.

The new Election Act mandates stricter accessibility requirements. Polling stations must be universally designed, and all voters must be able to enter them unassisted. However, the act permits exceptions to the accessibility obligation for “special reasons”, which are not defined, leaving room for interpretation.⁶¹ This exception does not apply to the obligation to ensure that the voter can enter the polling stations unassisted. However, a concern persists that the MECs could overuse this exception or incorrectly assess the accessibility of polling stations, thereby undermining the purpose of introducing stricter requirements in the first place. MECs are required to inform the Directorate whether they have used this exception. Information on lack of accessibility is included in the public register of polling stations, together with other practical information for voters, in line with good practice on providing relevant information to voters with disabilities.⁶²

According to data provided to the ODIHR EET by the Directorate, municipalities reported that 94 out of 912 polling stations used in advance voting, and 170 out of 1,638 polling stations used on election day were not fully accessible, representing in both cases over 10 per cent of all polling stations. This was an issue highlighted by disability organisations.⁶³ Most of the affected polling stations were located in schools and other municipal buildings which are also bound by the accessibility obligations of the Equality and Anti-discrimination Act.⁶⁴

To ensure that all polling stations are accessible for persons with disabilities, as envisaged by the Election Act and in line with the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act, the provision allowing exceptions to accessibility requirements for “special reasons” should be abolished.

The MLGRD Regulation supplementing the Election Act sets additional accessibility requirements for polling stations, voting booths, and ballot papers. It incorporates provisions of the Building Regulations on entrances, ramps, internal paths, signage, doors, and rooms of polling stations, among others.⁶⁵ While this comprehensive set of measurable requirements aims to provide voters with disabilities with greater certainty regarding accessibility, some MECs reported challenges in implementation due to infrastructural capacity in some areas.

The Regulation specifies the height of tables where ballots are stamped and cast and requires that at least one in ten voting booths in each polling station be accessible. Accessible booths are designed for lower reach, suitable, among others, for voters using wheelchairs, and party ballots are placed on alphabetically ordered shelves labelled in Braille and print to facilitate findability and accessibility for blind voters. Election officials were instructed to ensure that ballot papers remained correctly arranged, particularly before a blind voter used an accessible booth. All ODIHR EET interlocutors assessed the accessible booth design positively, though noted that their ratio was higher in advance polling stations than on election day due to cost.

⁶¹ The Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act allows an exception to the duty of universal design if compliance would impose a disproportionate burden on the duty bearer and establishes criteria to guide the assessment of such cases. The preparatory work of the Election Act and the [Guide](#) on universal design mention examples of such special reasons including cases when “it is not possible or it is disproportionately expensive to ensure that voters can enter the premises without assistance”.

⁶² The [Register of polling stations](#) informs voters about the location, opening hours, parking and transport facilities and whether the polling station is not accessible.

⁶³ See the [Norwegian Association of Disabled \(NHF\) information about inaccessible polling stations](#), and the [Ministry’s response](#).

⁶⁴ Most accessibility barriers are inside the buildings; for instance, when a key is necessary to use a lift.

⁶⁵ See the [Election Regulation](#) which refers to the [2017 Buildings Regulation](#) to establish technical accessibility requirements for the built environment of polling stations. It provides, for example, that entrance doors must have width of at least 1.16 m and a height clearance of at least 2.0 m.

The Regulation also defines two types of ballots. District-specific ballots containing full candidate lists for each party are placed on shelves inside the voting booths. In addition, a nationwide ballot lists all registered parties that received at least 5,000 votes during the previous parliamentary elections, and the parties registered after the previous parliamentary elections.⁶⁶ The nationwide ballots contain the information in print and in Braille, representing a good practice of universal design. These ballots are used for voting abroad, advance voting, and out-of-municipality voting, and the same can be requested by blind voters at all advance-voting polling stations. Voters vote by marking a listed party or handwriting the name of a district-specific party. While it is possible for blind voters to autonomously mark the nationwide ballot, this does not fully enable to vote independently, as handwriting a party name is not possible for such voters. Moreover, municipalities could decide whether or not to make the nationwide Braille ballots available also on election day, which led to uneven accessibility practices across the country.⁶⁷ While offering Braille ballots on election day provides an additional accessibility option alongside the accessible voting booths, the use of both district-specific and nationwide ballots may compromise vote secrecy, particularly in small municipalities, since the selection of the nationwide ballot to mark a vote, otherwise seldomly used on election day, would likely indicate a blind voter.

Consideration should be given to harmonising practices concerning the use of the Braille ballot paper, in order to ensure the right of blind voters to vote independently and in secret.

The Regulation also prescribes specific design features to ensure ballot legibility, such as a 20-point Arial font for party names on district-specific ballot papers. Several ODIHR EET interlocutors from civil society organisations noted that ballot accessibility and ease of use could be further enhanced through tactile cues to help voters orient the ballot when folding it, or by including a QR code on district-specific ballots linking to an accessible webpage with ballot information. Contrary to international good practice, ballots do not feature visual cues, i.e., party logos, which could assist voters with intellectual disabilities, limited literacy, dyslexia, or non-native language proficiency to distinguish and identify the ballot of their choice.⁶⁸

Consideration should be given to additional design characteristics of the ballot papers to be accessible and easy to understand and use, in line with international standards and practices, such as the addition of political party logos.

Positively, the Ministry and the Directorate of Elections published a guide and practical checklist on the universal design of polling stations and voting equipment to assist municipalities and promote good practices.⁶⁹ The Guide elaborates on requirements in the Election Act and Regulation and calls on Election Commissions to consult councils of persons with disabilities and older people on the selection and accessibility of polling stations. It also recommends measures such as providing magnifying glasses and additional lighting. Municipalities are not required to offer adapted transport to polling stations, which some ODIHR EET interlocutors from disability organisations viewed as a potential accessibility barrier.

⁶⁶ This list does not contain any candidate names.

⁶⁷ For example, they were not available in Oslo, while they were available in Tromsø.

⁶⁸ The 1996 UN Human Rights Committee's CCPR [General Comment No. 25](#) paragraph 12 recommends positive measures to overcome specific difficulties, such as illiteracy and language barriers, and that "specific methods, such as photographs and symbols, should be adopted to ensure that illiterate voters have adequate information on which to base their choice."

⁶⁹ See [Guide on universal design to polling stations and voting equipment](#), and [checklist](#). The Checklist lists the actions for the municipality in each stage of the preparation, distinguishing them by legal requirements, good practices and practical tips.

Information to voters is provided electronically and includes information relevant to voters with disabilities.⁷⁰ However, ODIHR EET interlocutors noted that the growing reliance on digital communication in the electoral process and campaign risks excluding some 12 per cent of the population with limited digital access or skills, primarily older persons, those with lower education, or living in less central areas.⁷¹ While the official website of the Directorate of Elections includes plain-language content, a sign-language video, and information in several languages, it lacks easy-to-read material useful for persons with intellectual disabilities and is only partially compliant with web accessibility standards, which have not yet been updated to the latest version in Norway's Regulation on Universal Design of ICT Solutions.⁷² The Directorate cooperated with organisations of persons with disabilities and funded initiatives to reach various groups of voters, including persons with disabilities.⁷³

Efforts should be made to improve the accessibility of information about the electoral process in line with the latest international digital accessibility standards, and to ensure that such information is also available in alternative formats, such as easy-to-read format, for persons with disabilities.

Voters are provided with a wide range of voting methods, including early voting, advance voting and the possibility of voting outside the polling station if they are unable to enter while preserving secrecy. In addition, during the advance voting period, temporary mobile polling stations are set in residential facilities and hospitals while mobile voting is also possible in the residents' rooms.⁷⁴ Homebound voting is available upon request, without any certificate required. Overall, these arrangements provide for an effective set of possibilities to exercise the right to vote.

C. ELECTION CAMPAIGN, MEDIA AND REPRESENTATION

While political parties fall under the Equality and Anti-discrimination Law, accessibility compliance of campaign meetings, and materials or communications varies. While most party conventions and headquarters ensure a certain level of accessibility, no party provided information about their manifestos in easy-to-read format and few provide information in sign language, including when campaigning on social media. Some parties have internal networks across the country of members with disabilities.⁷⁵ While most political parties promote gender equality and representation of youth and ethnic minorities, there is limited political representation of persons with disabilities at the national level.

The Broadcasting Act requires the public broadcaster NRK and commercial broadcasters with more than five per cent of TV viewers to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities, including through subtitles, sign language interpretation, audio description, and spoken subtitles.⁷⁶ NRK provides all election-related content with subtitles and sign language interpretation through broadcasted TV and accessible digital platforms, enabling persons with disabilities to acquire information about the elections and make informed voting choices. The NRK holds regular consultations with disability organisations,

⁷⁰ Voters which have not confirmed their digital contact in the last 18 months will receive the information by post. Voter information includes, among others, the municipality in which the voter is registered to vote, as well as the possibility of advance and home voting, and the right to free assistance. It does not include the possibility of requesting the Braille ballot at the polling station.

⁷¹ See the [2021 report](#) from the Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills.

⁷² See the [accessibility statement](#) for the website valg.no. The website partially complies with the [W3C Web Content Accessibility Guidelines \(WCAG\) 2.1](#), levels A and AA, required by the [Regulation on Universal Design of ICT solutions](#), last amended in 2023. Currently, there is a newer version of this international standard: [WCAG 2.2](#).

⁷³ The Braille ballot papers are printed by the Norwegian Association of the Blind. See the [list of communication initiatives](#) funded by the Directorate of Elections.

⁷⁴ The NEC received a complaint lodged by the daughter of a woman with dementia residing in a nursing home who voted assisted by election officials in her room before her son arrived to assist her. The NEC unanimously decided to reject the complaint that no undue influence took place. See [NEC decision 23/2025](#).

⁷⁵ Including the Liberals, Labour, and Conservatives.

⁷⁶ See the [Broadcasting Act](#) and [the Regulation on universal design of ICT solutions](#).

including before and after elections, with the participation of editors responsible for the election coverage.⁷⁷ ODIHR EET interlocutors from disability organisations noted that smaller media outlets continue to present accessibility barriers.

Disability-related topics were largely absent from the campaign.⁷⁸ The government's proposal to incorporate the CRPD into the Human Rights Act, a long-standing demand of the disability community, received very limited media coverage. Nonetheless, disability organisations actively participated in the public debate, encouraging the participation of persons with disabilities in the electoral process.⁷⁹

Most ODIHR EET interlocutors noted the absence of MPs with disabilities in the outgoing parliament and the small number of candidates with disabilities, particularly in electable positions, attributing this to accessibility and attitudinal barriers, as well as to limited support provided by public authorities.⁸⁰ Due to the limited hours of assistance provided by municipalities under the user-controlled personal assistance (BPA) scheme, persons with disabilities often prioritise other aspects of life over active political participation, limiting their ability to campaign on an equal footing with other candidates.⁸¹ The municipalities across the country offer varying degrees of support to persons with disabilities, impacting their ability to hold office effectively, particularly in unpaid local positions.⁸²

As enshrined in Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, public authorities should consider comprehensive measures, including through budgetary decisions, to enhance the participation of persons with disabilities in political life, including standing for election, holding office, and performing public functions at both local and central levels.

IX. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The new Election Act enhanced the regulation of election dispute resolution, thus largely addressing a number of prior ODIHR recommendations.⁸³ Under the new Act, the National Election Committee (NEC) is mandated with election dispute resolution. The NEC is composed of five members, with the chair and two other members being judges, while two members

⁷⁷ Representatives of different disability groups gave feedback on the NRK Voting Advice Application [Valgomat](#) before it was launched.

⁷⁸ Some media led by or focused on persons with disabilities published election-related information, including the [TV BRA](#) (TV God) in cooperation with the commercial channel TV2 and featuring reporters with intellectual disabilities, [Klar Tale](#) (Clear Voice), an easy-to-read newspaper, and [Handikapnytt](#), a digital media covering disability-related news.

⁷⁹ Organisations of persons with disabilities participated in the Arendal Week festival, a key political event in August, organised debates with political parties and raised awareness about disability-related issues during the election campaign. See, for example, [Disabled Youth Norway ranking of political parties' manifestos](#), or the [Norwegian Association of the Deaf comparison of political parties](#).

⁸⁰ The leader of the Conservative Party disclosed having dyslexia.

⁸¹ The user-controlled personal assistance scheme ([BPA](#) – Brukerstyrt personlig assistanse) is a welfare service providing persons with disabilities with a set number of assistance hours that can be used flexibly, rather than traditional home care offered at fixed times.

⁸² In the [2019 Concluding Observations](#) on the initial report of Norway, the CRPD Committee was “concerned about the low level of representation and participation of persons with disabilities in elections and their low representation in elected and appointed bodies”, and recommended Norway to “promote the participation of persons with disabilities, including women with disabilities, in political life and public decision-making with measurable targets and indicators”.

⁸³ The Act regulates, inter alia, who has the right to file a complaint, which decisions and acts may be appealed, which is the competent adjudicating body, deadlines and process for review, requirements on the content of appeals. See the 2010 [ODIHR and Venice Commission Opinion on the electoral legislation of Norway](#).

are former MPs.⁸⁴ The NEC is appointed by the parliament for a four-year mandate starting from 1 January of the second year following the elections. Members and substitute members may be reappointed for one more term and may be dismissed by the parliament with a two-thirds majority vote for serious violations of their duties, which is not defined by law.⁸⁵ The NEC Secretariat is formed by employees of the MLGRD, which raises concerns about its capacity to perform its work independently and may also lead to a potential conflict of interest.⁸⁶

Consideration could be given to further enhancing the role of the National Election Committee by resourcing it to function independently, to ensure effective election dispute resolution.

The Act grants the NEC discretionary power to choose whether to review complaints based only on written submissions, with oral hearings, *in camera*, or with a public hearing.⁸⁷ The NEC may invalidate election results if violations or errors could have affected the outcome; otherwise, it may only acknowledge the violation and instruct electoral bodies to correct the errors. The NEC may reject complaints as inadmissible if the conditions for review are not met or if complaints on the same grounds have already been examined. NEC decisions are final and not subject to further appeal. The NEC does not hold regular sessions and has no explicit deadline for reviewing complaints, at odds with international good practice for elections, but it is required by law to do so before the parliament decides on the validity of the elections.⁸⁸ If complaints are pending review when the new parliament convenes, the mandate of the new MPs is approved only provisionally.⁸⁹ The NEC publishes information on complaints, which provides transparency.

Consideration should be given to prescribing an expedited deadline for the review of complaints, to ensure effective and timely election dispute resolution. Complainants should be provided an opportunity for public hearings, in line with international good practices.

Under the new Act, the newly elected parliament retains the authority to decide on the validity of elections and may correct errors if necessary. Elections are declared invalid, in one or more municipalities, if a violation could have affected the distribution of seats.⁹⁰ In line with prior ODIHR recommendations, the 2023 Act stipulates that the parliament's decision on the validity of elections may be challenged before the Supreme Court.

Voters may file complaints concerning violations of the law, the allocation of seats to electoral districts, as well as the polling station and district level election results within the district where they are registered.⁹¹ Advance voters may file complaints regarding advance voting in the municipality where they voted. Only contestants may file complaints concerning the allocation of compensatory seats to

⁸⁴ By law, members of the parliament and the government, state secretaries, political advisers, county and municipal councils cannot be appointed as NEC members. Pursuant to a request of the parliament, the Association of Judges conducted an open call for the recruitment of judges for NEC positions. The two non-judicial members are nominated by the Labour and Conservative Parties while the two substitute members by the Centre Party and Progress Party.

⁸⁵ Under the old Election Act, the NEC was appointed by the King-in-Council and was responsible for the award of compensatory seats.

⁸⁶ The NEC members who are judges are not exempt from the regular duties at the courts.

⁸⁷ Section 3.3.h. of the 2002 Venice Commission [Code of Good Practice](#) in electoral matters states that the applicant's right to a hearing involving both parties must be protected.

⁸⁸ Section 3.3.g. of the [Code of Good Practice](#) states: Time-limits for lodging and deciding appeals must be short (three to five days for each at first instance).

⁸⁹ . The new Parliament officially convened on 11 October.

⁹⁰ Section 15-1 refers to breach of the Constitution, election-related acts regulations and sections 151, 152, 153 and 154 of the Criminal Code.

⁹¹ Criminal offences including undue influence and threats on voters, vote buying and selling, multiple and proxy voting, incorrect counting and distorting the counting results fall under the purview of the prosecutor.

parties, districts, and individual candidates, as well as the parliament's decision on the validity of elections.

Prior to the elections, the NEC reviewed 68 complaints.⁹² Of these, 17 were filed by one party whose lists were rejected in all districts due to an insufficient number of signatures and failure to meet the submission deadline because of technical errors.⁹³ Other complaints concerned various issues.⁹⁴ The NEC rejected the vast majority of complaints on their merits while it allowed one party to register its list.⁹⁵ In absence of legal requirements and at odds with international good practice, the NEC did not review these complaints in public hearings. However, information on the complaints and decisions was published promptly on the NEC website and decisions were sound and well-reasoned. Overall, the election-dispute resolution was timely and effective.

X. ELECTION DAY

In line with ODIHR's methodology for election expert teams, the team members visited a limited number of polling stations on election day and did not carry out systematic or comprehensive observation of the voting, counting and tabulation processes. Election day was calm, and where observed well-organized and efficiently administered, reflecting a high level of public confidence in the electoral process. Early voting was available from 1 July to 8 August at the municipality offices and in advance from 11 August until 5 September at any advance polling station nationwide.⁹⁶ On election day, voters could cast their ballots in a polling station within their municipality of residence, and in some municipalities, also on 7 September. Voters abroad could vote in person at the diplomatic missions or other designated voting centres from 1 July to 29 August, or by post, provided that the postal ballots were sent from abroad and received by 17:00 on the day after election day. Ballots cast outside the municipality were forwarded to the home MEC for counting. In anticipation of increased advance voting, the number of advance polling stations was expanded, while the number of election day polling stations was reduced.

Voters were required to present a photo ID to cast a ballot, as clarified by recent amendments and in line with a prior ODIHR recommendation. Before voting, each voter was identified and marked in the electronic voter register, accessible online at almost all polling stations via the EVA system, thus helping to prevent multiple voting.⁹⁷

The ballot papers were available in piles, in alphabetical order, in shelves inside the voting booths. While this practice does not fully safeguard against the misplacement of ballots and potential confusion of voters, the election staff was instructed to verify regularly that ballots were fully available and placed correctly. Ballots cast during advance voting were placed in sealed bags with serial numbers and transferred to the MEC after closing each day. Advance ballots were counted at the MECs prior to

⁹² See the [information on complaints filed to the NEC](#).

⁹³ The lists submitted by the party Alliance-Alternative for Norway were rejected in all districts on grounds of insufficient signatures or number of candidates, or missing candidates' personal information. The Alliance's complaint that the legal requirement of voters' signatures is in violation of the Constitution was also rejected. The list submitted by the Norwegian Democrats was rejected in a district where two lists with the same party name were submitted. A complaint filed against the registration of a Labour party list was rejected.

⁹⁴ Other complaints pertained to advance voting, incorrect voter information, the use of ballot scanners, counting and the overall conduct of the election.

⁹⁵ The Industry and Entrepreneur Party had their list rejected in the Telemark district as the party failed to submit it on time due to technical errors. The decision was overturned by NEC and it was allowed to run.

⁹⁶ Polling stations for advance voting were established in shopping centres, libraries, as well as temporary structures set up on main streets and squares etc.

⁹⁷ The ODIHR EET was informed that some municipalities used voter lists in paper format.

election day, both manually and by scanners, and the results were uploaded to the EVA system but not made public.

The new Election Act prescribes a mandatory manual count of ballots cast on election day at the polling station, whereas previously MECs decided whether to conduct the count at the polling station.⁹⁸ A second count must also be carried out by the MECs, which may choose to use scanners or conduct a manual recount. The results are verified against the first count and submitted through the EVA system. DECAs conducted a third count, using scanners, of all municipalities within their territory before establishing the results. The redundant vote-counts ensured the integrity and transparency of the election results.

XI. RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations as contained throughout the text are offered with a view to further enhance the conduct of elections in Norway and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. These recommendations should be read in conjunction with past ODIHR recommendations that have not yet been addressed. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of Norway to further improve the electoral process and to address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports.⁹⁹

1. To ensure equal suffrage, election authorities should further review whether the current system is duly proportionate to the principle of equality. In line with international good practice, the review should aim to ensure that the seat-allocation principles offer stronger protection of the equality of the vote while maintaining adequate representation of sparsely populated regions.
2. To safeguard the impartiality of the election administration, the law should be amended to prohibit candidates from serving as members of election commissions at any level.
3. To strengthen personal data safeguards, the use of official voter-register data could be legally confined to voter list verification, coupled with an obligation to irreversibly delete all copies within a narrowly defined period after election day.
4. Consideration should be given to regulating online campaigns with the aim to ensure equality of opportunity for contestants and the protecting the ability of voters to make an informed choice.
5. To maintain a level playing field and limit the potential for individuals or groups to gain undue political influence, consideration should be given to establishing limits on private donations and campaign expenditures.
6. To enhance transparency and accountability in campaign finance, third-party campaigning should be regulated and subject to the same or similar rules on donations and spending that apply to political parties.

⁹⁸ In 2017, a week prior election day, the MLGM issued a regulation prescribing a hand count of all ballots, reportedly aiming to dismiss concerns about counting with scanners and to enhance confidence in the electoral process.

⁹⁹ In paragraph 25 of the [1999 OSCE Istanbul Document](#), OSCE participating States committed themselves “to follow up promptly the ODIHR’s election assessment and recommendations”. The follow-up of prior recommendations is assessed by the ODIHR EET as follows: recommendation 3, 4 and 5 from the final report on the [2017 parliamentary elections](#) are fully implemented and recommendations 1, 2 and 8 are partially implemented. See also the [ODIHR electoral recommendations database](#).

7. To enhance the transparency and oversight of campaign finance, the law should require disclosure of the income and expenditure shortly prior to and after election day as well as the auditors' reports together with the annual party reports.
8. Consideration could be given to reviewing the composition of the Political Parties Act Committee to ensure its impartiality and defining an explicit oversight mandate throughout the campaign finance reporting period.
9. To ensure that all polling stations are accessible for persons with disabilities, as envisaged by the Election Act and in line with the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act, the provision allowing exceptions to accessibility requirements for "special reasons" should be abolished.
10. Consideration should be given to harmonising practices concerning the use of the Braille ballot paper, in order to ensure the right of blind voters to vote independently and in secret.
11. Consideration should be given to additional design characteristics of the ballot papers to be accessible and easy to understand and use, in line with international standards and practices, such as the addition of political party logos.
12. Efforts should be made to improve the accessibility of information about the electoral process in line with the latest international digital accessibility standards, and to ensure that such information is also available in alternative formats, such as easy-to-read format, for persons with disabilities.
13. As enshrined in Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, public authorities should consider comprehensive measures, including through budgetary decisions, to enhance the participation of persons with disabilities in political life, including standing for election, holding office, and performing public functions at both local and central levels.
14. Consideration could be given to further enhancing the role of the National Election Committee by resourcing it to function independently, to ensure effective election dispute resolution.
15. Consideration should be given to prescribing an expedited deadline for the review of complaints, to ensure effective and timely election dispute resolution. Complainants should be provided an opportunity for public hearings, in line with international good practices.

ANNEX: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS

Party	Votes	percentage	Seats	Compensatory Seats
Labour Party	902,296	28.0	53	0
Progress Party	767,903	23.8	47	0
Conservative Party	471,602	14.6	24	1
Socialist Left Party	181,192	5.6	9	4
Centre Party	179,994	5.6	9	1
Red Party	171,342	5.3	9	5
Green Party	152,782	4.7	8	4
Christian Democrat Party	135,230	4.2	7	4
Liberal Party	118,941	3.7	3	0
Pensioners Party	26,839	0.8	0	0
Norwegian Democrats	23,260	0.7	0	0
Generation Party	21,589	0.7	0	0
Industry and Commerce Party	18,771	0.6	0	0
Conservative	15,507	0.5	0	0
Peace and Justice (FOR)	9,430	0.3	0	0
The Centre Party (Sentrum)	5,701	0.2	0	0
The DNI Party	5,280	0.2	0	0
Welfare and Innovation Party	4,932	0.2	0	0
Patient focus	4,174	0.1	0	0
SAVE Ulleval Hospital	2,361	0.1	0	0
The Loneliness Party	712	0.0	0	0
Communist Party of Norway	50	0.0	0	0

Registered voters	4,059,218
Votes cast	3,246,318
Votes cast for parties	3,219,888
Blank Ballots	26,430
Turnout (percentage)	80.0
Invalid votes	5,510

ABOUT ODIHR

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is OSCE's principal institution to assist participating States "to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and (...) to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society" (1992 Helsinki Summit Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human dimension.

ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland) was created as the Office for Free Elections at the 1990 Paris Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the name of the Office was changed to reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and democratization. Today it employs over 150 staff.

ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of **election observation**. Every year, it co-ordinates and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers to assess whether elections in the OSCE region are conducted in line with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections and with national legislation. Its unique methodology provides an in-depth insight into the electoral process in its entirety. Through assistance projects, ODIHR helps participating States to improve their electoral framework.

The Office's **democratization** activities include: rule of law, legislative support, democratic governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender equality. ODIHR implements a number of targeted assistance programmes annually, seeking to develop democratic structures.

ODIHR also assists participating States' in fulfilling their obligations to promote and protect **human rights and fundamental freedoms** consistent with OSCE human dimension commitments. This is achieved by working with a variety of partners to foster collaboration, build capacity and provide expertise in thematic areas, including human rights in the fight against terrorism, enhancing the human rights protection of trafficked people, human rights education and training, human rights monitoring and reporting, and women's human rights and security.

Within the field of **tolerance** and **non-discrimination**, ODIHR provides support to the participating States in strengthening their response to hate crimes and incidents of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance. ODIHR's activities related to tolerance and non-discrimination are focused on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring, reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding.

ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on **Roma and Sinti**. It promotes capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities, and encourages the participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making bodies.

All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations.

More information is available on the ODIHR website (www.osce.org/odihr).